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The present study entitled "Mohamaad Reza Shah's 
Policies Towards the Gulf During the 1970s" has attempted 
to analyse the Iran's policy towards the Gulf during the 
period 1970's. The selection of the topic as well as the 
period of 1970's is considered very Important both for 
the Iran and the Gulf region as a whole in order to 
understand the long continuing turmoil and how far the 
monarchy of Iran was successful in achieving the various 
goals and objectives during such a critical period, 
i.e., rivalry with the major super powers and regional 
hostalities with most of the countries of the Gulf region. 
Hence, the basic objective of the Shah's policy was to 
achieve the regional super power or greater power in order 
to inlfuence the big super powers so that the Gulf 
countries as a whole may have the minimum dependency, 
both political and economic, over the big superpowers. 
It has already been traced out that Iran never wanted to 
grab the territory of any of the neighbouring countries 
and remain hostile with any of the Arab countries, 
(2) 
therefore, Iran explained it for a number of times that 
its policies and attitude is always to remain as a "big 
brother" and safeguard the interests of the Arab 
countries. 
Ill view of these objectives the Shah of Iran 
displayed his policies both at national, regional and 
inter-regional level in the Interests of the country of 
Iran as well as for the Interests of the Arab countries as 
a whole. Some of his policies plans and programmes were 
misunderstood even in Iran as well as in most of the 
regional (Gulf) countries and also at international level. 
As it has been stated in "The Hindu" Friday, May 21, 1993, 
p.7 that "Iran has always been a key to the stability in 
the region". Iranian Foreign Minister All Akbar Velayati 
told the German Journalists in a interview this month that 
"We are not encouraging conflicts but rather trying to 
defense crises and, where possible to mediate". 
In this regard the monograph entitled 'Mohammad 
Reza Shah's Policies towards the Gulf During the 1970's 
has been divided into seven chapters to analyse the 
various policies and its implications. The chapter first 
deals with historical and political background of Iran in 
view of the fact that it is not possible to understand 
the present without understanding the past. It is also 
(3) 
evident from the analysis of fifties to seventies that the 
major thrust of the Shah's policies towards the Gulf was 
to play a dominant role in the Gulf. In order to achieve 
this objective Shah's regime was successful in 
establishing the relationship with the hostile 
neighbouring countries only to become stronger enough in 
international politics and to have an indirect influence 
on the Gulf region. It is obvious from the historical 
and existing policies that Shah maintained his policies 
throughout the period of his reign but the approaches to 
improve the situation differ with the change of time and 
administrative system. As some of the major events of 
national, regional and international level exercised their 
profound influence on Iran's foreign policy. Few factors 
Influence the Iran's foreign policy more profoundly than 
the structure of power in the International system such as 
Soviet American Cold War complicated the Implementation 
of Musaddiq's nationalization policy. Every major foreign 
policy objective and decision of Iran has its domestic 
counterpart. Political stability is the most persistent 
problem of political modernization that interacts with 
foreign policy objectives and actions. In spite of the 
spectacular achievements in economic development, the 
problems of identity, legitimacy, distribution, partici-
pation and penetration complicate Iran's quest for 
(4) 
optluJal freedom of action In the international system and 
especially in the Gulf region. No doubt it is true that 
the presence of great powers on Iranian territory placed 
serious limitations on Iran's freedom of action but it is 
also true that the foreign policy of no nation is 
completely free from both the internal and systematic 
restraints. But even though Iran managed to extract 
maximum assurances regarding its political independence 
and territorial integrity. However, Iran was successful 
and able to acquire American diplomatic, advisory, 
military and economic assistance at the time when it was 
possible that the United States might withdraw to its 
traditional Isolationism, hence It is a clear indication 
of the success of its power supremacy in the Gulf region. 
In the early 1960's, the strategy of independent 
national policy was not simply a pro-western posture. 
This strategy was adopted as a result of the combination 
of a variety of complex domestic and international 
factors. The major objectives of this strategy were to 
consolidate the regime's control over the polity and 
launch unprecedented measures of economic reforms as well 
as to explore the chances of cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, more Independent policy towards the United States, 
more active policy in the Persian Gulf. The normaliza-
tion of relations with the Soviet Union was primarily 
(5) 
economic as cooperation resulted in stabilization and 
expansion of trade relations with the Soviet Union. But 
during 1963-73 Iran continued to resist Soviet pressures. 
Similarly Iran's alignment with the United States was 
further evidenced by not only the magnitude of its 
purchase of American arms but also its ability to breach 
the traditional relunctance of the United States to 
provide Iran with sophisticated modern weapons. 
During the period 1963-73 Iran adopted an 
independent national strategy and achieved an assertive 
position in the Persian Gulf and neighbouring areas of the 
Middle East and South Asia, such as: 
(1) Protection of the regime from internal subver-
sive forces by Arab hostile states or groups or 
by Soviet proxy. 
(2) Preservation of free transit through the strait of 
Hormuz, the Gulf and the Shatt-al-Arab. 
(3) Protection of Iranian oil resources and facilities 
on shore and off against any deliberate or 
accidental disruptions. 
For this purpose Iran launched two-fold strategy: 
Strengthening its military capability with the help of the 
United States and Britain; and cultivating friends and 
allies, not only in the Gulf area but also in the Middle 
(6) 
East, South and South east Asia. Iran managed to 
cultivate In the Gulf area the friendship of all other 
Gulf states by economic, diplomatic and military means. 
Beyond the Gulf area it scrapped a decade enemlty with 
^gyp^> resumed diplomatic relations with Lebanon, settled 
historic dispute with Afghanistan, Committed its support 
to the integrity of Pakistan in the face of the baluchi 
separatist movement, extended its security to the Gulf of 
Oman and the Indian ocean and developed economic and 
diplomatic ties with China. It was all to counter balance 
to Indian and Soviet bids for influence in South Asia, 
the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. 
Throughout, most of the Iran's modern history, 
the person of the King has played the key role in the 
making of Iran's foreign policy especially during the 
period 1970's. The Shah's personal control of Iran's 
foreign policy after the downfall of the Mussaddlq 
government became supreme and unchallenged. In foreign 
policy even more than in domestic politics the Shah 
played the central role. His all pervasive personal role 
is evidenced in all major decisions, ranging from the oil 
agreement and his personal agreement with the oil 
companies in the year 1973. 
(7) 
Instead of the Gulf region as a whole, the Iran's 
policy with Iraq and Saudi Arabia has been separately 
discussed. Iraq always use to counter balance the 
Iranian move and propagating against the interest of Iran 
in view that Iran is a major threat in regional politics. 
A number of incidents have been cited in relation to 
cooperation either political or economic, while Saudi 
Arabia use to remain neutral as not disagreeing directly 
with Iran but use to take side of Iraqi stand. 
The emphasis on the following key issues and 
policy programmes initiated by Shah has been given major 
attention in the discussion, such as: (a) Shah policy 
towards internal and regional security and its impact on 
the Gulf region (b) failure of the domestic and regional 
policies (c) Shah's concept of regional cooperation after 
1973 with Gulf countries and surrounding hostile 
countries (d) Shah's attitude towards the subversive 
forces (e) Shah's policy to attain the dominant power in 
the Gulf through socio-economic and development programs 
as well as military objectives and programs at national 
and regional level. 
The major emphasis was on internal and Gulf 
security as during the period of 1970's the country was 
facing the danger of national integrity and security 
(8) 
problem; both political, social, religious and economic. 
The Iranian regime was worried and interested to find out 
the sources of the threat to its security from within 
the country and also from outside. Lastly, the situation 
became so worst that the government was running under 
martial law and ultimately the Shah had to leave the 
country. During the period 1975-76 the question of Gulf 
security was being largely discussed and various ways and 
means were discussed to resolve conflicts in the region 
and to keep the foreign powers out of the Gulf. The issue 
of military cooperation was the major focus and Iran 
offered a plan in the year 1976 for an unified army under 
the joint command which would be responsible for the 
defence of the member states and the Gulf waters. But 
Saudi Arabia resented the Shah's ambitions in the Gulf 
and his proclamation as the sole protector of the Gulf. 
But Iran never liked that any foreign power should enter 
the region and adopt the policy of the British. Because 
of this attitude Iran partially emerged as the regional 
dominant power, militarily, politically and even 
economically. It is evident from the military policy in 
the Gulf that its policy was probably designed to project 
an image of Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf and 
Shah said that we are the only country with economic and 
military sophistication necessary to offer the desirable 
protection in the area. 
(9) 
The Implementation of economic policy during the 
period 1971-75 was possible because of the phenomenal 
increases in the oil revenue and Shah's policies in the 
Gulf region were concentrated largely around the Iranian 
economic and military strength assuring that Iran will act 
as a powerful and influential country in the region. 
No doubt that Iran achieved the capacity to strengthen its 
bargaining power in its regional relations but in reality 
the Shah was not very much successful in a self-generating 
industrial and military power. As a result this move 
caused a serious tensions within his own country and in 
the Gulf region. The domestic political structure was 
misunderstood by the Shah regime and the basic objectives 
were not planned and coordinated properly. In order to 
make his country more stronger as compared to other Gulf-
countries he started massive imports of highly advanced 
capital goods such as arms, expertise, trained labour 
force in support of a rapid economic and military build 
up. His policies were only limited to the soio-politlcal 
reforms but socio-economic imbalances increased with 
glaring gap between rural and urban areas. 
The Shah's policies was concentrated to establish 
an extremely modern military establishment ultimately 
defence expenditure proved particularly costly to Iranian 
economic development. Even the military sector was not 
(10) 
very successful in considering the massive investments and 
till 1978 many of the Shah's defence programs was under 
serious problems and difficulties. Thus it is obvious 
that by the year 1977 the country was under the grip of 
numerous problems and largely the general economic and 
social situation became very critical. The mounting 
social and economic inequalities between the priviledged 
and wealthy minority and the unpriviledged poor majority 
created a situation of social and political unrest. No 
doubt the Shah tried his best to improve the situation in 
the sixth Five Year Development Plan (1978-83) which was 
considered a turning point in Iran's national development. 
But the Shah's policy later on failed to such an extent 
that even the economy of the country collapsed because the 
export of oil became nill. The economic crisis in the 
country caused a large number of Iranians to leave the 
country and by the end of 1978 the demand for the removal 
of the Shah started. 
Even the inter-and-intra regional cooperation 
policy of Shah to attain the regional supremacy could not 
become effective because in pursuing this goal it was 
either coherent and inconsistent. It is also largely in 
the interest of his own country, while the cooperation 
with the Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is related to 
have a high image among the surrounding countries as well 
(11) 
as to minimise the Impact of USSR In the Gulf region. 
It Is evident that Iran's attempt for regional 
supremacy started firstly with the strait of Hormuz 
because of Its high strategic location. Iran faced the 
threat from Arablsm, radicalism, Insurgency and the 
question of the security of the sea-lanes as the 
justification for its policies for achieving the greater 
power and tried her best to seek the international 
support for the same. Secondly the five year period 
(1970-75) was the most Important period in Irans foreign 
policy because it was during this period that it reached 
the peak of its political, economic and military 
ambitious, and all these helped Iran to achieve greater 
success in achieving the regional supremacy. Iran 
publicly proclaimed its legitimate claims as the dominant 
Gulf power and it was declared that Iran was strong 
en ough to deal with any trouble In the region. 
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CHAPTER - I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Historical Background ; 
Mohd Reza Shah's policy towards the Gulf pri-
marily a development following the British withdrawal from 
Aden and the announcement of the British decision to 
withdraw also from the Persian Gulf. But its roots can be 
found in Iranian history. Iran's foreign policy between 
the second World V/ar and the downfall of Mohammad 
Musaddlq's government in 1953 was dominated by concern with 
great powers. The preponderance of British military power 
in the Persian Gulf during this period, as in the century 
before, confined Iran's concern In the Gulf area primarily 
to the problems of Shatt-al-Arab and Bahrain. Between the 
second World War and the downfall of the Musaddiq govern-
ment, Iran quarreled once with the British over Bahrain 
and once with Iraq over the ancient Shatt-al-Arab 
problem. Iran demanded during the oil nationalization 
1. Ramzani, R.K., Foreign Policy of Iran, University 
Press of Virginia 1973, pp.247-66. 
crisis that nationalization laws be applied to the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company, but reassertion of Iran's ancient claim 
to Bahrain on this occasion did not involve any major 
dispute between Iran and Britain. In the same way the 
ancient problem of Shatt-al-Arab quietly troubled Iran's 
relations with Iraq but again it not acquire the 
dimensions of a crisis or a move toward settlement. 
After the downfall of the Musaddiq government and 
the Shah's rise to power Iran's attention began to turn 
increasingly toward the Middle East and the Persian Gulf 
area. The rise of the Shah's regime coincided with the 
beginning of the Egyptian revolution. The rise of Gamal 
Abd al-Nasir not only as the leader of the new Republic of 
Egypt but also as the symbol of Arab nationalism and 
unity, was watched with interest, if not concern in Iran. 
The Shah's decision to join the Baghdad Pact ran counter 
to the declared Egyptian crusade against the pact as a 
"Zionist Plot" and Nasir's policy of positive neutralism 
was countered by the Shah's positive nationalism. 
Iran's foreign policy in 1953-57 was not only in 
basic conflict with Egypt but also with that of another 
revolutionary Arab State, Syria. It may be recalled that 
Iran passed a new petroleum law in 1957 that encompassed 
not only Iranian oil resources on land but also offshore 
resources in the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, on November 
12, 1957, the Iranian Council of ministers in the presence 
of the Shah approved for submission to the Majlis a bill 
that clearly designed Bahrain as the fourteenth Iranian 
province on November 16, 1957. Syria denounced the Iranain 
move and a Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated 
categorically that Syria considered Bahrain as a part of the 
"Arab Nation" a view held by the Arab League since 1954. 
The Iranian foreign minister stated on December 8, 1957 
that Iran would take all relevant steps to convert oil 
2 
rich Bahrain into an Iranain Province. 
While the Shah's positive nationalism and the Arab 
nationalism of Egypt and Syria clashed in 1953-57 he 
tried to balance this with friendship with other Arab 
states. The Shah invited King Saud to visit Iran in 1955. 
This was the occasion for the Shah's first meeting with 
the King and paved the way for his own visit to Saudi 
Arabia later. The Shah's visit in March 1957 was viewed 
as an opportunity for him to press for the formation of a 
bloc of moderate, pro-western states. 
Another Arab state the Shah tried to be friend in 
the pursuit of a balance of power in the Middle East in 
2. Ramzani, R.K., Iran's Foreign Po1 icy, University 
Press of Virginia, 1975, p. 39^ 
1953-57 was Lebanon. The Shah's visit to Lebanon in 
December 1957 and his "amity talks" with President Chamoun 
were regarded by anti-Western elements, in the Arab World 
as part of a series of moves to draw Arab countries toward 
the Baghdad pact. The Iran's attempt at befriending 
Lebanon was the Shah's own desire to balance Lebanon as 
well as Saudi Arabia against Egypt and Syria. His 
interest in the pact and his own balance of power strategy 
in the Middle East were compatible but not identical . 
Focus on the Gulf-After the Iraqi Revolution : 
During the 1950s the single most important event 
was the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, which focused Iran's 
attention on the Persian Gulf. Iran's concern with the 
implication of the Iraqi revolution, however, was compli-
cated by a variety of other factors as well. It seemed 
that Iraq was now added to Egypt and Syria in the struggle 
for power in the Middle East. The former Iraqi regime, 
despite all the difficulties between Baghdad and Tehran 
had been an ally Iran in the Baghdad Pact, but the 
defection of Iraq was only a matter of time. The balance 
of power seemed to be tilting in favour of anti-western 
Arab States. Another fact that intensified Iran's concern 
with development in Iraq soon after the revolution was the 
toleration of communist elements by the Qasim regime. 
Moreover the Egyptian and Syrian conflict with the Shah's 
regime intensified after the Iraqi revolution. The first 
serious sign of this was the sudden rupture of diplomatic 
relations between Egypt and Iran in 1960. The rupture of 
diplomatic relations between Iran and Egypt was followed 
by increasing acrimony not only between the two countries 
but also with Syria as well. Egypt chose the Arab League 
as the Instrument of its policy in the Persian Gulf in 
1964-65. The Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms of Bahrain, Qatar, 
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Oman and others were solicited 
by the secretary general of the Arab League for 
cooperation with Egypt for the general welfare of the area 
and the Arab Nation. Arab aspirations in the Persian Gulf 
at the time went beyond the Arab interest in the trucial 
states of the Gulf, they affected Iran's own territory as 
well. Iran's richest province of Khuzistan was called 
'Arabistan' to emphasize the view that it was part of the 
Arab Nation. 
To counter the power as well as the perceived 
ambitious of the revolutionary Arab leaders in the Persian 
Gulf, Iran began an unprecedented campaign of be-
friending the Gulf States in the early 1960s. The pre-
Iraqi revolution attempts at befriending Saudi Arabia in 
the Gulf area were expanded to include others in the Gulf 
region. 
Diplomatic Maneuvers Before Britain's Departure : 
The ntlcipation of British withdrawal from Aden 
in 1967 and the subsequent British decision in 1968 to 
withdraw military forces also from the area had a profound 
effect upon Iran's foreign policy in general and its 
Persian Gulf policy in particular. By 1967 Iran's 
experience in the Middle East had helped to clarify some-
what its objectives in the Persian Gulf. The pattern of 
conflict with Egypt, Syria and Iraq and the growing 
friendship of the Soviet Union with Iraq had left in 
Tehran that Iran's primary objectives in the Persian Gulf 
were. 
(1) to protect the safety of the Shah's regime against 
internal subversion sponsored indirectly either by 
radical Arab regimes or the Soviet Union, 
(2) to protect Iranian oil resources and the vast oil 
installations concentrated in the Gulf area 
against delibrate disruption from any quarter 
and 
(3) to preserve freedom of navigation in the ShatL-al 
Arab, the Persian Gulf and particularly the Strait 
of Hormuz. 
Op. cit. , p. 408 
As early as November 1967 British in anticipation 
of its imminent withdrawal from Aden and later from the 
Persian Gulf, approached Iran for discussion. The British 
minister of State, Goronwy Roberts arrived in Iran on 
November 9, held a meeting with the Shah. In a press 
interview the British minister said that the future of the 
Persian Gulf would depend on the understanding and 
cooperation of Iran. Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He 
also revealed that most of his discussions with the Shah 
in Tehran concerned the future of the Persian Gulf. 
Iran's basic objectives, were as clear as they 
were before. The strategies to be followed had to be 
flexible in order to accomodate the complications of the 
situation. The pre 1968 friendship with Saudi Arabia 
could become the basis for an Islamic ertente or previous 
friendly relations with Kuwait could also provide the 
basis for even a tripartite coalition or even Iraq could 
be finally won over in view of the fact that at the time 
of the British announcement Iran's relations with Baghdad 
were exceptionally calm or eventually even the trucial 
states, which were then being encouraged by the British to 
form a federation could join other like minded Arabs and 
Ittilat Havai, November 14, 1967 
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Iran. With these in mind Iran had declared from the 
outset its preparedness to cooperate with other Gulf states 
in maintaining security of the Persian Gulf. Iran's 
Persian Gulf diplomacy therefore, paralleled its security 
policy of creating unilaterally a credible deterrent with 
the assistance of the United States. 
Premier Hoveyda on January 27, 1968 in a news 
conference stated that Iran was greatly interested in the 
stability and security of the Gulf area and to that end 
Iran was prepared to cooperate with any littoral state 
that desired cooperation. He also emphasized that there 
is no doubt that Iran could protect its own interests and 
rights in the Persian Gulf will all its might and would 
not allow any outside power to interfere in the Persian 
Gulf. 
Iran's Relations with Saudi Arabia : 
Iran's strategy vis-a-vis the major Gulf states 
was to seek as much cooperation with them as the situation 
allowed. The first choice was Saudi Arabia, the Gulf's 
largest Arab state, with which Iran had established some 
rudimentory ties. King Saud first visited Iran in 1955 
and the Shah return his visit in 1957. The Shah wished to 
build upon these visits to protect Iran's interests in 
anticipation of British withdrawal. He was scheduled to 
visit King Faisal in February 1968, but a few days before 
he was due to make his trip, the ruler of Bahrain was 
royally received in saudi Arabia when the King declared 
full support for the Sheikh of Bahrain and there was 
allegedly some talk about the building of a catiscwav to 
link Bahrain to Saudi Arabia. This was interpreted in 
Iran as a rebuff of its long standing claim to Bahrain, 
and for this reason Iran had to call of the visit. Egypt 
paraded the cancellation of the visit as the result of 
Saudi Arabia's stand against Iran's ambition in Bahrain 
and claimed that Kuwaiti sources had announced that an 
agreement had been reached between Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain for the construction of a twelve mile bridge aimed 
as thwarting any attempt by Iran against Bahrain. 
The Shah's important state visit to Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait finally began on November 9, 1968. The visit 
to Saudi Arabia was long in the making, after the 
cancellation of the Shah's scheduled visit in February. 
Realizing the overriding significance of Gulf security, 
the Shah subordinated the ruffled feelings over Bahrain 
to greater interests. Other factors also assisted in 
paving the way toward the Shah's visit. It was believed 
that as the result of mediation efforts of King Hasan II 
of Morocco, the Shah stopped in Jeddah in June 3, 1968 on 
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the way to Ethiopia. The Shah and the King held brief 
talks and then embraced warmely, it was announced in 
Jeddah. In any event, before the visit to Ethiopia 
could take place, the outstanding dispute between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia over the continental shelf boundaries was 
finally resolved. And this agreement was finally signed 
on October 24, 1968, between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The 
importance of this agreement derived not only from the 
success of the two nations in settling their differences 
over the continental shelf in the Persian Gulf but also 
from their ability to compromise on their conflicting 
claims of sovereignty over the islands of Farsi and 
al-Arabi» Iran acquired title over the former and Saudi 
Arabia over the latter. During the five days visit, ol 
the Shah to Saudi Arabia, there were no serious and 
specific mention of the Persian Gulf situation v;as made 
in public, even the joint communique issued at the end of 
the visit on November 14, 1968 did not refer to the 
Persian Gulf. No single decision the Shah could make 
would elicit as much support for his Persian Gulf policy 
from Arab States as the abandonment of Iran's ancient 
claim to Bahrain, the rallying point of Arab States 
within and outside the Persian Gulf. The Shah's state 
Kayhan International, October 31, 1968. 
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visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait must have convinced him 
of the hands ;me rewards such a dramatic move would bring. 
As Iran broke its silence on the British decision 
to withdraw from the Persian Gulf, it tied its recognition 
of the British sponsored Arab Federation of the settlement 
of Iran's claim to Bahrain and other islands. In the wake 
of the creation of a temporary Federal Council representing 
seven Trucial States and Qatar and Bahrain, Iran strongly 
denounced the federation on July 8, 1968. The creation of 
a so called confederation of Persian Gulf emirates 
embracing the Bahrain islands is absolutely unacceptable to 
Iran. The Iran's objection to the federation was based not 
only on the claim to Bahrain but also on a claim to a 
number of islands (Two Tumbs and Abu Musa and also Rasal-
Khaima and Sharjah) that had apparently been recognized by 
Britain. 
However, on January 4, 1969 the Shah declared in 
press conference in New Delhi that if the people of Rahriin 
do not want to join my country Iran would withdriw i t •-
territorial claims to the Persian Gulf islands. He said 
Iran would accept the will of the people in Bahrain if this 
was recognized Internationally. The decision to settle 
6. Ibid., July 9, August 28, 1968 
7. Ibid., January 6, 1969. 
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the Bahrain dispute with Britain through the United 
Nations, in its request of March 9, 1970 to the United 
Nations secretary general for good offices, Iran stipulated 
that it would accept the results of his findings after and 
subject to their endorsement by the Security Council of the 
U.N. and on April 30, 1979, the Security Council endorsed 
the report of a mission that was sent to Bahrain from March 
29 to April 18. The report stated that the over-whel mi n^^ 
majority of the people of Bahrain wished to gain 
recognition of their identity in a fully independent and 
sovereign state free to decide for itself its relations 
with other States. This resolution was passed by the 
Senate. Moreover the Shah'sdiplomacy concerning Bahrain 
was making steady progress between the announcement of the 
British withdrawal in January 1968 and the actual 
withdrawal of British forces in 1971 
Iran's Relations with Iraq : 
Between 1968 to 1971, the prospects for accommo-
dation with Iraq worsened more than ever before. The Arif-
Shah summit meeting received to produce some agreement 
between the two countries in 1967 and even as late as June 
1968 Premier Tahir Yahia's visit to Iran seemed to be 
accompanied by hopeful signs of accommodation. But the 
fall of Abd al-Rahim Arif's regime on July 17, 1968 faced 
Iran with new regime in Iraq, the regime of col. Ahmad 
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Hasan al-Bakr. On July 21 Che new Iraqi premier stated in 
Baghdad that we will do every thing in our power to further 
strengthen the ties with Iran, and on February 1, 1964 
talks on the settlement of outstanding disputes between 
Iran and Iraq began in Baghdad. These developments, 
however, marked the lull before the storm. And the storm 
might have been welcomed by Iran in the knowledge that some 
six thousand Iraqi troops were engaged elsewhere. The 
over zealous Bathist regime tried to check the papers of 
ships moving up the shatt-al Arab, a right that Iraq had 
not previously exercised. In this dispute the Arab 
countries wished a peaceful and speedy settlement of the 
shatt dispute. At the diplomatic level Iran's offer of 
« 
negotiations would be accepted, Iraq replied, only if Iran 
retracted its decision to abrogate the 1937 treaty. Iran 
took the position on May 3, 1964 that the treaty was 
worthless and that no power can reimpose it on Iran. 
The basic power conflict between Iraq and Iran 
intensified after the announcement of the British decision 
in 1968. The crisis all the more brought and the 
conflicting ambitions of the two neighbouring nations in 
the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the Shah's troubles with the 
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr regime did not stop Iran from taking a 
firm stand against Iraq after the crisis and at the same 
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time offering peaceful accommodation with Baghdad. Iran's 
unresolved conflict with Iraq in light of the imminant 
departure of British forces from the Persian Gulf spurred 
Iran's efforts toward maintaining and creating further 
support for its position in the Persian Gulf within and 
outside the region. The Iranian Parliament's endorsement 
of the wish of the people of Bahrain to gain recognition of 
their identity in a fully independent sovereign state on 
May 14-18, 1970 was followed by strenuous efforts to be 
friend Bahrain even before it was declared 
independent. When Bahrain was declared independent on 
August 14, 1971, Iran was the first nation to recognize it 
only one hour after its announcement. 
Iran's Relations with Qatar 
and Other Smaller Gulf States: 
Qatar was the other Gulf state eventually gained 
Its Independence outside the framework of the Union of Arab 
Emirates (UAE). Iran also tried to befriend Qatar before 
the British withdrawal, it signed a continental shelf 
agreement with the sheikhdom on September 20, 1969, 
Q 
similarly to the agreement with Saudi Arabia. In April 
1970 Sheikh Ahmad bin All al-Thani, the ruler of Qatar, 
8. Ittilat Hawai, Nov., 30, 1969. 
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paid his first state visit to Iran, speaking on his 
arrival of the common objective between Iran and Qatar in 
stability and security and welfare in the Persian Gulf 
region. When Qatar declared its independence from British 
on September 1, 1971, barely one hour later as in the case 
of Bahrain the Shah recognized it by cable. 
However the Iran's greatest interest was to insure 
that if its negotiations with Britain for the acquisition of 
the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs failed, its 
planned unilateral military action for regaining the 
islands would not be roundly condemned by Arab states. 
The pattern of cultivating Arab States was perfectly clear 
by 1970, as evidenced by the ties already established 
with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Lebanon and the 
Trucial States. 
As noted, from the very outset Iran had linked its 
claims to Bahrain and the islands of Abu Musa and the two 
Tumbs to the recognition of the British sponsored Arab 
federation. Once the Bahrain problem was tactfully 
settled, Iran then made the settlement of its claim to the 
three Islands, the pre-requlslte of its recognition of the 
prospective Arab federation, and all these had been 
promised on the British time-table to withdraw forces from 
the Persian Gulf in 1971. Having overcome this momentary 
hurdle, Iran once again reiterated its claims to the three 
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islands in June 1971. The Shah stated on June 24, 1971 
that the islands belonged to Iran, they had been grabbed 
some eighty years ago, when Iran had no central 
government, his father had sent gunboats to recover them, 
but the British assured Iran that neither side would raise 
the flag till the question was settled. He then added, I 
hope this happens now. Otherwise we have no alternative 
but to take the islands by force. 
On November 30, 1971 Iran landed forces on the 
three islands, only twenty four hours after Sharja 
announced agreement with Iran on the island of Abu Musa. 
Later Iran claimed that not only Sharja but also Rasal 
Khaima were aware of the landing of Iranian forces. The 
Iranian foreign minister Abbas Ali Khal-atbary, stated 
subsequently that Iran's entire undertaking to retrieve 
the islands through long negotiations was designed to 
avoid bloodshed and regretted the incident on Greater 
Tumb. Still in keeping with its derive to maintain 
influence with Gulf states, Iran was quick to recognize 
the government of the Union of Arab Emirates in the wake 
of its formation. Britain had departed, and Iran was 
already in possession of the three islands, and thus 
there was no further reason to stand by the tactical 
negative attitude toward the federation. Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Fujaira and Umm al-Qaywayn formed 
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the Union on December 2, 1971 without Ras-al Khaima at the 
time but it, too later joined the Union. On the same day 
the Shah recognized the Union within one hour, as with 
Bahrain and Qatar previously. 
In preparation for the British wothdrawal, Iran 
quietly, built up its military strength, as seen, with the 
assistance of the United States; Secret deliveries of 
American and British weapons to Iran in 1969-70 was 
matched by Iran's open diplomacy ever since the announce-
ment of the British decision in January 1968 for gaining 
support for its policies in the Persian Gulf and the 
Middle East. Despite all the sincere talk about Iran's 
willingness to maintain the security of the Persian Gulf 
collectively with other Gulf states, Iran realized the 
serious limits of such an undertaking in light of the 
realities of the Gulf situation. The Iranian security 
policy in the region, therefore, showed that Iran would 
maintain Gulf security in cooperation with other Gulf 
9 
states. The diverse interpretation of Iran and Sharja of 
their agreement regarding Abu Musa and the absence of 
Ras-al-Khaima's consent in landing Iranian troops on the 
two Tumbs remained as potential sources of Iranian 
difficulties in the future. 
9. Ramzani, R.K., op. cit., p. 427. 
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Iran's Policies After the British Withdrawal : 
After the British departure, Iran's Persian Gulf 
policy began to undergo dramatic changes. The first 
serious and public Indication of this change was given by 
the Shah in an interview on 15 January, 1972. He said if 
the Indian Ocean becomes troubled we shall feel the effects 
and counter effects. Furthermore when asked if he intended 
to establish bases further afield in the Gulf of Oman. 
Subsequently in a major speech on the fortieth anniversary 
of the Iranian navy in November 1972, the Shah for the 
first time definitely indicated the expansion of Iran's 
security perimeter. He stated that the frontiers of Iran 
went beyond the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman into the 
Indian Ocean. 
The Shah did not elaborate what events specifically 
prompted the decision to spread the Iranian defense 
umbrella beyond the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, 
however, the Shah's silence on the fundamental 
consideration underlying the expansion of Iran's "Security 
Perimeter". Only represented the kind of dilemma in which 
Iran found itself. It had developed by November 1972 when 
the Shah announced the new "Security Perimeter unprece-
dented commercial, technical and economic ties with the 
Soviet Union. 
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However, just as the Persian Gulf situation under-
guided the resolution of so many disputes between Iran and 
its neighbours, it intensified Iran's friendship with 
Turkey and Pakistan, with which Iran already had close 
ties within and outside CENTO and the Regional Cooperation 
Development (RDC). The relations with Pakistan 
particularly called for strengthening in light of the 
Persian Gulf situation. 
Iran's relations with Iraq after the capture of the 
three islands and the British departure took a turn for 
the worse. Iraq broke its diplomatic relations with Iran 
immediately after the landing of Iranian forces on Abu 
Musa and the two Tumbs and denounced Iran violently in the 
Arab League and the United Nations. After the British 
departure a tour by a group of Western Journalists of the 
Sheikhdoms in 1972, from the important communications; 
Centre of Bahrain to the poor Emirate of Ras-al-Khaima 
revealed that there was no real power vacuum in the area 
but rather a new balance of power with the British 
remaining in the dominant position. 
If from all this Iraq could have concluded that 
Britain remained the dominant power in the entire Persian 
Gulf, it would have directed its attacks more against 
10. New York Times, January 12, 1972, 
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Britain than Iran. But the fact was that this assessment 
of the remaining British power in the Gulf was true not 
only in regard to the lower Gulf, Iran was the chief 
power in the Persian Gulf as a whole after the British 
withdrawal. 
The sharp Irano-Iraqi power rivalry in the Persian 
Gulf underguided the intensity of Iraqi deportations and 
border clashes that followed the British withdrawal. A 
helpless mass of human beings was being used as a political 
instrument by two unfriendly powers, it was reported on 
11 January 9, 1972. The acrimonous relations between 
Tehran and Baghdad took a turn for the worse after Iraq 
and the Soviet Union formalized their growing 
rapprochement in a fifteen year treaty of political and 
economic cooperation. The signing of the treaty might 
indeed have been precipitated by the capture of the three 
islands and the emergence of Iran as the dominant power in 
the Persian Gulf. But the fact still remained that the 
American assistance to Iran in building up its credible 
deterrent and the soviet arms aid to Iraq over the years 
had already injected Soviet-American rivalry into the Gulf 
area indirectly. However, by summer 1973 it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that the Irano-Iraqi power rivalry 
11. ibid., January 31, 1972. 
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in the Persian Gulf not only had become intermeshed with 
indirect Soviet-American rivalry but also was further 
complicated by the activities of other outside powers in 
the Gulf area. The Soviet-American rivalry was thus 
interlocking not only with the Irano-Iraqi power conflict 
at the head of the Gulf but also with the Intra-Arab and 
Arab-Iranian conflicts on the approach to and at the 
entrance of the Persian Gulf. 
The principal new factors affecting Iran's foreign 
policy towards the end of the sixties were the British 
withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and her decision in 1968 to 
withdraw her forces from these areas "east of suez" in 
1971. The Shah was already apprehensive of the 
anti-monarchical Iraqi and Egyptian regimes, which to his 
mind presented a threat to Iranian interests in the Gulf. 
The Soviet involvement in military aid and training in 
Iraq, also rmde the Shah more aprehensive about Iran's 
vital oil and trade lifeline in the Gulf. Moreover the 
secessionist ambitions of Iran's Arabic speaking minority 
in Khuzistan and of the Kurds in North Eastern Iran, were 
always encouraged by hostile Arab regimes. Lastly the 
competitive nature of oil production and marketing had 
greatly intensified rivalries between Iran and its oil 
rich Arab neighbours. 
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The Shah developed closer ties with Israel to 
combat the radical Arab policies in the Gulf, but as far 
as his own political interests was concerned he was 
apprehensive of the Israeli territorial acquisitions 
resulting from the 1967 war. In 1970 President Nasser and 
the Shah resumed diplomatic relations. He began 
vigorously to support the demand for Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territory. He gave aid to Egypt after 
the October war, keenly supported Kissinger's peace 
mission in the Middle East, and played a major role in 
contributing forces to the U.N. Disengagement observer 
Force in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This earned him the 
bitter enmity of the P.L.O. 
On 5 March 1975, at an OPEC meeting in Algiers, the 
Shah signed an agreement with the Iraqi Vice-President 
Saddam Hussain. In return for Iran's undertaking not to 
support the Kurdish rebellion. Iraq conceded to Iran the 
right to deepest channel (Thalweg) in the Shatt-al-Arab 
and also promised to refrain from helping revolutionary 
1 2 
movements against the Shah. 
The Shah saw in the Dhofar rebellion in Western part 
of the Sultanate of Oman not only a potent threat to the 
12. Rizvi, S.A.A., Iran: Royalty, Religion and 
Revolution, Marifat Publishing House, 
Australia, 1980, p. 272. 
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peace of the entire Gulf, but also a threat to all 
monarchies. The rebels had formed the people's front for 
the liberation of Oman, and their principal aims was to 
over throw the royal or quasi-royal regimes in all Gulf 
states. They also obtained support from the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen. Naturally the Shah was 
deeply concerned to prevent the south side of the Straits 
of Hormuz from falling into pro-Soviet hands, King Faisal 
of Saudi Arabia gave some financial assistance to the 
young Sultan of Oman but was deeply disillusioned at the 
growing sales of British arms there. The Shah also 
assisted by placing some of his newly equipped forces at 
the Sultan's disposal. These did not give as good on 
account of themselves as the Iranian press claimed, but 
did help in crushing the twelve years old anti-monarchical 
movement in 1976. 
However, the Shah's foreign policy was mainly 
directed towards ensuring exploitation of offshore oil 
fields and defending the approaches to the Straits of 
Hormuz from both north and south in order to safeguard 
unimpeded oil export. He was anxious to prevent either a 
US or USSR military presence in the Gulf region and was 
keen to keep all super powers out of the Gulf. 
Nevertheless the massive military build-up he instituted 
with a view to policing the Gulf made him the defendent of 
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U.S. Interests In the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean rather 
than that of the Iranian. 
The present work is divided into six major 
chapters alongwith the detailed historical background of 
policies and programms of Shah's regime during the period 
1970's. Chapter second deals with the Iran's relations 
with Iraq. In this chapter emphasis have been given to 
analyse the Iran-Iraq agreement before the British 
withdrawal, consolidation of Iran's position after the 
British withdrawal and Arab States and the mediation of 
Iran-Iraq dispute. Since Iraq is the major neighbouring 
country, therefore, a separate chapter is added to 
analyse the above mentioned issues. Chapter third aims at 
discussing the Iran's relations with the Saudi Arabia 
both in historical and 1970's perspectives. Saudi Arabia 
is characterised as one of the major countries of the Gulf 
and Centre of Arab Politics of the region. The analysis 
is based largely on two major problems, i.e. attitude of 
Saudi Arabia in the Gulf region in general and with Iran 
in particular. The situation will be well analysed after 
the phenomenal increase of Saudi revenue during the period 
1970's and policies and programmsbased on the oil income 
as it may be observed that there was a major change in 
Saudi Arabia politics after the big hike of prices and 
increase in oil-revenue. Chapter fourth deals with the 
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security of Iranian regime, I.e. the Internal problems 
and external policies. In this chapter a large number of 
internal and external issues will be discussed to find out 
the Iran's attempt to gain the upperhand in the regional 
politics as well as the controll over the deterioating 
conditions in internal situation. Chapter fifth deals with 
the regional cooperation and Shah's policies both for the 
Gulf and the neighbouring countries. In this chapter a 
detailed discussion has been made about the constraints of 
regional cooperation during the period 1970's. In this 
connection a detailed analysis will be made regarding the 
Iran-Arab relationship both political and economic. In 
order to strengthen the cooperation with the Gulf countries 
Iran moved towards the neighbouring countries such as 
India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was possible for Iran 
to extend various kinds of cooperation with these 
neighbouring countries because of the huge oil revenue 
after the year 1973. In this way Iran became successful 
in creating an inter-and intra regional political 
environment to achieve the regional supremacy. Lastly, 
Iran tried her best to minimise the influence of 
subversive forces in the Gulf region which is an attempt to 
stop the entry of any powerful organisation in the Gulf 
region. Chapter sixth attempts to analyse the impact and 
repercussions of Shah's policies in the Gulf region. In 
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this regard a detailed analysis will be made on military 
and economic objectives as well as Shah's policies around 
economic growth rather than economic development will be 
analysed to find out the truth behind the social and 
political unrest throughout Iran during the period 1970's. 
Lastly, in this chapter, an analysis will also be made to 
find out the various factors responsible for the failure 
of domestic and regional policies. Ch^ apter seventh deals 
with the Shah's concept of regional power, i.e. the 
dominant Gulf power. In this chapter an attempt will be 
made to analyse the socio-economic programs of the Shah's 
regime in order to minimise the socio-economic unrest 
among the masses as well as to introduce some of the major 
economic programs in many of the Gulf countries though 
most of the Gulf countries are oil producing with better 
economic affluency. Secondly, the objectives to build the 
military power will be discussed in terms of internal and 
regional (Gulf States) purposes. Both these attempts were 
quite successful in achieving the 'Greater power' in the 
region for Iran. 
27 
CHAPTER - II 
IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ 
(A)> Iran-Iraq Agreement before British Withdrawal 
(B) Consolidation of Iran's Position After the 
British Withdrawal. 
(C) Arab States and the Mediation of Iran-Iraq 
Dispute 
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CHAPTER - II 
IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ 
The single most Important event during 1950s that 
focused Iran's attention on the Persian Gulf was the 
Iraqi Revolution of 1958. The repercussions of this event 
In Iran's relations with the West and with the Soviet Union 
was that the Shah's regime sought American commitment to 
Iran against not only Soviet aggression but also any other, 
Including that of Iraq. It was also as a result, of Iran's 
Inability to obtain such a commitment that It finally 
resigned Itself to a bilateral defense agreement with the 
United States that Inf act, did not go beyond the Eisen 
hower Doctrine in committing the United States to the 
Elsenhower Doctrine : President Eisenhower's 
generosity was overtaken by events when in 
July 1958, the government of Iraq was over-
thrown by a group of radical army officers. 
In an attempt to counter unease amongst the 
other pact member, Eusenhower proposed an 
"Executive Government" between each of the 
pact members (apart from Iraq) and the US 
on a bilateral basis, which guaranteed the 
security of each state in the event of 
external threat. 
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defense of Iran. And it was also as a result of this 
revolution that Iran sought to negotiate a non-aggression 
pact with the Soviet Union in 1958-59 in order to escape 
the development of a pincer of Soviet pressures from the 
North and Iraqi hostility from the South. 
Iran's concern with the implications of the Iraqi 
revolution, however, was complicated by a variety of other 
factors as well. It seemed that Iraq was now added to 
Egypt and Syria in the struggle for power in the Middle 
East. The former Iraqi regime, despite all the 
difficulties between Bughdad and Tehran had been an ally 
of Iran in the Baghdad Pact, but the defection of Iraq 
was now only a matter of time. The balance of power seemed 
to be tilting in favour of anti-western Arab States. 
Another fact that intensified Iran's concern with 
developments in Iraq soon after the revolution was the 
toleration of communist elements by the Qasim 
regime. It may be recalled that the Shah's regime had 
been subjected to the threat of communist subversion in 
1953 and ever since had been engaged in concerted efforts 
Baghdad Pact : On October 11, 1955, Iran declared 
publicly its intention to join the pact of 
mutual cooperation between Iraq and Turkey, 
commonly known as the Baghdad Pact which had 
been signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955. 
It is believed traditionally that Iran's 
decision to do so was a departure from its 
long standing policy of neutrality. 
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to suppress the Tudeh elements in Iran. Furthermore, the 
cold war between Tehran and Moscow reached an unprecedented 
height by 1959 after the breakdown of Soviet-Iranian 
negotiations for a non-aggression pact. The appearance of 
Soviet Vessels at this time, reportedly carrying arms to 
Iraq through the Shatt-al-Arab, was an entirely new and 
unwelcome development in the Persian Gulf. All these 
considerations were compounded by still other factors. The 
Shatt-al-Arab dispute was still unresolved because the 
last, and perhaps the greatest hope for its solution was 
aborted by the revolution in Iraq. Moreover, the 
revolution could produce, Iran believed, other adverse 
effects. The very fact of the bloody destruction of the 
monarchy in neighbouring Iraq could provide an example for 
Iranian opponents of the Shah's regime within Iran, and 
the ancient problem of Kurds could combine with other 
tribal discontents and erupt into a general tribal 
rebellion. 
However, all these problems in one way or another, 
impinged on the outbreak of the Shatt-al-Arab crisis in 
late 1959. The Kurdish problem took the lead. In so far 
as the formal diplomatic relations were concerned, on 
3. Ramzani, R.K., Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-73, 
University Press ot Virginea, 1975, 
pp. 399 - 400. 
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July 30, 1958, Iran recognized the new regime in Iraq, but 
on July 25 Iran's deputy premier and director of internal 
security, Taimur Bakhtiar, had reportedly stated in an 
interview that if the Kurds of Iraq and Syria requested 
union with Iran such a request would be considered with 
great interest. He also warned that President Nasir (of 
Egypt) might attempt to create a Kurdish satellite state 
that would provide a land bridge between the U.A.R. and the 
Soviet Union. At the same time he stated that all Iranian 
Kurds were completely loyal to the Shah. A similar 
statement made on October 25, 1958 once again revealed 
Iran's own concern with the Kurdish situation, but such 
statements were interpreted in the Arab world as an Iranian 
effort to stir up the Kurds against the Iraqi regime. S.C. 
Sulzberger of the New York Times, however, wrote that 
indications were that there was a Russian plan to upset 
the Shah's regime by "indirect proxies" outside Iran the 
"conspiracy would be hatched in Iraq among the Barazani 
Kurds, who has ties with the Kurdish minority within 
Iran. Inside Iran another proxy would be employed with no 
connection with the Soviet Union, but whose desires to over 
throw the Shah coincided with the Kremlin's aims. This 
second proxy would be the powerful Qashqai tribe. Their 
leaders met in Munich to decide whether to declare war 
against the Shah while they were trying to work out an 
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alliance with the Bakhtiari tribe. The fact of such 
reports accurate or not, showed that Iran's concern with 
the tribal problem was not simply a figment of imagination 
or a fabrication of Tehran. In fact in May 1959 the 
Kurdish problem in Iraq began to have serious repercussions 
in Iran. According to "Ittilaat" some ten thousand Iraqi 
Kurds crossed the Iranian frontier into Iran and sought 
4 
asylum after fighting in Iraq. 
Although, the immediate cause of the Shatt-al-Arab 
crisis is difficult to ascertain. The view in Iran was 
that the Qasim regime stirred up the ancient problem in 
order to divert attention from internal problems. The 
other point of view was that Qasim's claim regarding the 
Shatt-al-Arab was precipitated by the Shah's reference in 
Iran's dissatisfaction with the terms of the 1937 treaty. 
4. Ittilaat Havai, May 17, 1959. 
5. 1937 Treaty : On 9 July 1937 an Iranian-Iraqi 
Border Treaty was signed and Tehran which on 
the whole confirmed the protocols of constant 
inople of 1913/14. Accordingly the Iran-Iraq 
border continued to run along the east bank 
of the Shatt-al-Arab. Furthermore, it was 
agreed to open the Shatt-al-Arab to merchant 
men of all nations and Naval vessels of the 
two contracting parties (For details ) see 
El-Azhary, M.S., Iran-Iraq War, D.K. 
Agencies, (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p. 15. 
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with Iraq as intolerable and unprecedented" in a news 
conference held on November 28, 1959. The problem with 
this suggestion is that as early as April 1959 a similar 
statement by the Shah was widely known and yet produced no 
known reaction from Qasim. 
President Qasim in a news conference he remarked 
that in 1937 Iraq was subjected to severe pressure and 
because the government of Iraq was caught in a complicated 
situation, it granted a strip of five kras. of the Shatt-al-
Arab to Iran, and this was a grant not an acquired right. 
If the boundary problems are not resolved in the future we 
shall not be bound by the grant of those five kms and viill 
restore them to our motherland. But the Iranian foreign 
minister told the Majlis that according to the 
international law, the boundary between Iran and Iraq in 
the entire length of Shatt-al-Arab should have followed 
the thalweg and declared that ever since the 
establishment of the military regime in Iraq, new 
difficulties were created in the Shatt-al-Arab side by side 
other unfriendly actions against Iran. 
But on January 3, 1960 Iranian government made 
public statement and charged that Iraq arbitrarily and 
contrary to the terms of the 1937 treaty had collected 
revenues for purposes other than maintenance of the river, 
and noted that the boundary line designated by the treaty 
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should have followed the thalweg all along the river more 
important, it was revealed for the first time that just 
before the downfall of the monarchical regime in Iraq, an 
agreement in principle had finally been reached between the 
two countries on two major points. First, they had agreed 
to appoint a joint commission for the administration of 
the Shatt-al-Arab, second, they had agreed to the appoint-
ment of a Swedish arbitrator who would settle the boundary 
demarcation problem in consultation with the Joint Irano-
Iraqi Commission. But the new Iraqi government declared 
after coming into power that it would honour Iraq's 
international obligations but in practice refused to 
respond to Iranian representation on the subject. 
(A) Iran-Iraq Agreement Before 
British Withdrawal : 
Despite the return of relative calm in the 
relations of the two countries between July 1960 and the 
announcement of the British decision in 1968 to withdraw 
forces from the Persian Gulf, the chances for settlement 
of outstanding issues were slim. No visible progress 
toward a settlement was made during the rest of Qasim's 
rule in Iraq. The rise to power of Abd al-Salam Arif on 
February 8, 1963 was accompanied by some hope in Tehran 
that the change might produce a new approach to Iranian 
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questions in Baghdad. Although after one year on February 
24, 1964 a high ranking delegation was sent to Tehran for 
negotiations for the first time since the beginning of the 
Iraqi revolution, and although a vigorous exchange of 
notes took place between premier Hoveyda and the Prime 
Minister of Iraq, Abd al-Rehman al-Bazzaz in December 1965, 
no sign of progress toward a settlement was in sight. At 
the invitation of the Shah President Arif and his wife 
visited Iran on 14 March 1967. The discussions between 
the two leaders were regarded as fruitful. The two 
countries agreed to consider six basic issues in Tehran 
These were '1) boundary incidents, (2) exploration and 
exploitation of boundary oil resources (3) status of 
Iranian subjects in Iraq and the future position of Iranian 
schools in Iraq (4) delimitation of Irano-Iraqi 
continental shelves in the Persian Gulf (5) facilitation 
of Iranian pilgrimage to holi Shi'i shrines in Iraq and 
(6) treatment of Iranian residents in Iraq and Iraqi 
residents in Iran. 
The absence of any reference to the Shatt-al-Arab 
dispute was conspicuous, but it might will have been 
intentional in order to avoid stirring up at the outset the 
6. Ittilaat Havai, March 16, 1967. 
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emotion-ridden issue. The text of the joint communique 
issued at the end of the Iraqi-Iranian summit meeting 
since the Iraqi revolution revealed that hard bargaining 
had taken place. For its part Iran joined Iraq in 
declaring that the Palestinian problem was not only an 
Arab concern but a question of concern to all nations. 
For its part Iraq joined Iran in announcing its decision 
that negotiations In regard to the delimitation of the 
continental shelves of the two countries, cooperation fot 
exploration of oil resources, and the manner of 
utilization of common boundary rivers proceed "according 
to the principles of international law." Although the 
communique stated that the two heads of state did endorse 
the decisions of their foreign ministers made in December 
1966, the general language of the communique itself left 
some doubts about the extent of agreement reached between 
Iran and Iraq on the basic Issues of the Shatt-al-Arab. 
These Issues had always involved not only the problem of 
water utilization but also those of the boundary line In 
the river, the administration of the river, and the 
problem of freedom of navigation. For this reason it Is 
difficult to assess the extent of agreement between the 
two countries at this time, nevertheless there was every 
7. Ibid., March 20, 1967. 
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sign that so;ne agreement between the two neighbouring 
nations had been reached whether they would survive the 
turbulance of Iraqi domestic politics remained to be 
seen. 
While the Shah's diplomacy concerning Bahrain was 
making steady progress between the announcement of the 
British decision in January 1968 and the actual withdrawal 
of British forces in 1971, the prospects for accommodation 
with Iraq worsened more than ever before. As noted 
previously, the Arif-Shah summit meeting seemed to produce 
some agreement between the two countries in 1967 and even 
as late as June 1968 Premier Tahir Yahia's visit to Iran 
seemed to be accompanied by hopeful signs of accommodation. 
But the fall of Abd-al-Rahman 'Arif's regime in July 17, 
1968, faced Iran with still a new regime in Iraq, the 
regime of Col. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. In the hope of 
salvaging what agreements had been previously reached, 
Iran extended immediate recognition to the new regime, and 
the Iraqi ambassador in Tehran conveyed to the Iranian 
government his country's appreciation for Iran's rapid 
move and the new regime's Intention to expand relations 
with Iran. On July 24 the new Iraqi Premier stated in 
8. Ramzani, R.K. Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-73, 
University Press of Virginea,1975,pp.403-4. 
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Baghdad that many ties bound his country with Iran and we 
will do every thing in our power to further strengthen 
these ties. And finally on February 1, 1969, talks on the 
settlement of outstanding disputes between Iran and Iraq 
began in Baghdad after a series of meetings between senior 
9 
officials from the two countries. 
However, these developments marked the lull before 
the storm. The lull might have been desired by Iraq while 
it was considerably troop commitments to the creation of 
the "Eastern Front" in cooperation with Jordan and Syria 
vis-a-vis Israel. And the storm might have been welcomed 
Iran in the knowledge that some six thousand Iraqi troops 
were engaged else where. The over zealous Bathist regime 
tried to check the papers of ships moving up the shatt-al-
Arab, a right that had not previously exercised. Its 
efforts to do so sparked the crisis on April 15, 1969. 
Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister told the Iranian ambassador 
in Baghdad that the government of Iraq consider the Shatt-
al-Arab as an integral part of the Iraqi territory. He 
demanded that vessels carrying the Iranian flag lower 
their flags before entering the river and that no Iranian 
Navy personnel be aboardships entering the shatt. He 
9. ibid., pp. 416-17. 
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further warned that if these demands were not met, Iraq 
would use force and in the future would not allow vessels 
destined for Iranian ports to use the river. In response 
the Iranian government declared on April 19 that the 
relevant 1973 treaty between Iran and Iraq was valueless, 
ineffective and non-valid, at the same time Iran declared 
its inclination and preparadness to start negotiations with 
the government of Iraq for the consolidation of the 
frontiers in Shatt-al-Arab, on the basis of the thalweg 
line, which is the accepted international principles and to 
sign a new treaty. 
In so far as the Iraqi threat of force was 
concerned the Iranian statement declared that if there 
should be any attempt to insult the imperial flag of Iran 
or any prevention is made against the free passage of ships 
in Shatt-al-Arab any of such actions will be met with a 
severe reaction and Iraq would be responsible for any grave 
consequences that might result from their aggressive 
policy.^° 
The eruption of such ancient problems in 1969, 
however, went far beyond the issues long associated with 
the Shatt-al-Arab dispute. The basic power conflict 
between Iraq and Iran intensified after the announcement 
10. Kayhan (Daily English), April 28, 1969. 
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of the British decision in 1968 despite attempts at 
negotiating differences over the Shatt-al-Arab, the status 
of Iranian residents and similar issues. The crisis all 
the more brought out the conflicting ambitions of the two 
neighbouring nations in the Persian Gulf. President Ahmad 
Hasan al-Bakr linked Iran's action in the Shatt-al-Arab to 
the Arab Conflict with Israel and the Iraqi regime's 
conflict with the Barazani Kurds. He denounced Iran's 
illegal ambitions in Iraqi territory and waters as well as 
in the Arabian Gulf, and said that Iran's moves as well as 
Barazani guerilla movements in the north, were attempts to 
force Iraq to withdraw troops from the Israeli front. 
However, the Shah's troubles with the al-Bakr 
regime did not stop Iran from taking a firm stand against 
Iraq after the crisis and at the same time offering 
peaceful accommodation with Baghdad. In countering 
allegations of imperialism and domination the Shah declared 
in early June 1969 that Iran had "no colonial designs" in 
the Persian Gulf that it was prepared to sign a defensive 
alliance with all the states of the region to insure its 
stability after the British military withdrawal in 1971 and 
at the same time he had been proved right to build up 
Iran's military strength to meet the challenge of 
11. New York Times, May 19, 1969. 
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adventurist regimes in the Middle East. Moreover, Iran's 
firm stand against Baghdad was supported by Turkey also in 
June at the end of Prime Minister Hoveyda's visit to Turkey 
to explain the sltuatiobn. King Hasan II of Morocco also 
supported Iran's stand on the Shatt-al-Arab river dispute. 
Iran also continued to take initiative in offering ways of 
setting its differences with Iraq, he principal reason for 
this was Iran's fear that the conflict might push Iraq 
further and more rapidly toward the Soviet Union. 
Iran's unresolved conflict with Iraq in light of 
the imminent departure of British forces from the Persian 
Gulf spurred Iran's efforts toward maintaining and 
creating further support for its position in the Persian 
Gulf within and outside the region. 
(B) Consolidation of Iran's Position 
After the British Withdrawal : 
Iran's relations with Iraq after the capture of the 
three islands in 1971 and the British departure took a turn 
for the worse. Iraq broke its diplomatic relations with 
Iran immediately after the landing of Iranian forces on 
Abu Musa and the two Tumbs and Iran denounced violently in 
the Arab league and United Nations. Moreover Iran was the 
Chief power in the Persian Gulf as a whole after the 
British withdrawal. This more comprehensive and accurate 
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assessment of the power situation was made public, after an 
on the spot check, in these terms. The A70 mile cruise 
from Kharg island at the head of the Gulf to Bandar Abbas 
at the strait of Hormuz showed that the Iranians control 
the key sites along the vital oil route and are building up 
12 their defenses at the entrance of the gulf. This was an 
entirely new element in Iran's relations with Iraq. 
However, the sharp Irano-Iraqi power rivalry in the 
Persian Gulf underguided the intensity of Iraqi 
deportations and border clashes that followed the British 
withdrawal. The acrimomious relations between Tehran and 
Baghdad took a turn for the worse after Iraq and the 
Soviet Union formalized their growing aprochement in a 
fifteen year treaty of political and economic cooperation, 
on April 9, 1972. The signing of the treaty might indeed 
have been precipitated by the capture of the three islands 
and the emergence of Iran as the dominant power in the 
Persian Gulf. But the fact still remained that the 
American assistance to Iran in building up its "credible 
deterrent" and the Soviet arms aid to Iraq over the years 
had already injected Soviet-American rivalry into the Gulf 
area indirectly. No matter who started what first between 
12. New York Times, January 25, 1972. 
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the two super-powers, the Soviet treaty with Iraq clearly 
accentuated Soviet alignment with Iraq and further 
globalized the Irano-Iraqi power conflict. The immediate 
consequences of this for the two local powers was the 
outbreak of the most serious clash between Iran and Iraq. 
Border clashes brokeout on April 10, 1972, in the Qasri-
Shirin Khanaqin region. Meanwhile Iraq complained to the 
United Nations of border clashes, and Iran accused Baghdad 
of being a havin and a training centre for subversive 
groups throughout the region. 
By summer 1973 it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that the Irano-Iraqi power rivalry in the Persian 
Gulf not only had become intermeshed with indirect Soviet-
American rivalry but also was further complicated by the 
13 
activities of other outside powers in the Gulf area. 
The Iran-Iraq relationship was primarily based upon 
long drawn conflicts that could be traced back to the Pre-
World War I era. The enforced friendliness under the 
umbrella of the Baghdad Pact gave way to an open 
confrontation after the July 1958 coup in Iraq. On the eve 
of the British departure from the Gulf, Iraq alone was the 
major Arab power in the region that was openly opposing the 
growth of Iran's dominant position in the Gulf. The Iraq-
is. Ramzani, R.K., Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-73, 
University Press of Virginia, 1975, p. 437. 
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USSR Treaty of 1972, accentuated the Soviet alignment with 
Iraq and in a way, strengthened the Iraqi position 
vis-a-vis Iran. The immediate consequence of this, for 
the two local powers, was the outbreak of the most serious 
clash between Iran and Iraq. Border clashes broke out 
on 10 April 1972 in the Qasr-i-Shirin Khanaqin region and 
by 13 May sniping incidents were almost daily 
occurence. 
However, the real Iraq-Iran confrontation was in 
Kurdistan where the Iranians, in their bid to undermine 
Iraqi capability were helping the Kurds against the Iraqi 
regime. The Kurdish question at one time had posed a 
threat to Iran's systemic security. But after 1958 the 
Iranian regime converted it into an option to be used 
against Iraq. As early as 1959 Iran was accused of 
sponsoring Kurdish revolt against Iraq. Iranian support to 
the Kurds was both military and non-military in nature. 
Before 1974 Iranian aid to the Kurds had been of a limited 
nature, consisting mainly of small arms, some anti-
aircraft weapons and other logistic help, after 1974 Iran 
began to supply them artillery, sophisticated anti-tank 
weapons and ammunition. 
14. Singh, K.R., Iran, Quest for Security, Vikas 
Publishing Rouse, New Delhi, 1981, p.185. 
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However, the net result of the Iranian Involvement 
on behalf of the Kurds was that Iran was indirectly 
dragged into an undeclared but potentially dangerous armed 
confrontation with Iraq. Iran accused Iraq of repeated 
ground and air attacks on the border areas. The result was 
that Iran and Iraq were on the brink of an undeclared war 
and the Kurdish question proper was relegated as a side 
issue. The situation became so tense and the U.S. 
Secretary general intervene to reduce the tension. Iraq 
moved the UN and the Arab league in this matter. However, 
these offices were failed to settle the border troubles. 
Iran began to strengthen the options in its 
struggle against Iraq. Since the Iraqi strength depended 
upon 'radicalism' and Arabism, Iran, during the period 
1971-75 drew closer to the USSR also so as to counter 
balance the Iraqi influence there. The task before Iran 
was to get t;ie USSR to recognize the validity of Iran's 
Gulf policy, to build up personal contacts between the 
Shah and the top leadership in Moscow. The Soviets gave 
guarded support to Iran's Gulf Policy but Iran had 
insisted that the matters concerning the Gulf should be 
settled by the littoral states themselves without outside 
interference. 
Thus, between 1972 and 1975 Iran got the USSR 
deeply involved in Iran with the result that it was able 
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to use the Soviet diplomatic leverage to put constraints 
on Iraq in its confrontation with Iran. Thus the top 
Soviet leadership made an almost public display of its 
neutrality in the dispute between Iraq and Iran, which 
strengthen the Iranian position diplomatically and finally 
contributed to the March 1975 agreement between Iran and 
Iraq. Iran also tried to isolate Iraq in the Arab World. 
Iraq was trying to act as the champion of Arabism in the 
Gulf and was seeking to take over that role from Nasser. 
Iraq thus hoped to align the Arab world behind her in its 
confrontation with Iran. Iran, however, refused to fall 
into that trap. 
In the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute in 1973, Iran took 
advantage to gain political and diplomatic advantages. 
Iraq had its eyes on two strategically placed islands, 
Bubians and Warba, which, if occupied by Iraq, would not 
only increase the Iraqi coastline but would also give a 
greater measure of security to the new naval base at Ummal-
Qasr. In this matter the Shah was considering military 
action against Iraq in the event of aggression against 
Kuwait. On 12 April 1973 Iranian premier Amir Abbas 
Hoveyda said that Iran will offer military aid if Kuwait 
was faced with Iraqi aggression. Thus Iran not only 
15. The Times of India, 14 April, 1973. 
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substantiated its position as the dominant power in the 
Gulf but also tried to emerge as a champion of an Arab 
State in the Gulf. 
(C) Arab States and the Mediation 
of Iran-Iraq Dispute 
If an offer to mediate between Iraq and Iran could 
be considered as an index of support of these Arab States 
to Iran, than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and finally 
Algeria offered their good offices. It was reported that 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were considering to mediate between 
Iran and Iraq. They felt that this conflict might weaken 
the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC),. 
Sources in Tehran, however, dismissed these reports by 
saying that no approach had been made to Iran by either of 
1 fi these powers in that connection. The climax of the Arab 
mediation between Iraq and Iran was reached at the Rabat 
summit in October 1974, where they formed the Committee of 
delegates from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia for 
mediation in Iran-Iraq dispute. 
However, the final reconciliation was reached at 
the OPEC summit at Algiers. After the public display of 
16. Kayhan International , 3 July, 1972. 
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Iraq-Iran friendship at Algiers, the two parties quickly 
reached an agreement on 17 March 1975 which was signed in 
Tehran by the foreign ministers of the two countries. The 
frontier dispute was resolved. The constantinopole 
Protocol of 1913 became the basis for the land boundary. 
As far as the Shatt-al-Arab was concerned the thalweg line 
was accepted as the basis of the new boundary. Thus Iran 
withdrew its support from the Kurds. In return Iraq too 
stopped supporting the anti-Iranian groups in Khuzistan and 
Baluchistan. 
With the Iraq-Iran detente the Kurdish revolt 
suffered a serious setback. Thousands of Kurds migrated to 
Iran, which maintained an open border for them. Details 
about Iraq-Iran cooperation and also of the boundaries 
were worked out in a comprehensive agreement signed on 
13 June 1975 at Baghdad. However the series of good 
neighbour, agreement were signed on 26 December 1975 that 
covered question like navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab, 
border posts, exploitation of international river, movement 
of citizens etc. The final exchange of details of the 
treaties between Iraq and Iran were affected on 23 June 
1976. Iran-Iraq disputes ended formally. 
17. Reppa, Sr., Robert, B., Israel and Iran: Bilateral 
_ Relations and Effect on the Indian Ocean 
Basis, Praeger, New York, 1974, p. 85. 
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CHAPTER - III 
IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH ARAB GULF STATES 
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SAUDI ARABIA 
AND ISLANDS DISPUTE) 
The Iranian regime realised the challenge and threat 
by the Arabism at a very high rate, either it was immediate 
or for future also. But it is obvious that Arabs posed as 
a more potential threat for the Iranian regime. It became 
more evident after the emergence of General Nasser as a 
leader of the Arab World when he declared four major 
policies and programme such as : (1) republicanism 
(2) Socialism (3) Arab Unity (Arab nationalism) and 
(4) non-alignment. These programmes posed a very serious 
threat to the Iranian political system, both by 
instigating the Iranians against the Shah and also by 
attempting to group the Arab countries of the Gulf into an 
overall Arab block under a radical leadership that would be 
hostile to the Iranian monarchy in the sensitive Gulf area. 
This threat was also coincided with the Iraqi coup of 1958 
and with the subsequent Iranian interest in the Gulf. 
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Hence these two different trends, threat from Arabism and 
threat to Iran's geopolitical and strategic Interests In 
the Gulf also coincided In the late sixties. Consequently, 
Iran began to shift the focus of its foreign policy from 
the north to east and south. Lastly, it can be concluded 
that Iranian policies and diplomacy shifted from the USSR 
towards the Arab World and the Gulf. Secondly, the 
withdrawal of British military forces from the region had 
a profound effect upon Iran's foreign policy in general 
and Persian Gulf policy in particular. The Iran's primary 
objectives in the Persian Gulf were (1) to protect the 
safety of the Shah's regime against internal subversion 
sponsored indirectly either by radical Arab regimes or the 
Soviet Union (2) to protect Iranian oil resources and the 
vast oil Installations concentrated in the Gulf area 
against deliberate or accidental disruption from any 
quarter, and (3) to preserve freedom of navigation in the 
Shatt-al-Arab, the Persian Gulf, and particularly Che 
Strait of Hormuz. 
It was also experienced by Iran that the future of 
the Persian Gulf would depend on the understanding and 
cooperation of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The 
Iranian government has always been agreeable to any kind of 
regional cooperation and it also agrees with regional 
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cooperation in the Persian Gulf. The above mentioned 
attitude of the government still prevails for the Gulf 
region as it is mentioned in the most recent news of 1993 
that "Iran has always been a key to stability in the 
region". Iranian Foreign Minister All Akbar Velayati told 
German Journalists in an interview this month of May 19, 
1993 "We are not encouraging conflicts but rather trying 
2 
to defense crises and, where possible to mediate." 
Iran's strategy vis-a-vis the major Gulf states was 
to seek as much cooperation with them as the situation 
allowed. The first choice was Saudi Arabia, the Gulf's 
largest Arab state, with which Iran, as seen, had 
established some rudimentary ties. Even on the issue of 
Bahrain Iran was not very tough in his policy. To 
reconcile the like-minded Arab states, on the one hand, 
and bait the British toward a better bargain in regard to 
the three Islands, on the other, the Shah dramatically 
declared his decision to abandon Iran's ancient claim 
to Bahrain. On January 4, 1969, he declared in a press 
conference in New Delhi that 'if the people of Bahrain do 
1. Ittala-at Havai, Nov. 14, 15, 1967. 
2. The Hindu (India), Friday, May 21, 1993, p. 7. 
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not want to join my country, Iran would withdraw its 
territorial claims to the Persian Gulf Island. He said 
Iran would accept the will of the people in Bahrain if this 
3 
was recognised internationally. 
(A) The Threat Posed by "Arabism" to Iran : 
Since the beginning Iran was not used and well 
prepared to meet the threat posed by the Arabism. "Except 
for a few, Iranians tend to dislike Arabs and to suspect 
Arab nationalism". Iran's conflict with the Arab States 
in general was partly rooted in divergent national 
cultural ethos. Furthermore, a modern nationalism among 
both the Arabs and Iranians had tended to intensify power 
rivalry and aggrarate traditional attitudes of mutual 
5 
contempt and mistrust. It is evident from the long 
history of Persian-Ottoman Conflict that it has kept the 
Arabs and Iranians apart. Religious factor had been a 
divisive force even during the Ottoman period. The neigh-
bouring Arab State, Iraq, had been a competitor of Iran. 
During the Islamic period too rivalries based upon 
3. Kayhan (Daily English), July 9, Aug. 28, 1968. 
4. Binder, Leonard, Iran: Political Development in a 
Changing Society, University ol California 
Press, Berkeley, 1962, p. 329. 
5. Ramazani, R.K., The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role, 
University Press oT Virginia, Charlottesville, 
1972, p.34. 
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variables like Arab versus Persian, Sunnl versus Shi'l, 
overlapping religious sects and languages, had all 
contributed to regional conflicts. But Nasser remained the 
primary source of Arab threat to Iran and remained a potent 
threat to the Iranain piolitical system in the sixties as 
both Iran and Egypt have posed recent revolutionary 
challenges to Iran, and the neutralist pro-Soviet policies 
of both have tended to increase official suspicion. The 
Iranian responses to the threat posed by Nasserism were 
varied and Iran kept several options open to neutralize 
that threat. 
Besides availing of the international environment at 
the Global level, Iran also sought to exploit the regional 
environment to gain political and diplomatic leverage 
vis-a-vis Nasser. But Egyptian continued their attacks on 
the Iranian regime. Not only was the radio kept busy but 
attempts were also made to mobilize the Arab League to 
project a pan-Arab anti-Iranian stand. Also the high-
ranking Islamic leaders in Egypt were used to giving the 
whole controversy on Islamic colour. A meeting was called 
at the Arab League to formulate an Arab policy vis-a-vis 
Iran. Egypt was pressing the Arab States to break off 
Binder, L., p. 329. 
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diplomatic relations with Iran but was not gaining much 
support. A special meeting of the Arab League council was 
called but no plan of action was formulated. The question 
was postponed till the Arab Foreign Minister's Conference 
in Lebanon and then put into cold storage. But after 
sometime the Egyptian propaganda attacks were gradually 
reduced. 
Consequently, Egypt started using the Islamic 
institutions to generate an Islamic front against Iran 
such as the al-Azhar (University of Cairo) requested the 
Shah to consider his decision regarding the recognition of 
Israel. It was emphasized that our sentiments have been 
hunt as well as the feelings of the Ulema at al-azhar. We 
believe that the feelings of all Muslims in East and West 
have been equally injured. We consider this action 
contrary to the religious and cultural measures which we 
have taken for strengthening the brotherly relations among 
the Muslim peoples and which you have condoned. We should, 
therefore, hope you will reconsider this grave decisiion 
for the purpose of Muslim Unity. An Islamic Congress was 
also convened at Cairo. It declared that the recognition 
of Israel was in violation of the teachings of the Quran 
7. Ramzani, R.K., op. cit., p. 37. 
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and urged all Arab and Muslim people to condemn the Shah's 
attitude.^ This pressure was kept up. Egypt was accused 
of supporting the Islamic riots in Iran in 1963. There can 
be several reasons for the violent anti-Shah reactions in 
Egypt. 
The Iranian presence in the Gulf was on the increase 
and it was taken as a threat to Arabism in the Gulf. It 
should also be remembered that 1960 was a period when Iran 
was closest to the USA and was also drawing very close to 
Israel. Thus President Nasser's perception of Iranian 
policy was not totally inaccurate. Politically, after the 
Second World War, was very close with the USA, its fear of 
the Arabs and its sense of cultural isolation in the Middle 
East, it is not surprising that Iran found Israel a 
natural ally. They had several common denominators; 
quest for security against threats from regional rivals, 
trade (especially oil), military cooperation and covert 
operations apatnst common enemies. Economic relations too 
had played a vital role in linking Iran and Israel. Oil 
was the basis of the economic, political and even 
strategic linkage between these two countries. After the 
1954 oil agreement between the National Iranian Oil 
8. Middle East Journal, 1960, p. 219. 
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Company (NIOC) and the oil consortium in Iran, the NIOC 
was left with its share of oil that it had to market. 
Since the world market was already cornered Iran had 
difficulty in selling its share of oil. Since the Arabs 
had boycotted Israel the Israeli market went a begging 
until NIOC discovered it.^ This link moulded Iran-Israel 
relations. One reason why Israel insisted on a right of 
passage through the Aqaba after 1956 was to keep open 
its oil lanes with Iran. These contacts developed further 
after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Once it became 
evident that the Suez Canal was not going to be reopened 
easily, Iranian began to use the pipeline connecting Aqaba 
to the Mediterranian. 
(B) Major Gulf Policies of Iran (Specially Saudi Arabia) : 
The Iranian possesses huge economic base in the 
Persian Gulf and can play a leading role in the region even 
after the Saudi Arabia's economic affluency and its other 
allied Arab Gulf countries. However, Iran always tried 
her best to check the subversive forces getting strong-
hold in the region, secondly, it was the earnest desire of 
9. Hurewitz, J.C., Iran in World and regional affairs, 
in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the 
Seventies, Praeger, New York, 1971, p.139. 
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the Shah to have a control over the straits of Hormuz, 
thirdly, the overall control over the Shatt-al-Arab as 
well as the protection of the Iranian oil resources, and 
lastly, facilities on land as well as off-shore against any 
deliberate or accidental disruptions. 
There are a large number of incidents to find out the 
policies and programmes of Iran in most of the countries of 
the Arabian Peninsula. The controversy over the name Arab 
or Persian Gulf itself symbolized the threat from Arabism. 
Radicalism means Arab support to anti-Shah forces in Iran 
or the growth of radical movements on the Arab littoral. 
The threat to Iranian oil ranged from Arab claims to 
Iranian oil-bearing territory like Khuzistan and the 
continental shelf in the Gulf, the threats to oil 
installations and safety of the oil lanes in the Gulf and 
beyond it. The international environment-Soviet support to 
the Dhofar movement, Soviet-Iraqi relations and the Soviet 
presence in the Indian ocean - might have also contributed 
to the overall threat perception of Iran. It is clear that 
most of these variables were inter-connected and based 
upon a set of assumptions like inevitability of Arab-
ic. The Arabian Peninsula, Iran and the Gulf States: 
New Wealth, New Power, a Summary record, the 
27th annual conference of the Middle East 
Institute, Washington DC, September 28-29, 1973 
(Mimeographed, 22). 
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Iranian rivalry, radical movement in the Arab world posing 
a direct threat to Iran. Thus these assumptions and Iran's 
threat perception were logically interlinked. The 
Iranian responses can be studied under several inter-
connected moves : (1) quest for legitimacy as a Gulf power 
either through diplomacy or by force, projecting Iranian 
power as the dominant factor in Gulf Politics, manipulating 
the international environment to suit Iran's requirement 
etc. The question of legitimacy is related with the threat 
from Arabism. Iran had to be accepted as a Gulf power by 
the Arabs. Hence agreements with the Arab States, 
especially on the question of demarcation of the 
continental shelf, security of the Gulf, closed-sea 
concept, control of navigation in the Gulf etc. assumed 
great significance for Iran. Diplomacy was buttressed 
with military might and the capacity and the will to 
demonstrate it and use it. The Iranian occupation of the 
three islands in the Gulf and the use of Iranian troops in 
Oman illustrated that variable. Iran had also skillfully 
used the international environment to suit Its policy. 
Though Arabism and Nassertsm constituted a potential 
threat to Iran and the Iraqi coup added substance to that 
overall threat from the Arab World. Such as Egypt and 
60 
Iraq was directly involved in several conflicts with Iran. 
The question of Shatt-al-Arab, Khuzistan and the 
continental-shelf agreement etc. were added subsequently. 
<C) The Policies Over Persian/Arabian Gulf : 
About the name of Persian/Arab Gulf both the Arabs 
and the Iranians were extra-sensitive. The Persian Gulf 
had been the traditional name but by 1955 the term Arab 
Gulf had gained popularity in the Arab World. This was 
not a mere matter of nomenclature - it is a - symptom of a 
rivalry which was rooted in history, a rivalry between two 
different races, two different religions, two different 
cultures. Not only are the two different terms 
mandatory in the publications in the Arab World and in 
Iran, but efforts were made to give them, especially the 
new term Arab Gulf, international recognition. In the mid 
sixties an attempt was made to have Arabian Gulf 
12 
currency which was quitely failed by the British who were 
still the dominant power in the Arab Sheikhdoms of the 
11. Marlowe, John, Arab-Persian rivalry in the Persian 
Gulf, Royal Control Asian Journal 5(1) January, 
1963, pTlT. 
12. Economist, 219 (64-66), 4 June, 1966, pp. 1077-78. 
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Gulf. An attempt was made to create an Arabian Gulf news 
agency in 1976, which created a bitter Arab-Iranian 
controversy. Iranian ambassadors from all perslan Gulf 
countries were recalled urgently. Foreign Minister 
Khalatbari was reported to have said on 7 January 1976 
that if the report of that news agency was correct Iran 
13 
would review its ties with these country. The idea of 
forming an Arabian Gulf news agency was initiated by Abu 
Dhabi in a conference of Ministers of Information of seven 
Arab States in the Gulf. The Iranian government objected 
to it very violently. 
The second point of dispute is Khuzistan or 
Arabistan, Arabs have been claiming that this strate-
gically located area on the Persian Gulf coast oil-bearing 
strata belonged to the Arab World and it was occupied by 
force by Reza Khan in the early twenties. A Khuzistan 
Liberation Committee was reportedly established as early as 
1955. In 1964 Arab Jurists began claiming it as a part 
of the Arab World and in November 1965 the Syrian 
government referred to Khuzistan as Arabistan and called it 
a part of the "Arab homeland". The 1969 Iran-Iraq dispute 
13. Tehran Journal, 8 January, 1976-
14. Burrel, R.M., Iranian Foreign Policy, Asian Affairs, 
Vol. 61, Pt. I Feb. 1974, p.9. 
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over the Shatt-al-Arab highlighted the Khuzlstan question 
and in April 1969 the deputy prime minister and minister of 
interior began calling Khuzlstan and Iraqi territory. 
A propaganda attack was launched against Iran through 
Radio Baghdad. Khuzlstan also became known as occupied 
Arabistan. An Arablstan Liberation Front also came into 
existence. 
Among above cited factors that dominated Iranian 
policy in the Gulf was its threat perception vis-a-vis its 
oil resources as one of the major factor around which most 
of the Iranian policies use to revolve. The scope of this 
threat ranged from the security of its oil-fields on land 
and in the continental shelf, oil installations like 
refineries and oil terminals, and of the sea-lanes. Over a 
number of years oil became more and more the crucial 
variable in Iran's national security. It was the basis of 
Iran's economic development, military power, diplomatic 
strength and also the basis of the systemic security of the 
ruling elite. Hence, the Shah regime became very cautious 
about the security of Iranian oil. It would not be wrong 
to say that oil diplomacy had assumed a crucial place in 
Iran's foreign and domestic policies. But there was some 
disputed area of oil producing on which depends the oil 
power, any attempt by neighbouring Arab countries to 
penetrate in such areas was responded by Iran very 
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violently. Hence Iran reacted violently to the Arab claLms 
that Khuzlstan was Arab territory or that the Gulf was an 
exclusively Arab area from which Iran should be excluded. 
Khuzistan was an old problem that involved Iran-Arab 
relations long back. But the question of the continental 
shelf was a new one. The question concerned the ownership 
of oil resources in areas that had never been claimed till 
then by any of the littoral states. Thus the continental 
shelf of the Gulf had to be divided among the littoral 
states and Iran wanted its due share. Since the exploi-
tation of the off-share oil resources started in 1957, the 
Iranian desire to acquire control over its share of the 
continental shelf and islands came to clash with "Arabism" 
in the Gulf, 
The Iranian oil installations like the refinery, 
storage tanks and the oil terminals were also not secured 
with the Arab threat such as Abadan use to serve as the 
major centre of Iranian oil installation. But Abadan was 
situated on the controversial Shatt-al-Arab and located 
just at the border of the Iraqi side. As long as Iran-
Iraq rlations were smooth, Iran never realised the 
security problem but after 1959 the situation became very 
serious on the issue of Shatt-al-Arab and hostility with 
these countries. Hence, Iranians began to give a second 
thought at Abadan and to shift to the Kharg island. Even 
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though its strategic and economic importance was 
relatively so high that Iran still is scared against either 
a surprise attack or a guerrilla raid. 
The Iranian government was also worried about the 
uniterrupted passage of oil tankers in the Gulf which Is 
not considered safe for the Iranian oil security because 
like other Arab States Iran does not have the pipeline to 
the Mediterranean. Therefcjre, Treedom to use the water-
ways both in the Gulf and beyond and also in the Shattal-
al-Arab, became a cardinal principle of Iran's oil 
diplomacy. Iran's fear of the threat to her oil lane in 
the Gulf arose both from a larger fear of Arab and Iranian 
rivalry as well as the fear guerrilla threat to tankers in 
the Gulf and of subversion based on the Arab Littoral. It 
also arose out of the general fear of Iraq, especially in 
the controversial Shatt-al-Arab. The Shatt-al-Arab dispute 
was a part of the boundary dispute that could be traced 
back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. 
The British decision to withdraw from the Gulf was 
highly welcomed by Iran as well as tried her best to 
15 
replace and to fill the vaccum. The British decision 
helped Iran and Iran's Gulf policy was the same like 
15. Schultz, Ann T., "Leadership Role for Iran in the 
Persian Gulf",Current History. 62(365), January, 
1972, p.25. 
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British. It helped Iran to emerge as the dominant Gvilf 
regional power-militarily, politically, and even 
economically. Iran's policy was totally against the 
presence of the British power in the Gulf. Also a 
continued British presence would have hindered Iran's 
policy vis-a-vis Bahrain or the three small islands in the 
Gulf. Thus it was imperative for Iran that Britain should 
leave immediately and no other outside power step in. 
The diplomacy of Iran was geared to fulfil its 
aspirations in the Gulf and it was fully supported by USA 
and UK also actively helped Iran to protect and promote 
the Iranian interests on the eve of the British departure 
from the Gulf. Iran also developed close political and 
economic contacts with the USSR that allowed her 
neutralize the possible Soviet support to Iraq and other 
Arab Gulf countries. Even Iran negotiated with China and 
prevent her from aligning with anti-Iranian forces in the 
Gulf. The major Arab powers, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 
the Gulf and Egypt outside, were cultivated as friends. 
Conscious efforts were made to cultivate India despite the 
adverse repurcussions of the Indo-Paklstani war of 1965. 
Thus by the time the British withdrew from the Gulf, Iraq, 
the main rival of Iran, had been diplomatically isolated 
and to a large extent neutralized. Iran had achieved it 
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while working against heavy odds. It was indeed a tribute 
to her diplomacy with the Arab countries of the Gulf. 
(D) Iran's Policy to Neutralize the Opposition : 
Iran always tried to neutralize all possible 
opposition in the Arab World. Egypt had been its old 
enemy. Despite the setback of Nasser in 1967 was still a 
force to be reckoned with. Thus, following three months 
of hard bargaining, diplomatic relations with Cairo and 
Tehran were finally established in 1970. Relations 
improved significantly following Sadat's rule in Egypt 
after Nasser's death. Egypt was finally neutralized, as 
it is evident from the very mild reaction to the question 
of Iran's occupation of the three Islands in the Gulf on 
the eve of the British departure. 
On the question of Iranian claims to Bahrain, th<-
Saudi-Iranian relations too had suffered a temporary set-
back in the year 1968. But the soothing touches of Anglo-
American diplomacy healed the rift between the twin 
pillars of western presence in the Gulf. The Saudi-Iranian 
solidarity was reflected In the statement by the -saudi 
Foreign Minister during his visit to Iran in April 1971. 
He said that Saudi Arabia and Iran had agreed to 
coordinate their policies on joint actions to be taken in 
the Gulf. The result of this alliance was that the Iraqi 
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strategy of creating an Arab defence alliance, that was 
declared by President Bakr In $ broadcast on 16 July 1970, 
was cold-shouldered by these Arab littoral states. Thus, 
Iran had finally isolated Irflq in the neighbouring areas 
and even vts-a-vls the super-powers. 
Iran proceeded with concrete moves as well as moved 
diplomatically to create an international environment 
favourable to its Gulf policy especially to reach the 
goals that would helped her to emerge aa the dominant 
power in the Gulf. But before it could acquire that 
position it had to seek legitimacy even as a Gulf power 
because the Gulf controversy whether the Gulf was Arab or 
Persian had already emerged as a major issue confronting 
Iran with Arab Gulf countries. Iran had created an 
international environment that buttressed Iranian diplomacy 
vis-a-vis the Arab claims. Thus concrete issues like 
continental-shelf agreements, the Bahrain issue and the 
dispute over the three islands in the Gulf become very 
importat iss\ ,-s in Iran's Gulf policy. Negotiations were 
initiated with Saudi Arabia on the question of dellniting 
the continental shelf and Iran obtained the Saudi 
recognition of her sovereignty over one Island in the 
Middle of the Gulf, i.e., the Island of Farasiyah. Side by 
side, as a consequent, other dispute were solved and 
other agreements were signed, such as Iran and Qatar in 
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1969, Iran and Bahrain in 1971, Iran and Oman 1974, Iran 
and UAE 1974. But Iran has not been able to sign the 
agreement with Kuwait and Iraq . But Iranian claims over 
four islands were hotly contested by the Arabs and proved 
a challenge to Iranian diplomacy as this issue will be 
largely discussed in chapter IV. But the Bahrain issue 
even created a temporary rift between two friendly pro-
western regional powers, i.e. Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia offered to the visiting Sheikh of Bahrain what the 
Iranians thought was a "royal" welcome. The Shah to show 
his displeasure cancelled his proposed visit to Saudi 
Arabia. 
It is, however, evident that Saudi Arabia and Iran 
were the twin pillars of western diplomacy in the Gulf and 
it was imperative that they should cooperate. Also it was 
necessary to evolve a face-saving formula on Bahrain that 
would suit the Arabs and also the Shah, Sir William Luce 
visited the trucial coast Sheikhdoms, i.e. Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. He also visited Iran in 1971 but nothing 
came to the concrete conclusion. Negotiations, however, 
continued on these three islands and even on Bahrain. The 
question was also discussed in the emergency session of the 
Arab League in December 1971. Iraq suggested that the Arab 
states shoulfi break off diplomatic relations with Iran 
but it was not accepted. It also requested its 
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Secretary General to contact Iran and the Arab States 
involved in the problem of consultation regarding the 
settlement of the problem, which would preserve the 
friendly relations between Iran and the Arab governments. 
The political committee of the Arab League continued its 
diplomatic mediation. The Secretary General informed the 
Committee that King Faisal was mediating with Iran to solve 
the problem.^^ The Security Council also discussed the 
question in an emergency meeting. Iraq took the lead in 
attacking Iran and Britain. It called the occupation of 
the three islands as "blatant agression against the Arab 
people everywhere". Many Arab states continued to 
denounce Iranian occupation of those islands even after 
1971. Thus the issue of the three islands is dormant but 
not finished. It can be a source of future Arab-Iranian 
confrontation if the Arabs so desire, or it can also be 
projected as an inter-Arab issue. Either way it is 
capable of posing a threat to Iran's security in the Gulf. 
However, by the end of 1971 Iran had succeeded in emerging 
as the dominant regional power In the Gulf. 
However, the Arab-Iranian relations would continue 
to be governed, for some-time at least, by several factors 
16. Egyptian Gazette, 14 March 1972. 
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such as the attitude of Arab regimes towards the Shah, the 
attitude of the present Shl'i clergy-dominated regime in 
Iran, the possibility of Shl'l-Sunni rivalry, and the 
leftist or socialist orientation of some Arab states. Many 
of the Arab states supported the Shah till he was over-
thrown. Egypt under the leadership of President Sadat, 
continued to support the Shah even after he was 
overthrown. In other Arab States the new Iranian regime 
was accepted but without much warmth and a stable prospect 
of peace may not be achieved through the policies and 
diplomacy of Iran. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
SHAH'S POLICIES AND CONCEPT OF SECURITY 
I. Shah's Policies Towards Internal Security : 
An analysis of the Shah's policies and concept of 
security will be made at national and regional level in this 
chapter. As the major threat posed to the Shah's regime was 
to the security of the regime because of the prevailing 
political, economic and social systems that had evolved 
around the monarchy. The country's integrity and security 
was threatened partly by several centrifugal forces operat-
ing in Iran. The threat too was magnified beyond proportion 
because of two reasons: 
(1) It was treated as a question of secession rather 
than of regional autonomy, 
(2) It got intermingled with Iran's rivalries with 
its neighbouring states (Gulf region). 
It is an universal fact that political system of 
Iran revolved around the person of the Shah. "The key to 
system continuity resides in the person of the Shah. He Is 
the centre of a strong socio-political structure made up 
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of personalistic ties and connections". 
The Iranian Political, system was largely and solely 
in the hand of Shah as a 'personal' or 'individual' w;iy ol 
deciding the whole political and economic affairs of Iran. 
Any attempt to participate in it with any disagreement o •• 
competitiveness was being regarded as a challenge oi 
potential threat to the country's political system. In any 
constructive political dialogue between the Shah and the 
others was being regarded as threat to the present regime 
and instead of being considered as opposition group they 
were always considered as 'Opponents'. 
(A) Religion, Politics and Internal Opposition : 
Just». after few years of his monarchical system of 
administration the security of his personal life as well as 
the administrative system was being threatened. The use of 
religion, tribalism and radicalism became very common in 
disturbing the monarchical system and created an environment 
of insecurity in the country as well as in the region (Culf! 
These threats were started bv the opposition and lar^ e^ls 
launched by the religious groups, i.e. radical, tribal 
dissidents and subversive forces. Religion posed a ver\ 
1. Arabian Peninsula, Iran and the Gulf States: New 
Wealth, New Power, A Summary'^TeT'ord, the 27 th 
Annual Conference of the Middle llast Institute, 
Washington DC, September, 28-29, 1973 (Mimeo-
graphed ) , 26. 
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significant threat to the Iranian political system under the 
monarchy, because of its emotional, faith and socio-cultural 
base of the masses. It Is also very significant that 
Iranian religious leaders were very influential politically 
and they were also influential and being influenced by the 
outside forces also. It is evident from the role being 
played by Jamaluddin Afghani and his Iranian followers that 
they consolidated the opposition against the Iranian 
monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Even 
the father of the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi too had to 
suffer a major setback at the hands of the Ulema and had to 
visit holy places like Najaf and Karbala to demonstrate and 
establish his faith in religion. The Ulema power in Iran 
is concentrated in the market of the major cities or in the 
huge market area that is the Centre of the socio-economic 
and political unrest. At that time Islam use to combine 
varying socio-economic groups comprises of the most poorer 
(porters, artisans, small shopkeepers and retailers) and the 
richer sections of the society (wealthy merchants and whole-
3 
salers and religious class). The religious groups formed •a 
board of law which can reject the constitution and any law 
2. Cotton, R.W., Nationalism in Iran, University of 
Pittsburg Press, 1964, p. 139. 
3. Brian, S,, Religion and Society Today, in Ehsan 
Yarshater, ecT. , Iran Faces the Seventies, New 
York, 1971, p. 170": 
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being Imposed in the public and the Uleraa used to agitate 
for this and they use to reject the laws which they consider 
contradictory to Islam. The desired power by the Ulema was 
granted under the constitution of 1906 but they were not 
getting it because when such a board was established and 
constituted it can curtail the power of the present regime 
of Shah. 
Religion provided a way for positive political 
action for the religious group. A number of religious group 
were formed, such as Fedayan Islan (Crusaders of Islam) and 
Hezb-e-Melal-e-Islami (the Islamic Nations Party), not only 
because of their extreme religious radicalism but also 
because of their involvement in assassination attempts in 
Iran such as a leader of Fedayan Islam (Khalil Tahmasabi) 
who was held responsible for shooting dead premier All 
Razamara and a newspaper of this group openly boosted of 
their responsibility for the crime, rising young 
politician (Hasan All Masur) was also shot dead by Mohammad 
Bokharai who belonged to the Hezb-e-Mellat-e-Islaml. A large 
number of similar incidents took place in Iran proving the 
activities and involvement of religious groups in the 
4. Amin, Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 
1961, p. 18. 
5. Jabri, Marwan, Dilemona in Iran, Current History, 
48(285), May 1965, p. 306. 
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country. But these religLous groups and active followers 
were in few thousands but were involved in active role of 
politics in the country without a mass base. But the 
followers of these groups were being blamed for maintaining 
links with the foreign powers especially with the Egypt 
under President Nasser. The leader of the Hezb-e-Melal-e-
Islami called Mohammad Kazem Musavi was accused of being an 
conspirational contact with an unfriendly foreign (Egyptian) 
government. These groups were also accused of following an 
appointment policy by the existing regime. To strengthen 
themselves these Islamic groups often aligned themselves 
with other political groups In their opposition to the Shah. 
The Ulema acted as the main opposition basically on 
two basic reasons with the Shah's regime. They opposed the 
modernization like land reform and franchise to women, both 
were opposed on religious ground, The land reform measures 
was opposed primarily on the ground that they violated the 
individuality of the private property. But there were so 
many reasons that added fuel to the controversy. Despite 
the opposition of the clergy Shah personally went to Qum to 
distribute the land and personally handed over the land 
deeds to the peasants, Qum is the heart of the Shi'i Islam 
6. Farmayan, F., Politics During the Sixties, Ehsan 
Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Forces in the Seventies, 
Praeger, New York, 1^71, p. 121. 
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ard stronghold of the Ulema group In Iran. At the same time 
the government arrested and exiled the respected Mujtahld 
Ayatollah Khomeini from Qum as he was very popular and well 
known opponent and protestor against illegitimate 
authority . 
The opposition of the Ulema followed by large scale 
rioting in a large number of towns and the market centre 
became the battlegrounds. But the riots could not achieve a 
purposeful success because of the fact that there was not 
sufficient coordination between the Ulema and the secular 
nationalist forces in Iran. A large scale rioting once 
again broke out in the first half of 1978, The government 
imposed martial law on September 1978 and began large-scale 
arrests of the Iranian opposition leaders. The Iranian 
opposition had crystallized in 1977-78 followed by some 
liberalization. The Ulema got organised under the 
leadership of Ayatollah Sayed Kazem Sharl'at of Qum. The 
extremist ulema leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 
continued to operate from his exile in Iraq and then from 
Paris. The riot of 1978 denoted not purely a religious 
movement but a mass movement supported by a cross section of 
the Iranian population ranging from conservative religious 
7. Rose, L.G., 1942-1976: The Reign of Mohammad Riza 
Shah, in Hossein Amir Sadeghi, ed., Twentieth 
Century Iran, New York, 1977, p. 86. 
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groups led by Ulema and supported by the bazaarl (market) 
population, moderates like the Iranian society for the 
Defence of Liberty and Human Rights, old groups like the 
National Front and the students leaders, and extreme 
radicals like the Islamic Marxists. Yet despite the active 
support of these several political groups, the movement was 
basically a mass movement and not a party movement. That 
was one of the causes of Its dramatic success and, if the 
situation is not properly handled by the politicians, can 
also become a cause of its failure. Any split in the top 
political groups would negate the achievements of the mass 
movement and once again breed mass discontent not only 
against the regime but also against the politicians, who for 
g 
their own narrow interests might betray the mass movement. 
The policy of liberalization initiated by the Shah 
could not achieve its success and the National Front leader 
Bakhtiar said the reconciliation with the present regime is 
not at all possible. He also said that 'We are faced with 
an army of occupation which fires indiscriminately and kills 
the innocent'. The Ulema leaders demanded that Shah 
should put in force the Iranian Constitution of 1966 which 
provided for a committee of five Ulema to supervise legis-
lation and ensure its compatibility with Islam. But the 
8. Singh, K.R., Iran: Quest for Security, Vikas Pub, 
House, Pvt. Ltd. , 1981, p. 10. 
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ulema group of Qum were reluctant to support the demand of 
Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, who was demanding the Shah's 
Violent overthrow. According to Ayatollah Shariatmadari 
'History and the Iranian nation alone, not I, will decide 
whether the monarchy should continue. But neither the 
radicals nor the extremists were prepared to have a dialogue 
with the Shah or with the old Premier Sharif Emami, who was 
brought because of his image as a conservative man who might 
be acceptable to the ulema. Consequently, in the absence 
of a dialogue the country was governed through the instru-
ment of guns under martial law. But the question that was 
posed was "How many times would the soldiers continue to 
fire upon their brothers. Jltimately the guns fell silent 
and the Shah had to leave, probably never to return. 
(B) Threat from Tribalism and Minorities : 
After religion, tribalism was the major source of 
threat to the Iranian security. The major cause was tribal 
socio-economic hierarchy and its relationship with the 
central authority. It was also because of the demographic 
composition and geographical location of the non-Persian 
minorities occupy areas on the periphery of Iran, and 
9. Cooley, John, K. , Shia Muslim foes reject sitting 
down with the Shah, Christian Science Monitor, 
20, Sept., 1978. 
10. Ibid. 
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and secondly, these minorities are part of similar groups in 
the neighbouring countries, i.e. Azerbaijanis in the 
U.S.S.R., Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey, Arabs in Iraq and 
Baluchis in Pakistan. The Iranian politics was highly 
affected by the tribal autonomy. These tribal rebellions 
were being inspired by foreign powers interfering in the 
internal affairs of Iran. Hence, the Shah was greatly 
disturbed by these events. 
The government of Iran was disturbed from the 
Kurdish nationalism and its impact on regional politics. At 
the time Iraq's coup of 1958, the Kurds of Iraq and Syria 
requested to unite with Iran. In order to counter the Arab 
national power the Kurds wanted to take shelter with Iran 
but later on these Kurds worked out an alliance and to 
declare war against the Shah. 
The Iranian government was also worried and 
interested to find out the sources of the threat to is 
security from within the country and also from outside the 
country. A number of allegations are traced and indicated 
by the government of Iran and blamming the local oppositions 
getting support from the foreign countries. The Shah was 
also worried from the radical Arab countries like Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq and Libya. At one stage even India was blamed 
11. New York Times, 26 July, 1958, Quoted in Ramzani 
n. 7, 400 and 27 April, 1959, p. 401. 
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and accused for supporting the Baluchi movements which the 
Iranian government thought threatened Its national security. 
These supports to the opposition were based either on 
Ideological base or were trying to use It as a politico-
diplomatic lever In their confrontation with Iran. 
Iran always looked with suspicion not only upon the 
Arab policy of the USSR but also Its growing naval and 
politico-military presence In and around the Indian Ocean 
region, especially in the Gulf (Iraq) and the Bab-al-Mandeb 
area (Somalia & Yemen). The Soviets were also committed to 
support the radical movement in Dhofar which was resented 
by the Shah. After 1971 the Iranian developed a thesis that 
they were being encircled by the Soviet Union. 
(C) External Opposition to Iranian Security : 
Iranian security was also being threatened by 
Chinese as the most active opponents of the Shah were the 
Maoist guerrillas and were staunch supporters of the Dhofar 
movement and offered all possible military and political 
support to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Occupied 
Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The Chinese experts trained Dhofarl 
12 guerrillas and occasionally accompanied them into battle. 
Subsequently, the Cubans were treated as the most serious 
12. Kayhan International, 27 December, 1970. 
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13 
external threat to Irans regional security. The Shah of 
Iran expressed fear of the possible threat posed by the 
Cuban soldiers in South Yemen. 
Within the Gulf region Iranian realised a threat to 
its security by the radical forces in the Arab World. This 
threat can be divided into two parts, direct support by 
anti-Shah forces in Iran from radical Arab movements and 
indirect threat to Iranian security posed by Arab radica-
lism, republicanism, anti-imperialism and even Arab 
nationalism, as exemplified in the controversy over the 
name-Persian or Arab Gulf and the Islands in the Gulf. 
Long back Egypt was considered as a threat to Iran 
as the Nasser was being considered as hero for a large 
number of Iranian Nationalists. Secondly Nasser attempted 
very keenly for the Arab Unity and Arab nationalism. His 
military support to the republican regime in Yemen and even 
his alleged support to the Islamic group in 1963 were also 
seen as a threat by the Iranian regime. 
The Egyptian influence declined after 1964 as well 
as marked change was seen after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 
By July 1968 after the coup of 1968 in Iraq by the radical 
wing of the Ba'ath party, Iraq replaced Egypt as the new 
centre of anti-Iranian activities in the Arab World. It 
13. Wolfgang, B., Cuban Intervention in Africa and 
Arabia, Aussen Politic, 27(3), 1976, p.333. 
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took up the Arab Leadership on the question of the "Arab" 
Gulf and Khuzlstan. Iraq also tried to project its dispute 
with Iran within the framework of an Arab-Iranian dispute. 
After that Iraq was being accused by Iran for its inter-
ference in Iran's Internal affairs. It was also being 
reported that antl-Iranlan broadcast were from within Iraq 
citing the example of revolutionary struggles of Ho Chi 
Mlnh, Algerian and African guerilla etc. Radio of the 
Patriots began operating in April 1974 and the Shah as well 
as Iranian regime were its main targets. It should also be 
noted that these propaganda activities coincided with the 
Kurdish war and subsided following the March 1975 detente 
between Iraq and Iran. Iraqi regime was also accused of 
instigating a coup d'etat in Iran. A spokesman of the 
Iranian security forces, in a televised conference on 13 
December 1970, revealed the details of an abortive coup 
d'etat. According to him Lt. Col. Teymur Bakhtlar was 
supposed to organise that coup with the help of the Iraqi 
Ba'ath regime, The Tudeh party and other banned groups like 
the Confederation of Iranian students. Large quantities of 
small arms, explosives and money were seized. Several 
persons were also arrested. Iraq was also accused for 
regularly supporting anti-Shah guerrillas in Iran. Besides 
14. Kayhan International, 24 Dec. 1970. 
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the Arab governments, Palestinian organisations like the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was reportedly 
supporting Iranian guerrilas either directly or through 
common links with the guerrillas in Dhofar. The fact was 
also evident that the Dhofar group had also established 
links with the Tudeh party. 
The Shah was always fearing with the radicalism 
prevailing in the Gulf countries. It is obvious for him 
that radical coup d'etat may take in any place in the Gulf. 
It became more obvious when he explained the reason for his 
interference militarily in Oman that he could not tolerate 
the emergence of a communist regime in the Gulf. The Shah 
had always been pessimistic about the future of the 
traditional regimes in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia. 
The responses to these large number of threats of 
various nature was no doubt very spontaneous by the Iranian 
Government. Every effort was made to strengthen the roots 
of the monarchical system of the government. Various 
religious issues were also raised to save the regime even to 
please the Shi'i population such as the Shah tried his best 
to project the impression that he has got the blessings 
of God and especially of 'ALI' and 'ABBAS' , who are 
15. Marvin G. Weinbanm, Iran and Israel, Orbis, 18(4), 
Winter, 1975, p. 1081. 
16. Cottrell, Alvln, J., Concern Over Saudi Arabia's 
Viability: an exclusive interview with the Shah 
of Iran, New Middle East. (31), April 1971, p.22 
17. Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mohammad (His Imperial Majesty), 
Mission of My Country, London, 1961, p. 38. 
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reversed especially by the Shi'i population. In an 
interview with E.A. Bayne, the Shah reiterated his belief by 
saying "Four times in my reign I have been threatened 
seriously, and four times my life has been spared. I must 
confess that I am beginning to have a mystical sense about 
my job.-*"^  Thus it was argued that if God had thought fir to 
save the Shah. He has a vested interest in what he was 
doing. Such a logic could have been acceptable to the 
traditional Iranian population, especially in the interior. 
Keeping in line with that logic posters were displayed in 
Iran which showed the Shah and the Quran. besides efforts 
to neutralize the charges that the Shah was against 
religion, these posters showing the Shah and the Quran 
"Symbolize the duty of obedience to the pious ruler, and 
presumably they strengthened the loyalty of the simple, 
19 traditional religious minded masses". But, generally, the 
younger intellectuals denied the religion for the sake to 
criticise the existing regime and the Ulema and the 
religiously sophisticated people of the over-crowded market 
places the legitimacy of the regime was not at all 
acceptable. The anti-Shah riot at large scale of 1978 in 
continuation with 1963 is a major proof that Shah was not 
18. Bayne, E.A. Persian Kingship in Transition, American 
Universities, Field Staff Inc., New York, p. 39. 
19. Binder, Leonard, Iran: Political Development in a 
Changing Society, University ol California 
Press, Berkeley, 1962, p. 76. 
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capable enough to buy legitimacy by linking the present 
20 
regime with Shi' i divinity. "^  
A large number of secular activities were displayed 
by Shah regime to attain the legitimacy of the monarchy and 
its continuity was also assured. The powers and the 
position as well as status of monarchy had also been 
legitimised through amendments through the Iranian 
Constitution. It was stated that it is the primary duty of 
bureaucracy, judiciary and the army to serve the Shah since 
Iran followed the concept of dowIat-i-Shahanshahl. The 
Shah brought a number of constitutional amendments to 
increase his power such as to dissolve the parliament and 
his direct participation in the decision-making process in 
Iran at the cost of the Majlis. It is traced through the 
major two amendments: (1) Creation of the Senate and 
(ii) Curtailing the power of the Majlis at the cost of the 
royal family in 1967. The Senate was created only to check 
20. That the Shah had the blessings of God, and espe-
cially of 'All' and 'Abbas', who are reversed 
especially by the Shi'i population. The Shah 
claimed that when he was ill as a child he saw 
the vision of 'All' and got well, that 'Abbas' 
saved him when he fell down from a horse and 
that he saw the Imam in the Royal palace. All 
that prompted the Shah to believe that he was 
favoured by God. "From the time I was six or 
seven, I have felt thcit perhaps there is a 
supreme being who is guiding me". The Shah's 
almost miraculous escape from the bullets of 
the assassi n in 1949 buttressed that feeling 
further. "I know that many will deny that God 
supports anything or anybody. But now, as In my 
childhood days, my reliance on God affords me a 
firm foundation for thought and for action". 
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upon the more exuberant Majlis since the Senate was not a 
very powerful body and it could not have a say in financial 
matters that were the exclusive jurisdiction of the Majlis. 
It was realised after 1970 that acquiring mere 
constitutional legitimacy was not enough if the popular 
acceptance is not acclaimed which was equally relevant for 
the existence and survival of the monarchical system in 
Iran. The Iranian people at large scale are not docile on 
which legitimacy can be conferred very easily as they have 
always demanded for popular participation for the political 
legitimacy of the regime. Hence Shah was very tactful in 
including the political parties and elections to the Majlis 
as well as their participation in the political decision-
making process, and always strtved for posing and 
projecting the image of political freedom in Iran. 
(D) Threat from the Nationalists : 
After the arrest of the nationalists in the year 
1953 the country started facing a major threat for the 
existence of the monarchy and by 1975 a saturation point 
reached for a controlled democracy. In order to minimise 
the danger the Shah created a two-party system. The Hezb-e-
Mardom party (Peoples Party) led by Asadollah Alam and 
Hezb-e-Melliyun party (National Party) became the government 
party. Melliyun party, , representing the 
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government, received two-third votes in the Majlis. In Iran, 
party platforms were new phenomena and membership of the 
party were largely determined on the basis of friendship and 
relations. In due course of time such a system of political 
parties failed because being the loyal subjects of the Shah 
no one even wanted to play the role of being an opponent. 
In the absence of an active opposition the Melllyun too 
lost its political significance but it was allowed to 
continue as an official party. But immediately Shah started 
a new era so-called "progressive' reforms like the white 
revolution and he wanted that ruling party should be 
progressive in attitude. Hence the old Melllyun was 
replaced by the newly created party, Iran-e-Novin. It was 
kept under the leadership of Ali Mansur who led a group of 
progressive and young economists and social scientists. 
After sometime It was realised that the two-party system 
could not survive or deliver the goods and the Shah decided 
to create a single-party system. He declared in a speech 
that the two-party system was no longer tenable and did not 
correspond to the current needs of national development. 
Hence he proposed a creation of a single party. He wanted 
that all the politically aware elements to unite to develop 
the country in the spirit of the White Revolution. It was 
expected that the party would encourage constructive 
criticism. Hence a new party Rastakhize-e Iran(Resurrection 
89 
cf Iran) was created under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Abbas Hoveyda. It had all the formal structures like poltt 
bureau, committees at various levels and even the cadre 
system. The new party was conceived to serve as a 
mobilizing agency In the modernizing process, as a screening 
device In the search for talent to fill various high 
government positions, as a channel for educating In the 
principles and priorities of the White Revolution, and as a 
system of meeting the communication gap with the people at 
large. But later on people realized that It was all for the 
benefit of the monarchical system. Since there was no 
sharing of power there was no sharing of responsibility. 
The events of 1978 proved that the people of Iran had 
rejected the legitimacy of that system. 
(E) The Danger from the Process of Modernization : 
The process of modernization was used to create a 
more favourable situation in the country. The basic 
objectives of this process was twofold, i.e. to weaken the 
traditional sources of opposition in favour of monarchy like 
religious conservation and tribalism and also the creation 
of a secular and modernized socio-economic infra-structure 
that would support the institutions that had brought these 
changes. Hence a concerted efforts were made to curb the 
powers of the tribes and the ulema and also to create the 
infra-structure of a modern secular society. Reza Shah 
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carefully and cautiously calculated a plan for the destruc-
tion of tribal power. He wanted absolute power in a unified 
and controlled state and the autonomy of the tribes had to 
21 be destroyed for the achievements of this goal. His 
policy was mainly concentrated to disarm the tribes and 
masses, conscription and settlement were the three main 
instruments of his policy besides the traditional Iranian 
way of bribing the tribal leaders, imprisonment and exile 
22 
or murdering the unwanted elements. The way of conscript 
tion took away the young and able-bodies young men from the 
tribal areas, thereby not only reducing the capacity of the 
tribe to pose a military threat but also affecting the 
tribal economy. The government policy and plans, generally 
and very frequently, implemented with the use of force, to 
inhabitate the tribes not only compelled them to settle in a 
well-defined place but weakened their economy but suddenly 
forcing them to switch over from a migratory life and 
pastoral economy to new sedentary socio-economic infra-
21. Cotton, R.W., Nationalism in Iran, University of 
Pittsburg Press, 1964, p.314-317. 
22. Upton, Joseph, M., The History of Modern Ifan: An 
Interpretation, Havard Middle Eastern Monograph 
Series, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachussettes, 1960, 79. Also see, L.P. 
Elwell-Sutton, Reza Shah the Great: Founder of 
the Pahlavi Dynasty, in George Lenczowski, ed., 
p. 30. 
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structure. A concerted efforts were also made to break the 
tribal monopoly in a demarcated area of Khuzistan by 
encouraging urbanization and better land utilization so that 
Persians could move in and balance the local Arabs. Even 
the local language and culture was also changed by 
introducing and encouraging the Persian language and 
culture. In these regions better means of communications 
like railways and roads and also well-trained and 
disciplined army helped in bringing the tribes under 
control. All possible means of accessibility was introduced 
to bring the tribals closer to the mainstream and better 
life though the incidents of tribal revolt did occur from 
time to time but were no longer a serious challenge, unless 
supported by outside forces like the Kurdish movement, the 
Khuzistan question or the Baluchi problem. But even these 
did not pose a real threat to the security of the monarchy 
of Iran. These policies were more or less very successful 
but the combined effect of the forces of opposition, these 
tribal locations along the periphery of Iran became a major 
cause of support to the opposition during the period 1970's. 
The Iranian monarchy, even after so much efforts, 
was unable to neutralize or even reduce the political 
influence of the clergy and the threat posed by religious 
fundamentalism to the prevailing monarchical system in Iran. 
The major cause of this failure was that the monarchy was 
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not sincere in creating a strong secular, democratic and 
progressive force in Iran that would have balanced the 
forces of religious conservatism in that country. Whenever 
this force showed signs of independence it was suppressed 
thus indirectly strengthening the hands of the religious 
leaders. The suppression of democratic, secular and 
progressive forces in the fifties was indirectly responsible 
for the religious riots of 1963 and their suppression in the 
sixties and seventies was partly responsible for the 
religious riots of 1978. Undoubtedly the secular forces 
were also active in 1978, but the main force was still the 
religious group and not the secular group. Thus it is 
obvious that the monarchy indirectly helped to encourage and 
strengthen the conservative forces that ultimately posed the 
real challenge to the monarchical system in Iran. 
In order to attain the political legitimacy the 
government of Iran also adopted the policy and tactic to 
bring about socio-economic change and reforms. A subs-
tantial part of the oil economy was obtained to invest in 
economic development and social uplift in the country. An 
increase of 12 per cent in GNP (Gross National Products) was 
recorded per annum which was quite high for a better life 
and better standard of living as well 150 US Dollar per head 
per annum income of 1950's recorded a very high increase by 
500 US Dollar during the early period of 1970s. Such a high 
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increase in income is held responsible to the high price 
hike of oil in the year 1973. On the economic development 
front industrialization was one of the main targets of the 
fourth and the fifth five-year plan. Other major reforms 
was noted in the field of health, education, female emanci-
pation and land reforms by the regime. The White Revolution 
symbolized the sum total of the efforts from above at the 
socio-economic transformation of the society. The sudden 
high level modernization resulted in regional and socio-
economic imbalances and created potential problems for the 
then existing socio-economic structure in Iran. It is quite 
obvious that the 1970s "Witnessed considerable evidence of 
social and political malaise, such as violence and plots 
against the regime... 
The strategy of economic development and rapid 
modernization, no doubt, created a problem and were held 
responsible for the tension but these offers only a partial 
explanation to the Iranian situation today. The problem 
should be judged in different manner and especially in the 
context of the developing world as the experiences of Iran 
poses an interesting hypothesis, i.e., can socio-economic 
modernization alone guarantee systematic security? Can 
people accept the principle of sharing of responsibility 
without a commensurate sharing of power? Recent events in 
Iran have shown that socio-economic modernization alone can 
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be no substitute for political freedom even in a Third World 
country. Secondly, the Iranian monarchy weakened its own 
position so much so that neither the intelligentia nor the 
ulema were prepared to negotiate with it when the monarchy 
denied the right to participate in the decision-making 
processes. The nationalists rejected the Bakhtiar govern-
ment because he had negotiated with the Shah. Therefore, 
the Iranian opposition was in no mood even to negotiate with 
him lest it give legitimacy to the monarchical system. 
(F) Mechanism of Repression : 
Because of the continuous repression the political 
dialogue started taking place. Therefore, the mechanism of 
repression has to be seen from different angles: 
(i) in order to fight against real or potential 
sources of danger to the Iranian political 
system the help of outside forces is needed. 
(ii) seeking outside forces to fight against forces 
hostile to the regime. 
(iii) seeking a dentente with forces that were 
helping the opposition. 
(iv) and finally building up forces of overt and 
covert operation in Iran to fight against the 
'enemies' at home and abroad. 
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The policy of containing the threat at all possible 
points, the Iranian regime had gone out of its way to 
support governments that had been trying to suppress hostile 
guerrilla movements inside their own countries. The 
Iranians extended full support to the regime in Oman to 
contain the Dhofar movement. During the period 1972 the 
Iranian armed forces joined the forces of Oman in anti-
insurgency operations in Dhofar. Though the Iranian forces 
were limited to about two thousands only but sufficient 
enough to bring effective movement. The reason for the 
Iranian involvement in Oman was not only the links between 
the insurgents there and the guerrillas in Iran but also the 
fact that Oman also controlled the vital entrance to the 
Gulf. Oman's sovereignty extends to the Musandam peninsula 
adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz. "Hence, Irdn believed 
that the strategic location of that region made inavoidable 
a positive response to Oman Sultan's request for military 
23 intervention." The military and political help extended 
to Pakistan by Iran after 1971 can only be explained in the 
light of the potential danger from the Baluchi movement in 
Pakistan. Similarly the Kurds also received help from Iran 
who were fighting against the Iraqi regime was a good 
23. Zabih, S. Irans Policy towards the Persian Gulf, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
Vol.7, 1976, p. 357. 
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example of using insurgency tactics against the regimes 
hostile to Iran. 
iiQ) Super Power Shelter for Political Survival : 
For the continuity of the regime, Iran followed a 
policy of seeking shelter and support of a super power and 
also safeguard themselves from the internal hostile forces 
of the country. Hence, the Shah sought American support for 
his political survival and also because of the fact that 
both Iran and America were anti-subversion, therefore, Iran 
was very much inclined to follow the policy of America. The 
U.S.A. help was also crucial in strengthening police and 
military elements to enable the regime to use them to 
protect the system. The use of these military and para-
military forces for political support to the regime was 
encouraged by the Shah as well as for internal security 
specially in tribal areas. Such an US help provided in Iran 
was quite useful and operations were quite successful in 
eighty per cent territory of Iran covering about three-
fourths of the population. It provided good radio communi-
cation, small arms and other equipments including light air-
craft, helicopters and fast petrol boats. Later on some of 
the major items were also provided such as heavy weapons 
like mortars, medium tanks, trucks, ammunition, rocket 
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launchers, recoiless rifles, signal equipment etc. Besides 
the U.S. financial, military and technical support for the 
strengthening of the forces was also used to buttress Iran's 
internal security. The military assistance supply programme 
for Iran is in the form of items which increased the 
strength and efficiency of the Iranian army so that the 
country can guard itself against internal subversion or 
25 
external aggression. The Secretary of Defence, McNamava 
said that the prime purpose of present assistance to Iran 
was "to help to build-up its military forces to the point 
where they can Insure internal security and provide at least 
26 
an initial defence against Soviet attack. No doubt it is 
a reality that the heavy military equipments supplied under 
Mutual Defence Aid Programme were used by the Iranian 
government for its internal security purposes." Tanks 
provided under the programme, weapons supplied in past 
under MDAP and officers and soldiers and other American 
training, helped the Iranian forces to gain control during 
24. The Mutual Security Programme: For a Strong and Free 
World, First Report to the Congress7 December 
31, 1951, GPO Washington, 1952, p.25. 
25. Report to Congress on Mutual Security Programme for 
the six months ended December 31, 1953 U.S. 
GPO, Washington, 1954, p.27. 
26. Hearings on Military Posture and HRG 637 (No. 36). 
House Committee on Armed Services, 88 Congress 
2 Session, 1964, quoted in Hovey, p. 98. 
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the period of mob violence at the time of the oil crisis and 
to maintain the internal order of the country and preserve 
27 its internal security. 
The United States of America was also involved in 
covert activities in Iran in support of the regime of the 
Shah. The most glaring example of US support to the Shah 
was the antl-Mossadeq operations when the CIA's partici-
pation and General Zahedi's economic affluency tilted the 
balance against Mossadeq. According to Hurewitz the Shah 
was obliged after this operation to the USA 'whose discreet 
28 intervention helped to put an end to the Mossadeq regime. 
The Iranian regime also applied and used the tactic 
of ridicule and contempt to belittle the threat posed by the 
radical elements. Commenting to the Jenne Afrique (weekly) 
from Tunis, in June 1971, about an attempted guerrilla 
revolt in north Iran the Shah said "How can an organisation 
of only 50 members threaten a country of 30 millions .... 
The assistant cooks of the Imperial Army alone would be able 
29 
to deal with them." The Shah was also unable to under-
stand the interaction between the forces of the left and of 
Islam and the joint threat posed by them to his regime. 
27. The Mutual Security Programme: For a Strong and Free 
World. First Report to the Congress, Dec.31, 
1951, G.P.O., Washington, 1952, p.25-
28. Hurewitz, J.C., Iran in World and Regional Affairs, 
in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed. , Iran Faces the" 
Seventies, p.132. 
29. News Review, West Asia, Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analysis,New Delhi,July 1971, p.5. 
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He dubbed all radicals as marxists. "They are all Marxists. 
All Marxists. And something very new that is really amazing 
but it's one of those things, they call themselves Islamic 
Marxists. As you might see for youselves how could you be 
30 
religious and marxist at the same time." 
It is obvious that Shah faced a series of problems 
during his first decade of his rule that not only threatened 
his security but also defied easy solution. Gradually the 
Shah had failed in his efforts to attract broader political 
support. There was a steady deterioration in his relations 
with the previous focii of power: landowners, merchants, 
religious leaders and intelligentia. These groups resented 
the gradual erosion of their power. They either joined the 
ranks of the opponents or became passive spectators of the 
unfolding of the new act. Both ways they were a total loss 
to the Shah's quest for support and legitimacy. Thus, his 
inabilit\ to control the opposition gradually forced him to 
follow a totalitarian trend and employ the instruments of 
terror and repression. Over a number of years his 
dependence on the security forces increased till he had to 
rely on them exclusively for his political survival. The 
opposition either got suppressed or emerged as the movement 
of dissent which finally got equated with treason as it 
30. New York Times, 24 September, 1975. 
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happened because as they were not allowed for the political 
participation. It was noted that even a common man in the 
street was treated as a potential threat to the system 
because there were no values or instruments to bind his 
loyalty to the Shah. Thus gradually economic and social 
benefits, if any, of the policies of the regime were ignored 
and reaction against political repression alone became the 
dominant theme for popular- resentment and even hatred for 
the regime's repressive policies. 
The politics of repression of the Shah regime has 
its own logic. The amount of force to be used in suppress-
ing a movement increases in geometrical proportions to the 
time factor involved. It can be explained clearly that the 
greater the time span, the larger is the force required to 
suppress a given opposition. Thus a regime might start with 
the lowest level of repressive machinery-ordinary police-
and end up with using the national armed forces or 
even foreign troops to remain in power. Thus it is mathe-
matically possible to evolve a formula to calculate the time 
when the rt^ pressive forces can be expected to reach a point 
of exhaustion and give up, or overstrain and collapse. The 
examples of the French policies in Indo-China and Algeria, 
of the USA in Vietnam and of Portugal in Africa can well 
illustrate this hypothesis. The Iranian system too had 
gone through this process - from low-level repression in the 
1940's to the use of modern armed forces in 1978. 
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II. Shah's Policies Towards Regional (Gulf) Security : 
The question of Gulf security was being widely 
discussed during 1975-76. It came up during the meeting 
between the foreign ministers of the Gulf states who had met 
in Jeddah in July 1975 during the Islamic Foreign Minister's 
Conference. The foreign ministers of the Gulf states not 
only endorsed in principle the need for a summit meeting on 
this subject but also drew up a six-point provisional agenda 
as a term of reference for the same. It discussed the ways 
and means to resolve conflicts in the region and to keep the 
foreign powers out of the Gulf. It also sought to include 
the topic of military cooperation among the Gulf states to 
guarantee free navigation through the Gulf. The question of 
Gulf security was discussed during the visits of Prince Fahd 
to Tehran in July 1975 and Premier Hoveyda and Saddam 
Hussain to Saudi Arabia in April 1976. All these develop-
ments paved the way for the Muscat Conference. It was the 
first formal conference held at foreign-ministers level in 
which all the Gulf states participated. It failed to 
achieve any result and stopped after two days without even a 
declaration. The proceedings were not officially disclosed 
but the unconfirmed reports dealt in detail about the 
conference. According to Economist's Foreign Report of 
1 December 1976, Iran offered a plan for a unified army, 
navy and airforce under a joint Command, which would be 
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responsible for the defence of the member states and the 
Gulf waters. That joint army was also to be used if any 
regime was threatened internally. The navy, whose backbone 
would have to be the powerful Iranian fleet, would not only 
have ensured the coastal security of the Gulf states, but 
would have closed the Gulf to outside shipping except when 
permission for navigation was given by the Gulf groupings. 
In other words, the Gulf would have become a closed sea. 
Iraq on the other hand, proposed a treaty under which each 
Gulf state would retain its littoral rights but would ensure 
free navigation to international shipping. Thus not only 
USA enjoy its naval base in Bahrain, but the Umm al-Qasr 
port facilities would remain open for Soviet Vessels. But 
the Saudi Arabia was not happy with either of the proposals. 
Saudi Arabia had resented the Shah's ambitious in the Gulf 
and his proclamation as the sole protector of the Gulf. The 
Saudis vvere also not very happy about Soviet-Iraqi 
relations. Thus the Saudis, for the time being preferred 
the status quo or the policy of inaction. The defence of 
the Red Sea was also considered by Egypt, Sudan and Saudi 
Arabia. It is a well known fact that Egypt had advocated 
the defence and security of the Gulf and the Red Sea be 
interlinked. Just before the Muscat Conference Egyptian 
surveyed the Gulf only to propogate the issue among other 
members. Such an arrangement would help to project the 
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large Egyptian navy, since the Suez Canal was operational 
into the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf. The 
Arabs too would have an Arab navy to balance the Iranian 
navy. Also since Egypt was coming closer to conservative 
Arab oil-producing countries of the Gulf, the Egyptian 
presence might reassure them not only visa-vis Iran but also 
Iraq. Needless to say, neither Iran nor Iraq supported the 
Egyptian move. 
It was a serious set back for Iran that Muscat 
conference could not held properly and rather without 
conclusion. According to a commentator of Rayhan, Amir 
Taheri, the Iraq, USSR and even USA were responsible for the 
failure of that conference. He clearly pointed it out that 
the 'United States is not especially keen on collective 
security in the Persian Gulf.... A regional grouping would 
mean a further strengthening of OPEC which is not particu-
larly populer in Washington. The USA was also criticised 
for playing the divide and rule policy in the Gulf. 
Therefore, the break up of the Muscat Conference can not be 
ascribed to Iraq alone as some would like to throw the blame 
on it. 
It is quite obvious that Iran's attempt for a 
collective Gulf security pact have not succeeded and 
completely successful because of the many reasons. Among 
these two are very important: 
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(1) The Arabs have a lingering distrust of Iran because 
of its large size in area as well in population and military 
potential. For many of the smaller states and Island 
countries in the southern littoral, Iran's attempt of 
collective defence of the Gulf is tantamount to seeking 
formal acceptance of her political and military predominance 
As they visualized that the existing military and political 
disparity among the littoral states is bound to transform 
any form of collective defence arrangements into an instru-
ment of military hegemony of the predominant power within 
the proposed grouping. 
(2) The Arabs also resented of the "Big Brother" 
attitude of the Shah or about the guardianship of the Gulf. 
According to Chubin, Iran's concept of a regional security 
system embraces the concept of peace zone in which the 
strongest regional actors would assume responsibility for 
32 the area's defence." According to him, Iran, because of 
its military capability, could extend a protective umbrella 
over the whole of the Gulf and this ensure security under 
the formula of the regional security system. 
Even after a persisted attempt by Shah to remove the 
image the attitude of the Arabs and smaller littoral 
countries continued. The Shah said that Iran's readiness 
32. Op. cit., 13 October, 1975. 
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to provide military assistance to other countries in the 
region is in no way represented a kind of big brother 
33 policy. It was quite open and many also realised the 
firmness and insistence of Iran upon forming a Gulf security 
pact or organisation as a means to legitimise Iranian 
intervention in the area. "There is at present one 
plausible explanation for Tehran's constant reitration of 
the need for a formal Persian Gulf defence pact; the desire 
to have standing authority to intervene in the event of 
34 
sudden disruption on the Arab littoral." Even those Arabs 
who are pro-western found it difficult to go along with Iran 
on this point. Iran was, therefore, left with no 
alternative but to claim that it would defend the region 
35 single handed. 
Undoubtedly it is a fact that between 1971-75 Iran 
did managed to attain most of the objectives that it had 
planned much earlier for their own benefit. The Iran had 
managed and consolidated its position in the Gulf and 
successful to expand its influence on the Indian ocean 
littoral of the area, especially in Oman. Iran also managed 
to acquire a huge quantity of weapons to enable it to 
33. Op. cit., 18, July, 1976. 
34. Chubin, Shahram and Zabih Sepehr, The Foreign 
Relations of Iran; A Developing State In 
a Zone of Great Power Conflict, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1973, 
pp. 180-81. 
35. Shah's interview to Aukaz of Saudi Arabia, Tehran 
Journal, 29 May, 1976. 
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develop a military capability that would be essential to 
fulfil the goal that it had set for itself. The regime of 
Shah also very successfully utilized the international 
environment not only to strengthen its bonds with the pro-
western elements but also to neutralize the potential threat 
from the USSR, China, India and radical Arabs. The 
country's economy was booming and the Shah was willing to 
liberalize the strict political control at home which gave 
a hint that he felt a lessening of the threat even from 
internal sources. It was quite clear and proved to the 
region in the year 1975 that the Shah was firmly in saddle 
and that Iran was on its way to develop as a major power in 
the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region. But even 
subsequent events proved that Iran had over-reached itself. 
Thus, 1975 saw the beginning of the downfall and decline of 
the regime of Iran. 
(A) British Withdrawal from the Gulf : 
If it is analysed in a historical perspective it can 
be concluded that Iran occupied a dominant position in the 
Gulf in the past. Therefore, a power that had for 
centuries Iranian ambitious in the Gulf. It was probably 
the most significant event that shaped Iran's Gulf Policy 
since the sixties. Britain left the Gulf almost in a hurry. 
The resulting confusion strengthened Iran's position in the 
Gulf. Thus, Iran's Gulf policy can not be understood fully 
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without analysing the British withdrawal and its reper-
cussions on Gulf politics. There were several reasons that 
led to the decline of British power in the post-word war II 
era. The process of decolonization that started with India 
destroyed the original base of the British position in the 
Gulf.-^ ^ Gradually the Britain found it very difficult to 
maintain its pre-eminent position in this region. The 
promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 was the 
first over manifestation of the loss of British capability 
to manage the area. 
Iran's policy during the British withdrawal was only 
to fill the gap created by the speedy withdrawal of the 
British. Iran never liked that any foreign power should 
enter the region or adopt the policy of the British. The 
British decision dovetailed with Iran's Gulf policy. It 
helped Iran to emerge as the dominant regional power -
militarily, politically and even economically. Thus it had 
no desire either to see Britain retain its position in any 
form, or other powers, like the USA or the USSR, to step in 
their presence would have pre-empted Iran's pre-eminence. 
Also, a continued British presence would have hindered 
Iran's policy vis-a-vis Bahrain or the three small Islands 
in the Gulf. Thus it was imparative for Iran that Britain 
leave immediately a no other outside power step in. 
36. Killey, J.B., The British Position in the Persian 
Gulf, World Today. 20(6), June, 1964. 
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During the period of sixties, Iran diplomatically 
tried its best to fulfil the aspirations in the Gulf. It 
pursued the policy that after an initial setback got the USA 
once again firmly committed to full support to Iran. The 
United Kingdom actively helped her to protect and promote 
the Iranian interests on the eve of the British departure 
from the Gulf. Similarly just after 1962 Iran had developed 
close political and economic contacts with the USSR that 
allowed her to neutralize the possible Soviet support to 
Iraq in the Gulf. During the last days of the British with-
drawal Iran even recognised China to prevent her from 
aligning with anti-Iranian forces in the Gulf and Egypt 
outside, were cultivated as friends. Conscious efforts were 
made to cultivate India despite the adverse repercussions of 
the Indo-Pakistant war of 1965. Thus by the time British 
withdrew from the Gulf, Iraq, the main rival of Iran, had 
been diplomatically isolated and to a large extent 
neutralized. Iran had achieved it while working against 
heavy odds. It was indeed a tribute to her well planned 
diplomacy. 
It was observed during the Kennedy administration 
that political relations between Iran and USA started 
deteriorating but it was reversed when Johnson became the 
USA President. During the presidentship of Johnson and 
subsequently of Nixon, the friendly relations between the 
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two countries were put on a close personal basis which was 
reiterated time and again in several speeches and joint 
statements. The top leaders like the Shah and Nixon also 
exchanged visits during this period. As a result of these 
visits and the warm personal relations between the two top 
elites of the two countries, not only was Iran strengthened 
politically vis-a-vis the Arab states in the area including 
Saudi Arabia, but also the bottlenecks regarding the 
delivery of sophisticated arms as well as the economic 
aspects of arms trade were removed. Iran once again began 
to receive the same type of priority treatment that it used 
to get during the Eisenhower administration. 
The political relations with USSR and Iran also 
improved greatly during this period. It was because of the 
positive move by Iran, partly in order to foster Soviet 
stakes in Iran as a counter against Moscow expanding 
37 
relations with Baghdad. Suddenly the relations between 
the two countries improved greatly. The trade relations 
also improved and a big natural gas deal was also finalized. 
Iran received a steel-mill, even arms, from the USSR. It 
was an important aspect of Shah's diplomacy that attempts 
were made to upgrade bilateral relations from the impersonal 
level to a more personal level. After that series of high 
level visits were exchanged. The president Brezhner came to 
Iran and the Shah also visited the USSR. Kosygin returned 
37. Ramzani, R.K., The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role, 
University Press of Virginia, 1972, p.354. 
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the visit on the eve of the Soviet naval deployment in the 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In October 1970 the Shah and 
Podgorny opened the gas pipeline near the border between the 
two countries. The political relations were gradually 
strengthened to such an extent that even renewed Russian 
interest in Iraq after 1968 could not put the clock back as 
far as Iran was concerned. One possible reason that brought 
the USSR closer to Iran during the sixties was the gradual 
deterioration in Iraq - USSR relations. The process had 
already started during the days of Premier Qassem, when he 
began to impose curbs on the Iraqi Communists. But the 
Ba'ath coup of February 1963 can be termed as the crucial 
turning point in Soviet-Iraqi relations that indirectly 
benefited Iran. Soviet newspapers like 'Pravda' began to 
criticise the anti-Kurdish policy of the new Ba'ath regime 
38 in Baghdad. Thus the supply of Soviet military equipment 
to Iraq came to a halt and Iraq once again had to turn to 
its traditional source. The changed relationship between 
Iraq and r.he USSR also enabled Iran to draw the USSR closer 
to it, with the result that though the July 1968 coup in 
Iraq brought a more radical and pro-USSR regime to power in 
Baghdad, the USSR had developed enough stakes in Iran-USSR 
friendly relations that it even went out of its way to 
38. Pravda, 6 May 1963 in Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press, 25, May, 1963, 27 and Pravda, 
12 June 1963, ibid., 25(24), 10 July 
1963, 26. 
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mediate on behalf of Iran in the Iran-Iraq dispute in 
1969-70.-^^ 
(B) The Policy to Neutralize the Opposition froa all Sides : 
The most important policy of Iran, i.e. to 
neutralize the opposition from all sides. It shows an 
interesting deviation from its earlier policy of balancing 
one power against other. Under the new policy the Shah was 
trying to neutralize opposition by an all-round detente with 
with China is a good illustration of this tactic. Iran had 
not recognised the Peking regime. But gradually Iran's 
policy started changing. In the year 1969 the Shah said 
that though Iran did not recognise the People's Republic of 
China. Yet it must be admitted into the United Nations. 
The problem of recognition was taken up during the visit of 
the Shah's sisters to China in April 1971. On 17 August 
1971 Iran recognised the Peking regime as the sole legal 
Government of China. By befriending China-Iran had not only 
neutralized the possible Chinese support to Iraq but also to 
insurgency movements in Dhofar and even in Iran. Iranian 
action was also in line with the American policy and the USA 
also started a beginning to change its China Policy. 
39. Interview with the Shah, Kayhan International, 29 
January 1972. The Shah did not retute the 
hint thrown by the interviewer that the USSR 
had put pressure upon Iraq so as to put a 
halt to the influx of refugees from Iraq in 
1969-70. Quoted in Ramzani, ibid., p. 146. 
40. Kayhan International, 6 September 1969. 
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Iran's attitude to normalize its relations with 
India is evident through the major deal about the oil 
refinery in Madras despite the political attitude of Iran 
after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The refinery was to 
be supplied with Iranian crude. Iran also rendered a help 
of 30 million US Dollar towards the foreign exchange 
requirement of the cost of construction of that refinery. 
The friendly trip of Shah to India in 1968 also strengthened 
Indo-Iranian relations. Hence, Iran also got the assurance 
of India that the vaccum created in the Gulf due to British 
departure ought to be field by the local powers themselves. 
Even at regional level Iran did not neglect to 
neutralize possible opposition in the Arab World. The 
country like Egypt had been its old enemy. Despite the set 
back of 1967 Nasser was still a force to be reckoned with. 
The Shah became successful in neutralizing the Egypt. Two 
major factors helped in this detente: 
(1) The slightly pro-Arab stand of Iran after the 1967 
war. 
(2) The Cairo-Baghdad rivalry especially after 1968 
The Rogers proposals of 1970 was violently criti-
cized, just after it was accepted by the Nasser, by the 
"radical" regime in Baghdad. Thus, after three months of 
hard bargaining, diplomatic relations between Cairo and 
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Tehran were finally established in August 1970. After the 
death of Nasser and during the rule of Sadat,relations were 
improved significantly. Thus Egypt was finally neutralized, 
as became clear from its very mild reaction to the question 
of Iran's occupation of the three Islands in the Gulf on the 
eve of the British departure. 
On the question of Iranian claims over Bahrain the 
Saudi-Iranian relations suffered a temporary setback in the 
year 1968. But the Anglo-American diplomacy removed the 
existing rift between the twin pillars of western presence 
in the Gulf. The Saudi-Iranian solidarity was reflected in 
the statement by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Oman Saqaf, 
during his visit to Iran in April 1971. He said that Saudi 
Arabia and Iran had agreed to coordinate their policies on 
joint actions to be taken in the Gulf. The result of this 
alliance was that the Iraqi strategy of creating an Arab 
defence alliance, that was declared by President Bakr in a 
broadcast on 16 July 1970, was cold shouldered by these Arab 
littoral states. In this way Iran had finally isolated 
Iraq in the neighbouring areas and even as a result became 
claiming as a super power in the region. 
(C) International Political Environment : 
To create an international environment favourable to 
its Gulf policy Iran moved very diplomatically but also 
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proceeded with concrete moves to reach the goals that would 
help her to emerge as the dominant power In the Gulf. But 
before it could acquire that position it had to seek 
legitimacy even as a Gulf power because the controversy 
whether the Gulf was Arab or Persian had already emerged as 
a major issue confronting Iran. Iran had created an inter-
national environment that buttressed Iranian diplomacy visa-
vis the Arab claims. But diplomacy had to be converted into 
hard realities. Iranian moves to get her position accepted 
in the Gulf, whether through bilateral agreements like the 
continental-shelf treaties, multilateral pacts dealing with 
Gulf security, recognition of the newly formed UAE, claims 
over the islands in the Gulf, her pre-eminent role as the 
guardian of the sea-lanes or its anti-insurgency role in the 
area, must also be seen as moves to seek legitimacy as a 
Gulf power per se. Thus concrete issues like continental-
shelf agreements, the Bahrain issue and the dispute over the 
three islands in the Gulf become very important issues in 
Iran's Gulf policy. 
The problem of state control over the continental-
shelf assumed importance after it became feasible to exploit 
its mineral resources, especially oil. The Persian Gulf, 
like the Gulf of Mexico, was shallow and rich in oil 
resources. Also many American Oil Companies had either 
acquired or hoped to acquire concessions in that area. 
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Hence the littoral states like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms issued pro-
41 
clamations in the light of the Truman proclamation. Iran 
too put up a draft legislation to that effect but it could 
42 be passed as a law only in 1955. 
The policies of Iran regarding the several con-
flicting boundary disputes among the Gulf states can only 
be understood in historical perspectives, i.e., starting 
with fifties. The Gulf countries during this period 
granted oil concessions on the continental shelf without 
e ..in caring to delimit their maritime boundaries. 
Generally these concessions overlapped. Three states 
lodged protests with Iran on this issue - Iraq in the May 
1973; Kuwait June 1963 and Saudi Arabia June 1963.^^ 
These protests coupled with the Arab stand that the "Arab" 
Gulf belonged exclusively to the Arabs, must have unsettled 
the Iranians at that time. Hence there was an urgency to 
get Iranian claim to the Gulf recognised but without Iran 
losing its legal advantages. Negotiations were initiated 
with Saudi Arabia on the question of delimiting the 
41. Albaharna, Hossein, M. , The Arabian Gulf States: 
Their Legal and Political States and Their 
International Problems, Librarie 3u Liban, 
Beirut, 2nd Revised Edition, 1975, pp. 278. 
42. Ibid., p. 279. 
43. Ibid., p. 292-93. 
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continental shelf. An agreement was reached In December 
1965 but the final signing of the treaty was delayed. The 
final version, which gave an added advantage to Iran, was 
signed on 2A October 1968. The new agreement, by reckoning 
the milage from Kharg island rather than from the mainland, 
permitted Iran to have possessions over the newly 
discovered oil fields in that area. Iran also obtained 
the Saudi recognition of her sovereignty over one island in 
the middle of Gulf, the island of Farasiyah. 
In this regard Iran started negotiating on so many 
agreements such as Iran and Qatar September 1969; Iran and 
Bahrain, June 1971; Iran and Oman, July 1974; and Iran and 
the UAE, August, 1974. But Iran has not been able to sign 
an agreement with Kuwait and Iraq. Iraq had already 
protested to Iran on this question in 1963. It also 
effectively blocked any agreement between Iran and Kuwait 
by lodging its protests on 25 February 1968. Iran and 
Kuwait made another abortive attempt to conclude an 
agreement during the visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister, 
to Kuwait in July 1970. But the Iraqi Foreign Ministry's 
official spokesman said on 11 July 1970 that Baghdad would 
not recognize any agreement on the demarcation of the Gulf 
44. Schulz, Ann, The Gulf, South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean, Tn Mohammad Mughlsuddln, ed., 
Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf, 
Praeger, New York, 1977, p. 
45. Middle East Journal, 22(3), Summer 1968, 239 
(Chronology) 
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without a formal Iraqi approval. The question of 
delimiting the continental shelf in the northern part of 
the Gulf is interlinked with Iraqi claims over certain 
Kuwaiti territory, especially the islands of Bubiyan and 
Warba and the legal question of the equitable distribution 
of national resources. The median line principle and the 
recognised international land boundaries out constraints on 
Iraqi demands on the continental shelf in the Gulf. This 
issue has not been resolved as yet despite the Iraq-Iran 
detente since 1975. 
(D) Iran's Policy Over Islands : 
The Iran's claim to the continental shelf was also 
extended to the disputed islands in the Gulf. Iranian 
sovereignty over some of them, like over Farasiyah, was 
settled when Iran negotiated the continental shelf agree-
ments. But Iranian claims over four islands were badly 
contested by the Arabs and proved a challenge to Iranian 
diplomacy. Iran's 'island diplomacy" was very complex 
especially the Bahrain and Abu Musa. These islands were 
important to Iran in pursuing a forward policy in the Gulf 
because they not only allowed Iran to control and exploit 
possible oil-bearing areas in the Gulf but also gave her 
control over strategic points on the sealanes in the Gulf. 
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The Bahrain was being claimed as a part of the 
Persia since the days of Nadir Shah. In the twentieth 
century Reza Khan pushed Iran's claims very vigorously 
through diplomatic channels. Nothing much came out of 
it thanks to the dominant British position in the Gulf at 
that time. But Iran continued to claim control over 
Bahrain and called it its 14th province. Syria denounced 
the Iranian move and called Bahrain a part of the Arab 
nation. The Shah in a press conference in 1960 said that 
Bahrain was a part of Iran. "Our policy is surely irrevoc-
able. We will take advantage of the first opportunity to 
ensure the realization of this ancient right which we hold 
in full laith. But Iran renewed its claims over Bahrain 
after the British declaration of withdrawal from the east 
of Suez. The Shah summed up the Iranian case in such a 
way; Britain took away Bahrain 150 years ago. Now when 
Great Britain was leaving. "We cannot accept the fact that 
an Island detached by Great Britain from our country should 
46. Several Scholars have discussed this dispute in 
detail. Pro-Arab stand is taken by the 
following: Hussein M. Albaharna, pp. 167-95; 
Majid Khaduri, 'Iran's claim to the 
sovereignty of Bahrain, American Journal of 
International Law, 45(4)"^ October, 1951, 
pp^ ; 631-47, an3" J.B. Ketty, 'The Persian 
claim to Bahrain, Inte rn a t i on a1 Affairs, 
33(1), January 1957, pp. 51-70. The Iranian 
Position is ably explained by Ramazani, R.K., 
The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role, University 
Press ol VTTgine 1972, pp. 248-50 and 
Fereydoun Adamiyat, Bahrain Islands, A Legal 
and Diplomatic Study of the British Iranian 
Controversy, New York, 1955. 
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be handed over to others at our expense. On this basis 
Iran refused to accept the newly planned Federation of 
Gulf Sheikhdom unless the Bahrain issue was resolved to 
its satisfaction. The Iranian Foreign Minister said that 
the creation of a so-called confederation of Persian Gulf 
Emirates embracing the Bahrain islands was absolutely 
48 
unaccepLable to Iran. But the Bahrain issue even 
created a temporary rift between two friendly Pro-
Western regional powers: Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia offered to the visiting Sheikh of Bahrain what the 
Iranian thought was a "royal" welcome. The Shah, to show 
his displeasure, cancelled his proposed visit to Saudi 
Arabia. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia were the twin pillars of 
Western diplomacy in the Gulf and it was imperative that 
they should cooperate. A detente was reached between 
these two countries in the year of 1968. It was also 
necessary to evolve a face-saving formula on Bahrain that 
would suit the Arabs and also the Shah. In Switzerland secret talks 
A7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information and Press 
Department, Iran's Foreign Policy. 
48. Ramzani, R.K. The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role, 
University Press ot Virginia, 1972, 
pp. 47-48. 
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wi.'.re held between Iranian and Bahrain officials but no 
solution could be reached till the parties concerned hit 
upon the formula of mediation by the United Nations 
Secretary General. The final drama on the Bahrain Issue 
began when the UN Secretary General on 28 March 1970, 
announced his acceptance to exercise his good offices. 
Lastly It was directed by the UN Security Council that 
creation of an Indepent state of Bahrain, was unanimously 
49 
accepted by the Security Council. All the parties to the 
dispute also accepted it. There was some opposition to it 
in Iran but it was quickly silenced. Iran was the first 
state to recognize the newly created state of Bahrain on 
14th August 1971. It was suggested by some that Iran, by 
following a policy of sweet reasonableness on the Bahrain 
issue, had assured British and Arab support on the Iranian 
claims to three small Islands in the Gulf: Abu Musa and 
the two Tumb Islands. Ramzanl, however, discounts it and 
argues that if that were the case there would have been no 
need for "the secret, protracted Anglo-Iranian negotiations 
over the three Islands after the Bahrain settlement. 
But Iran refused to alter the stand on the question 
49. Albaharn, Hussein, "Fact-finding mission of the 
United Nations Secretary General and the 
Settlement of the Bahrain-Iran dispute. May 
1970, International Vomparatlve Law Quarterly 
22(3), July, pp. 545-4^ 5. 
50. Ramzanl, p. 57. 
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of Iranian sovereignty over the three small islands in the 
Gulf: Abu Musa, Little Tumb and Bigger Tumb. Like Bahrain 
these three islands were also claimed on the basis of 
historical links. Iran reiterated its claims on these 
islands after the British declaration of 1968 on the 
proposed withdrawal from the Gulf. Iran maintained its 
claims despite strong Arab protests. The Iranian Foreign 
Minister in a strongly worded statement on 20 December 
1970, said that Iran would never abandon its legal claims 
to sovereignty over these islands, and that these would 
be no peace and security in the Gulf unless these rights 
were completely recognised. Iran also claimed these 
islands by using the argument that unless Iran controlled 
than they would pose a threat to its security. The attack 
by Bazooka by a small speedboat on an oil tanker, taking 
Iranian oil to Israel near the Island of Perim in Bab-al-
Mandeb in June 1971 can be used as an illustration of such 
a potential threat. On 15 February 1971 the Shah of Iran 
threatened to use force if those islands were not handed 
52 
over to him peacefully. He reiterated his threat in 
June in his interview to the Blitz (Bombay). The Shah 
51. The Times, London, 29 December, 1970. 
52. Kayhan International, 20 February, 1971. 
53. Ibid., 24 June 1971 and Blitz (Bombay), 26 June, 
1971. 
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also blamed Iran on not returning those islands. He said 
that when the British came to the Gulf, Iran was weak and 
hence Britain occupied those islands to combat piracy. But 
they always belonged to Iran, and Britain could not 
hand them over to someone else. He added, "I do not intand 
to preside over the action of my country...." . The Shah 
said that his father had tried to get back those islands 
from Britain but his attempts were failed by British 
warships. The Shah said that things have changed now. I 
have a fleet of worships, Phantom warplanes and brigades 
of parachutes. I could defy Great Britain and militarily 
occupy the islands. That would make me very popular and 
earn me headlines in the newspapers all over the world. 
But that would not be convenient, I prefer to negotiate 
with the British. Thus it is a very interesting thing to 
nore that while giving a warning to the Arabs the Shah was 
making the British the scapegoats of his Gulf diplomacy 
54. The Iranian regime put a claim to the two Tumb and 
Abu Musa islands in 1930. Even at that time, 
Britain had advocated leasing out these 
islands to Iran but Arabs did not agree to 
Burrel, R.M., "Britain, Iran and Persian 
Gulf", in Derek Hopwood, ed.. The Arabian 
Peninsula, Society and Politics, Towota, New 
Jersey, 1972, pp. 171-73. 
55. Kayhan International, 20 February, 1971. 
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only Lo get the favour in all types of political negotia-
tions with the countries of the Gulf. 
(e) Iraq's Opposition to the Shah 
Policies of Gulf Islands : 
Among the countries of the Gulf region Iraq was the 
most vocal Arab opponent of Iran's policy vis-a-vis the 
three islands of the Gulf region. In 1971 on 29 June the 
Iraqi Foreign Minister, in a statement to the Iraqi's news 
agency, criticised the Iranian claims on the ground that 
they were based upon "extinct colonist conditions". He 
said that Iran was trying her best to inherit British 
Colonialism in that Arab area. Iraq demanded Arab support 
on the basis of Arabism. The situation was so hostile 
against the Iran's claim over these three islands that next 
day, President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr of Iraq accused Iran in 
an address of Baghdad University that Iran is serving 
American imperialism. The move of Iraq against Iran was 
supported by the Kuwait and also rejected Iranian claims. 
After the meeting of the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers on 
14 June 1971 a spokesman declared that the islands were 
Arab. But Saudi Arabia did not take an open stand but was 
busy along with Britain to workout an optimum solution to 
the problems created by the British East of Suez policy. 
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(f) The Opposition by Arab Sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia : 
As It is evident that Saudi Arabia never took an 
open stand but was busy with an optimum solution. There 
were several attempts at mediation. The Shah of Iran had 
threatened that he would not recognize the proposed Union 
of Arab Sheikhdoms unless Iran's claims on Gulf Islands 
were recognized. Saudi Arabia sought to mediate between 
Iran and the Sheikhdoms and it was reported that King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia told the rulers of six Trucial 
states of Dubai that Iran had asked for their cooperation 
in the Gulf and that since Iran had the longest border 
along the Gulf, its interest could not be denied. He, 
however, denied that Saudi Arabia had been working out a 
secret formula with Iran on the future of the Gulf. 
The opposition and threat of non-recognition of the 
proposed federation in the Gulf region was potent and acted 
as a strong diplomatic pressure upon the Trucial Coast 
Sheikhdoms. After a three day visit to Iran by Sheikh Zaid 
of Abu Dhabi said on 17 May 1970 that he was confident that 
the Iranian government would confirm and support the 
formation of the federation. The Iranian government 
recognized the UAE on 4 December 1971, after it had 
occupied the three islands but the question of exchange of 
diplomatic missions was delayed till October 1972, so as 
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to use It as a lever to neutralize unified Arab action 
against Iran on the question of Iran's forcible occupation 
of the three islands. 
It was clearly revealedby the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister to 
Al-Nahan of Beirut that there were some Arab proposals on 
the question of the future of the three islands. A formula 
of leasing out of those islands to Iran for a period of 99 
years was suggested by the Kuwaiti Minister provided if 
Iran recognize them as being Arab. The second offer was a 
joint Arab and Iranian forces on the islands. But both 
these offers were rejected by the Iran. 
It was decided in the year 1970 in July to send a 
top level negotiator, Sir Luce, to the Gulf problem to 
smoothen the final phase of the British withdrawal from the 
Gulf. Sir William Luce was considered as the best suitable 
negotiator for the mission as he was the Governor of Aden 
and British Representative in the Gulf. He was entrusted 
with the task of settling claims over these three disputed 
islands, the Buraini Oasis, and Britain's future relations 
with the Sheikhdoms, including the future of the British 
military presence there. 
The countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was 
visited by Sir William Luce, and Iran on 12-25 May 1971. 
The problem of these three islands was discussed. On the 
return of Sir William Luce, al-Khalij reported on 
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5 June 1971 that Iran would forcibly occupy three islands 
by the end of the year and that Britain would not come to 
their help at that time. He advised the rulers to nego-
tiate with Iran. The rulers of these countries refused his 
suggestions at that time but negotiations, however, 
continued. In early November 1971 al-Khallj reported about 
definite Anglo-Iranian proposals to Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaima. According to him these proposals envisaged a 
partition of the island Abu Musa with the lion's share 
including strategic sites and deep underground water 
resources on the island going to Iran. The oil would be 
worked under Iranian laws though the oil income would be 
divided equally between Iran and Sharjah. Iran also 
promised to give Sharjah 1.5 million Ponds annually for 
nine years. Agreements on these lines were to be confirmed 
by exchange of letters through the British Foreign 
58 Office. Ras al-Khaima too was offered a similar deal. 
According to Sheikh Ras al-Khaima, Sir Luce had conveyed to 
him on 31 October a proposal according to which he was 
asked to relinquish the two islands in return for annual 
payment by Iran amounting to 1.6 million Ponds for a 
period of nine years. Ras al-Khaima was also offered 
49 per cent share in any oil and other mineral wealth 
discovered there. The ruler rejected the offer and 
127 
British officers in London declined to comment on this 
problem. 
During this period of indicision Sir William Luce 
persisted in his negotiations. The final round of talks 
were held in November 1971, following which an agreement 
was reached between the ruler of Sharjah and the Iranian 
government through the intermediary of the British 
government, which was the protectorate authority till then. 
The agreement reportedly reached on 28 November, was 
announced by Sharjah radio on 29 November 1971. The ruler 
in an interview published on 27 December 1971 by Al-Usbu 
al-Arabia, said that he had no alternative but to reach an 
agreement with Iran. He said that his emirate was too weak 
and all he received from other Arabs were words of advice. 
He reiterated his accord subsequently also and said that it 
was in the interest of the Arabs in the Peninsula. It is 
reported that oil has been found in Abu Musa Sharjah, 
according to the November 1971 accord, would continue to 
get 1.5 million Pond annually till a period of 9 years or 
till its share of oil revenue reached 23 million. But no 
agreement could be reached with the ruler of Ras al-Khaima. 
On 30 November 1971 the Iranian troops landed on 
the three islands. The landing in Abu Musa was very 
peaceful because of the agreement signed on the eve of the 
landing but the Ras al-Khaima police stationed in the two 
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Uumb islands fired at the Iranians who had gone to occupy 
islands. There were casualities on both the sides. 
Britain, as expected, did nothing. The Iranian action 
generated a storm of protest in the Arab world and some 
Arab states raised the question before the Arab League and 
the U.N. There was no mass upsurge in the Arab World over 
the Iranian action apart from a few hostile acts like 
demonstrations and burning of Iranian banks and business 
houses in Ras al-Khaima, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. 
The Official protest can also be divided into three 
categories: hostile like the stand taken by Ras al-Khaima, 
Iraq and Libya; moderate like Kuwait and conciliatory on 
the side of Iran as demonstrated by the Egyptian and Saudi 
Arabian position in the Arab League and the United Nations. 
Against the forcible occupation of the Tumbs by the 
Iranian troops Ras al-Khaima protested to Britain. It also 
declined to join the newly formed United Arab Emirates. It 
wanted the UAE to boycott Iran and Britain politically, 
economically and culturally and to expell the Iranian 
forces from the Arab territories of the three islands. Its 
conditions were ignored and Ras al-Khaima joined the UAE in 
February 1972. Among the Arab states, Iraq and Libya took 
a strong stand. Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with 
Iran and Britain. It accused both those powers of 
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colluding In this matter. The British Foreign office 
rejected the Iraqi charge. Iraq also nationalized the 
British oil interests and expelled thousands of Iranians 
from Iraq. The Libyan action was similar to that of Iraq 
except that there were no Iranians to be expelled. It was 
also reported that Libya was even contemplating sending 
guerrillas to Ras al-Khaima to initiate anti-Iranian 
59 
operations. 
The Iranian occupation was denounced by National 
Assembly of Kuwait and it was criticised upto the level of 
public denunciation as one of the members even went to the 
extent of declaring the large Iranian community in Kuwait 
as a fifth column. But the Kuwait Government took a 
moderate stand. The Kuwaiti Minister of state for the 
Council of Ministerial Affairs, in a statement on 28 
January 1972 tried to explain why Kuwait did not sever 
diplomatic relations with Iran as demanded by some 
Kuwaitis. 
As compared to other Arab states Egypt took a very 
moderate stand. The Egyptian press as early as October 
1971, had argued that the three islands were nothing but 
pieces of rock that did not deserve a confrontation with 
59. Egyptian Gazette, 2 December, 1971 
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Iran and argued that the Arabs ought to concentrate then 
energies on their struggle against Israel. It was 
mentioned by Egypt that Britain was responsible for the 
protection of the Arab islands in the Gulf against any 
foreign attack. Egypt called on Iran to withdraw its 
troops from the islands and to enter into negotiations for 
an urgent peaceful solutions. The Saudi reaction was 
the most mild one. "Even the landing of Iranian troops on 
the three islands did not seen to ruffle irreparably the 
C O 
basic friendly relations between Tehran and Riyadh." 
(g) The Involvement of Arab League and 
the United Nations on the Issue of Islands : 
In the emergency session of the Arab League the 
problem was discussed on 5 - 7 December 1971. Iraq 
suggested that the Arab States should break off diplomatic 
relations with Iran, but was not accepted. The League 
reportedly agreed upon five decisions whose contents were 
kept secret. It also requested its secretary General to 
contact Iran and the Arab states involved in the problem of 
consultation regarding the settlement of the problem, 
which would preserve the friendly relations between Iran 
60. News Review, West Asia, November, 1971, p.13 
61. Egyptian Gazette, 2 November, 1971 
62. Ramzani, R.K., The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role, 
University Press of Virginia, 1972, p. 91. 
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and the Arab Governments. The prospects of any talks were 
suggested by the Shah who said that Iran's action was a 
purely internal matter that did not concern anyone else. 
The political committee of the Arab League continued its 
diplomatic mediation. The Secretary-General Informed the 
Committee that King Faisal was mediating with Iran to solve 
64 the problem. 
On third December 1971 the question was taken to 
the United Nations by four radical Arab States; Algeria, 
Iraq, Libya and South Yemen. The Security Council dis-
cussed the question on 9 December in an emergency meeting. 
Iraq took the initiative in attacking and criticizing the 
Iran and Britain. Such an occupation of the three islands 
as "blatant aggression against the Arab people everywhere'. 
Iraq also blamed Britain for not fulfilling its obliga-
tions. It was argued that the Sheikhdoms were British 
prote. orates when the agreement with Sharjah was signed. 
According to the agreement Britain was legally responsible 
for the agreement as well for protection. Also since 
Britain was the protecting power at the time of the 
Iranian occupation, therefore, she should have legally 
63. Kayhan International, 29 January, 1972. 
64. Egyptian Gazette, 14 March, 1972. 
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prevented the Interests of Ras al-Khalma, even by using 
force if necessary. The British representative replied 
that Britain could not expected to fulfil Its obligations 
at that late stage. 
On the basis of these arguments Iranian represen-
tative argued that though It was an Internal matter he 
would Inform the Security Council about the Iranian 
position. After claiming that these Islands were Iranian 
territory, he said that Iran had already signed an 
agreement with Sharjah about Abu Musa. As regards the two 
tumb i-slands he said that Iran had tried to solve the 
problem through negotiations but having failed to reach a 
settlement, it had no alternative but to exercise its 
sovereign rights in an area which was always an Iranian 
domain and will remain Iranian. No action was taken at 
that meeting of the Security Council and the matter was 
postponed on Somalia's suggestion to allow a third party 
negotiation. The Iranians, however, warned all outsiders 
from intervening in its domestic affairs. 
The Arabs tried to seek help from various official 
and unofficial sources to condemn the Iranian action. The 
65. Thomas, Roy, E., Iraq and the Persian Gulf Region, 
Current History, 64(1), January, 1973, p.24 
66. Ramzani, R.K., The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role, 
University Press of Virginia, 1972, 
pp. 66-67. 
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Middle East Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solida-
rity Conference passed a resolution on 14 January 1972 
and demanded Iranian withdrawal from the three islands. 
The AAPSC also blamed Britain for its alleged complicity 
with Tehran and denounced the US for setting up bases in 
the Gulf. The Iranian delegation staged a walkout when 
this resolution was being passed. The Iranian 
government took no official note of the AAPSC resolution. 
Most of the Arab states continued to denounce 
Iranian occupation of the Islands even after 1971. As it 
is evident from a press statement issued in Baghdad and 
Kuwait at the end of the Iraqi foreign minister's visit 
to Kuwait on 3 May 1972 denounced Iranian occupation of 
these Islands. The joint communique Issued at the end 
of the visit of the Sudanese President to Abu Dhabi on 28 
April 1972 said that the UAE and Sudan regarded these 
three islands as an integral part of the Arab nation. 
The UAE in a letter addressed to the UN Security Council 
President, and signed by the UN representatives of 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria and 
Tunisia said that three islands occupied by Iran were 
67. Kayhan International, 15 January, 1972. 
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6 8 Arab territories and belonged to the UAE. It was 
reported that Iraq, Libya and Kuwait were the active 
force behind this move while Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar 
and Sudan had refused to sign the letter. Tehran 
observes described the letter as a "pitiable moan" of 
anti-Iranian states in the Arab World. Whether it was a 
moan or a roar the fact is that the issue is being kept 
alive. 
The basis of Iran's occupation of Abu Musa island 
is being questioned and both are giving different inter-
pretations to the 8 November 1971 agreement between Iran 
and Sharjah. However, the issue of these three islands 
is dormant but not finished. It can be a source of 
future Arab-Iranian confrontation if the Arabs so desire, 
or it can also be projected as an inter-Arab issue. 
Either way it is capable of posing a threat to Iran's 
security in the Gulf. But if Iran wants to play a 
dominant role in the Gulf it has to project and pose a 
strong military capability. In this regard Iran has 
changed its diplomacy in the regional environment. Such 
a diplomacy will also help Iran to project itself as a 
guardian of the sea-lanes as well as a strong regional 
power capable of safeguarding the "Security" of the Gulf 
68. ibid., 22 July, 1972 
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against the possible threat from insurgency and also from 
the threat to systematic security that might result due 
to sudden change of regimes in the region. 
Iran also offered its support to any Arab state 
that felt itself threatened by another Arab state. This 
'forward' diplomacy could be based only upon an image of 
Iran as a strong and dominant regional power. Projecting 
a strong military capability, therefore, was an intrinsic 
part of Iran's diplomacy in the Gulf. The sudden 
military build-up of Iran during the sixties can be 
attributed to five main reasons: (1) Iran-Iraq rivalry 
going back to 1958, (2) the fertility of the CENTO as a 
military shield during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 (3) the 
lessons of the surprise attack of the June 1967 war 
(4) the inevitability of the British withdrawal, 
lastly, the growing Soviet presence in an around the Gulf 
and in the Indian Ocean. Iran had limited options in the 
first half of the sixties to fulfil its desired goal. 
The economy was still weak and the U.S. regime under the 
Kennedy administration was hostile to Iran's military 
build-' 0. The Johnson administration was more 
sympathetic to Iran's demanded for modern arms. Economic 
conditions had also Improved enough for Iran to contemp-
late buying modern arms rather than to depend upon the 
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old arms transferred from the US surplus stock. The 
British too were prepared to sell arms to Iran. Also the 
Iran-USSR detente not only helped Iran buy a few items 
from the USSR but even allowed it to use the threat to go 
to the USSR as a diplomatic level to get sophisticated 
arms from the USA. The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 opened 
the doors of the US military-industrial complexes for 
Iran who could shop for anything the USA produced, even 
the best conventional arms that had not been introduced 
even in USA armed forces. Thus it was not only the arms 
acquisition but also the fact that Iran could get any-
thing it wanted from the west, that proved to be of great 
diplomatic value to Iran in furthering its interests in 
the Gulf. 
(h) Iran's Military Policy In the Gulf -
for the Dominant Power : 
In order to analyse the Iranian military policy 
it is necessary and of vital importance to note that Iran 
had been trying to develop a Gulf-wide military capabi-
lity, especially naval capability. The withdrawal of the 
military commitment by British from the Gulf in 1971 was 
the only factor responsible which accelerated the peace 
of Iran's military policy that has been chalked out 
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earlier. The continuity of Iran's military policy 
vis-a-vis the Gulf is very important if one wishes to 
analyse Iran's threat perception and response before the 
British East of Suez declaration and also following the 
British withdrawal after 1971. Actually the post 1971 
policy was a continuation and a logical follow-up of the 
policy defined in the first half of the sixties. The 
four year period of 1968-71 only forces Iran to 
accelerate the peace of its evaluation. This becomes 
very clear if one analyses Iran's arms acquisition 
programme during this period. 
Iran was also evaluating the military capability 
of the neighbouring countries such as Iraq. The 
government of Iran was extremely worried about the 
military imbalance between Iran and Iraq, especially 
after :he coup in Iraq and the transfer and purchase of 
Soviet arms to Iraq. Iran's capability was not efficient 
enough to match Iraqi weapons at that time because of 
the arms control policy of the Kennedy administration. 
In view of this dangerous situation Iran began to place 
orders for new eeapons. Iran had placed orders for a 
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large number of sophisticated weapons with British. 
In other way Iran, even before 1968, was already laying 
tie foundation of an airforce and navy that would enable 
Iran to dominate not only the sea-lanes but also the 
Gulf-littoral. Material ordered at that time began to 
arrive by 1968, thereby giving the impression that Iran 
was reacting to the British East of Suez policy and the 
entry of the Soviet Task-force in the area. Iran 
enhanced its capability after 1968 by ordering two 
destroyers, two corvettes, helicopters and phantoms from 
the USA and Rapier SAM and about 700-800 Chieftain tanks 
from Britain. The end result of the arms acquisition 
policy was that by 1971 Iran emerged as the dominant 
regional military power in the Gulf. As it is evident 
from the fact that Iran staged a big display of its air 
naval firepower in the Gulf 5 December 1970. The island 
of Bani Farur was first 'Bombed' and the occupied by 
70. "Iran: equipment ordered from Britain", Military 
Review, A7(l), January 1967, 107. Data 
compiled by using sources like the Janes's 
Fighting Ships (London), The Military 
Balance (1155, London), Arras Trade with 
the Third World (SIPRI, Stockholm (F5 and 
F4 planes, helicopters, C-130 transport 
planes, M-60 tanks and HAWK surface to Air 
missiles with the USA, and one destroyer. 
Four SAM-class frigates and about 10 
hovercraft with Britain). 
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by paratroops and airborne troops carried by trans-
port planes. Finally, hovercraft-borne troops joined in 
the final mopping-up operations and for the effective 
occupation of the island. The Shah himself watched the 
operations from a destroyer that led the "mock" 
invasion. This display of Iranian military capability 
was probably designed as an image projection of Iran as 
the dominant power in the Gulf and also to convey the 
readiness of Iran to translate into action its threat to 
use force to occupy the three islands in the Gulf. It 
also demonstratd Iranian capability to control the sea-
lanes in the Gulf. These military preparations, 
therefore, prompted the Shah to declare on 15 February 
1971 that Iran was ready to take Britain's place as the 
policeman of the Gulf. "He said that we are the only 
country with economic and military sophistication 
necessary to offer the area protection". 
71. News Review, West Asia, March, 1971, p.9. 
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CHAPTER - V 
SHAH'S POLICY FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION 
One of the significant recent trends in the 
thinking of the people all over the world has been a 
deeper understanding of the role of cooperation parti-
cularly in the fields of socio-economic problems, 
collective security, common-market and various other 
political and economic activities of the developing 
countries; and to a large extent among the regional 
countries of the Middle East. It is equally true that its 
crucial and fruitful role in economic development and 
security of developing countries is beyond controversy 
today, especially in their initial stages of development. 
In the context of Iran it was the primary goal of 
Reza Shah to be recognized as an effective regional power 
but his regional policy behaviour in pursuing this goal 
was either coherent or inconsistent. 
The basic aim of this chapter is to analyse the 
aspect of the regional cooperation in historical 
perspective during his regime and how far his regional 
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cooperation policy was successful in capturing the regional 
power or establishing various sources of economy such as 
regional common market or offering sizeable capital aid and 
investment to some regional and neighbouring countries. 
The phenomena of the regional cooperation is still 
existing and getting strength throughout the world in many 
forms varying in policies and constraitns. Still today the 
development and security problems are well recognised 
problems in the Middle Eastern Countries among all the 
developing countries inspite of the much higher income and 
religious and cultural affinity to sort out various 
disputes and grievances. 
The analysis of the past concept and objectives of 
regional cooperation during the Shah's period) will help 
to understand the present is supposed to be the basic 
criteria to analyse the impact of Shah's Regional 
Cooperation and Policies. It will also be analysed that 
how far the Shah's policy of regional cooperation have 
solved the problems of security and minimised the major 
disputes of that time. 
It is a well established and Universally recognised 
fact that to a large extent a balanced regional 
development, either the problem of security or socio-
economic, depends on the international and regional 
cooperation. In order to become independent and free from 
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foreign limitations the concept of regional cooperation is 
no doubt is very useful and fruitful attempt. It is also 
evident that no one country of the Middle East is signi-
ficant in terms of various resources as well as the size 
of population and its characteristic to cope up with the 
present strategies of development and security measures. 
In order to achieve some of the basic objectives, 
i.e., minimum level of political and economic dependency 
within the country or within the region has already been 
observed and experienced during the past, and the present 
situation of Iran and neighbouring countries. 
(A) Constraints for Regional Cooperation 
During the Shah's Period : 
It was realised during the Shah's period that there 
are many common problems facing the region in terms of 
security, trade, technology, dealing with the multi-
national corporations and political and economic relations 
at regional and international level. He also realised 
that it is to their advantage to cooperate with each other 
and to act together rather than singly. It was also 
realised that the economies of the countries of the region 
are not complementary with one another and the situation of 
cooperation among them is insignificant, while the scope 
for these complementarity is enormous. There are however, 
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problems, one of these is that the size of the economy of 
each country is not uniform. For example, size of the 
economy f Iran or Iraq is much larger than the countries 
of UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Yemen etc. This does not 
make for cooperation in terms of equality. But this 
problem can be over come if the country of the region 
agree on a policy of balanced inter-dependence among 
themselves. 
It was also realised during this period that the 
cooperation can be greatly increased if the countries of 
the region agree on the establishment of a common 
secretariate to undertake the necessary studies for 
translating possibilities of cooperation into concrete 
propos al. 
During the Shah's period it was also realised and 
emphasised that regional cooperation can be promoted and 
strengthened through :-
1. Establishing a regional communication network and 
avail timely information of various socio-political 
and economic situation. 
2. Maintaining the reserves of various items at the 
regional level. 
3. An emergency arrangement should be made for the 
weaker and needy countries of the region. 
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4. Other possible sources should be consulted such as 
loans repayable In kind and assistance In 
transportation etc. 
5. Cooperation should help in the promotion of 
production to achieve the self-sufficiency through 
long term measures. 
(B) Regional Cooperation in the Gulf 
Countries During the Shah Period : 
A much cherished aim for regional cooperation of 
Shah was to strengthen Iran's regional stability and 
security and to achieve the benefit from regional 
resources for its socio-economic development. It was his 
major objective which dates back to the early years of his 
rule. 
The term regional cooperation was used by Shah in 
different ways for practical purposes. For example, during 
the 1950's he used this term as "the system of alliances 
and mutual aid" between countries with common interests 
was the most effective way to ensure the stability and 
security of the whole world in general and of Iran in 
particular. 
During this period he pursued a foreign policy 
i.e. opposing the Soviet Communism and revolutionary 
nationalism, but the basic aim was to made the strong 
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alliance with the developed western countries. It was his 
most narrow thinking i.e. seeking alliance and cooperation 
with only friendly regional countries such as Pakistan, 
Turkey and Iraq. It shows that the concept and objective 
of regional cooperation at that time was not very clear to 
him. 
After some time Iraq was also dropped out in the 
year 1959. Although the alliance provided for economic and 
technical cooperation between member countries, it failed 
to help the Shah's regime either to build a solid long 
term basis for its own continuity or strengthen the 
Iranian regional position. 
On the other side, the Iran's relations was 
weekened with the Soviet Union and the Arab World and 
caused anxiety for Afghanistan and India which were engaged 
in serious border disputes with Pakistan. 
In the beginning of the 1960s the Shah gave less 
emphasis to military organizations and higher weightage for 
the promotion of regional economic cooperation. After this 
period Shah was very successful in improving the regional 
relationship with Iran. 
1. Pahlavl, M.R., Mission for my Country, P.N. 294. 
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The regional cooperation for development was 
established with Pakistan and Turkey in July 1964. 
Commercial relationship with Soviet Union were expanded 
and the Soviets extended economic and technical assistance 
to Iran and economic and cultural relations with 
Afghanistan were improved and working relationship with 
the Arab States, (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq) was 
developed and Iran's relationship with the West 
particularly the United States was also remained normal» 
The Shah during this period needed, more than ever 
before not only regional peace and estability but also 
increasing support from such regional resources as 
raw materials, technology and trained manpower as well as 
considerable recognition for the status he wanted for 
Iran. 
(C) The Iran-Arab Relationship and Cooperation ; 
On various grounds and problems Iran's relation 
with Arab World remained very strong and particularly with 
the radical Arab States, and Iranian policy was centered 
around the Middle East Conflict such as the countries claim 
over the Bahrain its disputes over Shatt-al-Arab and Shah 
general dislike for the Arab revolutionary regimes. The 
Shah initiated the process as early as 1967 when in the 
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wake of the Third Arab-Israeli War, he reappraised his 
regimes Middle-Eastern policy and demanded Israeli with-
drawal from Arab occupied territory." 
Secondly, he condemned the use of oil as a 
political weapon by Arab Oil producing states. When Britain 
announced its intention in the year 1968 to withdraw from 
the Gulf, the Shah felt to resolved the problem of Bahrain 
forever. In the year 1969 in New Delhi Shah for the first 
time announced that he will never use the force for the 
people of Bahrain to join Iran. This statement was 
explained to mean that Iran was ready to accept a refren-
dum in Bahrain under United Nations auspices to decide the 
future status of Bahrain. 
Later on Iran abandoned its claim over Bahrain and 
resolved the problem peacefully with the United Nation 
and Britain. Even Security Council appreciated this move 
of Iran. This move contributed in creating an atmosphere 
of peace, friendship and stability in the Gulf region, 
this move was also appreciated by the Arab world but 
Baghdad claimed the settlement a victory for the Arabs 
against the territorial expansionist policy of the Shah. 
However, Iran never tried and could not involved 
in any military operation with Arabs and the Bahrain. 
3. Arab Report and Record, 1969, p.2. 
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This peaceful settlement was proved in the interest of 
Iranian regional position as well as the concept of Shah 
regional cooperation and lastly, it was an end to a major 
conflict between Iran and its neighbouring Arabs. It is 
major evidence of Iran's desire forregional peace and 
cooperation and the country concentrated on other urgent 
objectives after the settlement of this issue. Side by 
side a number of issues and important differences with 
the Arabs were settled. Iran also agreed on the agreements 
with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar such as Sharing of the 
continental-shelf of the Persian Gulf in the year 1968 
and a full agreement was reached in the year 1969. But 
Iran never agreed with full understanding with Britain on 
its traditional claim over the three strategic islands of 
Abu Musa and the greater and lesser Tumbs near the strait 
of Hormuz. 
During the period of OPEC formation in the early 
1970s. Arabs and Iran jointly succeeded and many of 
differences were remained with the Arab Gulf States. Such 
a move contributed effectively in promoting a better 
regional understanding on various common interests. 
Consequently, trade, links between Iran and the 
Arab countries expanded as well as the trade with Egypt 
also expanded which was a leading member of the Arab 
radical camp. 
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Unfortunately during this period Iran and Iraq 
relations took a turn and worst situation were observed 
over the dispute of Shatt-al-Arab and diplomatic 
relations were stopped, in spite of the fact that Iranians 
appeared very keen to negotiate its differences with Iraq 
as it is evident from an address by Iranian foreign 
4 
minister in the U.N. General Assembly in the year. He 
declared that "we do not demand exclusive domain over it 
(Shatt-al-Arab). We seek no more than which is accorded to 
us by the practice of Nation under well stablished rule 
of international law, as soon as in the case of Danube, the 
Rhine and the Scheldt rivers. (And that his government 
was)... ready at any time at any hour, at any moment, any 
where, to start a negotiations with the government of 
Iraq, for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of 
the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, on the basis of boundary to be 
set at mid-channel on Thalweg and freedom of navigation for 
all countries - throughout the entire river, in accordance 
with the accepted principles of international law. 
4. Bursell and Cottrell, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
Tensions Dielemas, p.5, 1970. 
5. Verbatim, Record of U.N. General Assembly Meeting, 
No. 1857, Oct. 1, 1970, p.7, such a solution 
has been outlined earlier by Manuchechr 
Gangy, a close adviser of Reza Shah and 
Iran's Minister of Education during 1976-78, 
in his book Hoquqe Bein al-Malala-ye Omumy, 
pp. 220-27. 
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It is also evident from the transformation of the 
Iranian-Egyptian relationship from one of the hostility of 
1950s and 1960s that to one of friendship and close 
cooperation in the 1970s and it took place because of weak 
position of Egypt during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It 
strengthened of Iran's regional position in the Gulf and 
after a break of 10 years, break the diplomatic relations 
were stopped between Iran and Egypt. At that time Egypt 
was in a dire need of outside capital aid and investment 
to rebuilt its war effected economy defence forces and 
Urban Settlements. Egypt on the other hand was more 
attractive as compared to other Arab countries in terms of 
technology and industrial advancement and an attractive 
source of support for Iran and its strategic location with 
the Suez Canal, and a gate to markets and resources in 
Africa and Europe. Above all, the Shah was always search-
ing for regional political influence. The result of all 
these was a growing interest between Iran and Egypt in 
regional and International politics. 
Stressing the importance of close cooperation 
between Iran and Egypt in August 1975, the 
Shah declared; "We believe Egypt must emerge 
as a very powerful country... We have faith 
in the strength and importance of Egypt", a 
large educated class and ancient history, 
the Shah disenined the cooperation between 
Iran and Egypt as a base and foundation for 
the entire region both the Arabian Peninsula 
and the Persian Gulf. We say this is a cooperation 
between the region of Asia and Africa. The Cooperation 
between Iran and Egypt is thus of importance he 
emphasised that for these reasons we have extended 
help to Egypt and we have large and joined projects 
for provisions of more extensive facilities to Egypt. 
(The Shah's interview with the Kuwaiti News paper 
al-Siyasah as reported in Keyhen International,Aug.13, 
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Iran and Egypt were Ch s able to strengthened 
their political and economic relations very rapidly after 
1970. Iran's supported Egypt at political level in search 
for peace with Israel and friendship with the United 
States, the Shah was also happy over the increasing 
closeness of Egyptian with the conservative Arab States 
and he expressed solidarity with Egypt during the year 1973 
Arab-Israeli War. He was supporting Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied Arab land and the right of the 
Palestinian people to self determination even if this 
would involved that establishment of some form of 
Palestinian identity adjacent. Moreover, he appreciated 
Sadat for his peace initiative. He was the second world 
leader after President Cartor to support Sadat historic 
peace mission to Jerusalem in December 1977. He described 
Sadat mission as dignified and expressed Iran's warmest 
feeling of friendship or support. In return Sadat shared 
and supported the Shah concern for the security and the 
stability of the Persian Gulf against Soviet penetration 
as well as his resolution that the Gulf's security must be 
9 
a responsibility of its littoral states. 
7. Keyhan International , Dec. 1, 1973. 
8. The Shah's Interview with Al-Ahram, as published in 
feyhan International, June 12, 1976. 
9. Keyhan International , January 14, 1978. 
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A very sound trace of Iranian and Egyptian 
political friendship and cooperation is available during 
the period 1974 because of its growing oil income. The 
basic purpose of this cooperation was to expand economic 
and trading cooperation. Iran took a major financial 
burden to reconstruct the ruined towns of the suez canal 
area particularly port said; the widening of the canal; 
the establishment of the numerous joint industrial, 
mining, and agricultural ventures in Egypt; the expansion 
of the certain existing Egyptian Industries. Consequently, 
Egypt agreed to offer Iran a free zone at a port on the 
Mediterranean as an outlet for Iranian Commercial and 
industrial activities in Africa and Europe, and Iran agreed 
in principle to participate in a multinational project to 
construct a pipeline to transport oil from Suez to Port 
Said. Subsequently in the month of September 1975 the 
two countries also agreed to improve their air links and 
develop a joint shipping line and in June 1976, Egypt 
agreed to grant Iran oil terminal facilities. 
Ultimately those fast growing economic ties resulted 
in a huge increase in the volume of trade 
10. For details, see Burrel and Vottrell, "Iran, 
Afghanistan. Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemma", 
pp. 24-28, Kayhan International, ^ fay~29) 1974 
and Nov. 27, 1974. 
11. Keyhan International , September 23, 1975 and June 
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between the two sides, largely favouring Iran from 1972. 
During the period 1975-76 Iran's Imports from Egypt 
amounted to over Rls. 64 billion, but Its non-oil exports 
to Egypt exceeded Rls. 788 billion; hence Egypt ranked 
12 
ninth In the world among Importers of the Iranian goods. 
The Iranian-Egyptian regional political and 
economic cooperation helped the Shah to secure access to 
economic outlets and It also helped to Improve Iran's 
relations with certain other radical Arab States, 
especially Syria and Iraq but Isolated the Arab 
revolutionary group particularly In the Persian Gulf. The 
Syria realised the growing strength of Iran which helped 
both the countries to exchange ambassadors In March 1974 
and Iran agreed to supply Syria with 150 million US Dollar 
for Joint Ventures and signed a trade agreement for 
further economic cooperation and transaction. Similarly, 
12. Ibid., June 12, 1976, Ravabete Khareji-ye Iran 
Shahanshahl, p. 82. In the month of June 
1976 Shah described Iranian Egyptian 
relations as "excellent". He stated President 
Sadat's policies are courageous and wise... 
At any rate we spare no effort in helping 
Egypt in eliminating economic difficulties 
imposed on it by war. 
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Iraq with the fear of isolation coincited with certain 
changes in the behaviour of the Ba'th government. The Shah 
further strengthened the Iranians regional position and 
created regional atmosphere in the Gulf States to 
cooperate with his country and informing a Persian Gulf 
'Collective Security'. His policy of this type of 
cooperation, no doubt was in the benefit of Iran but in 
the light of the concept of cooperation it is a well 
established fact that generally the large size of 
countries enjoy the major share of benefit. 
(D) Cooperation with Pakistan, India and 
Afghanistan to Achieve Regional Supremacy : 
Iran perceived a most important problem with the 
eastern zone countries such as : 
(1) Pakistan's domestic political instability in 
1971 
(2) Afghan-Pakistan growing disputes 
(3) Indian-Pakistani disputes over Kashmir? 
(4) Afghan-Sovlet-Indlan friendship 
(5) Soviet interest In securing a direct access 
to the Indian ocean 
(6) India's growing economic and military 
strength as an Indian ocean power as well as 
its expanding ties with the Arab world and 
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growing Interest in securing the wealth of 
the Persian Gulf. 
It is evident that all these factors were against 
the interest of the Shah's regional power. Therefore, he 
adopted a policy aimed to keep alliance with Pakistan and 
support the Pakistan domestic stability. In order to 
check Soviet influence in the zone Iran started disliking 
the Indian and Afghan over-dependence on Soviet-economic 
aid. He used Iranian capital aid and investment in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and India in order to reduce the 
Soviet impact. Iran mediated over this problem and the 
Shah's objective was always not only to settle 
potentially dangerous quarrels but to increase Iran's 
access to the Markets and the minerals, agricultural, 
technological and industrial resources of India, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Iran and Afghanistan settled an agreement over 
the dispute of Helmand river problem which was decided 
and amicably agreed by Iran in favour of Afghanistan that 
Afghanistan was entitled to use a greater proportion of 
the river's water even in years of low flow - a condition 
that Tehran had rejected in the past. This problem 
was settled in the year 1973 and a tense relation was 
14 improved. In a similar manner Iran attempted to 
14. Ibid., p. 44, 1977. 
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resolve its political differences with India over Iran's 
traditional support for Pakistan over Kashmir as Iran 
always supported Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir with 
India. Another sign of cooperation is evident with the 
statement of Iran that he would not tolerate any further 
disintegration of Pakistan after the creation of 
Bangladesh. Iran also mediated with Pakistan and Afghanis-
tan in solving the problem of Pushtunistan but remained 
unresolved but the leaders of these two countries agreed to 
pursue peaceful negotiations and improve their relations in 
their mutual interests. 
On the issue of Indo-Pakistan relations Iran 
always negotiated against the confrontation several times. 
Although during the war of 1965 Iran supported Pakistan's 
"Just" claim over Kashmir which confined this support to 
political statements and limited logistic aid, though it 
1 ft gave extensive relief support. After the war, the Shah 
offered to mediate, and during the separate visit to 
Pakistan and India he urged both sides to settle their 
differences peacefully. But in the late 1960's Iran 
transferred to Pakistan a large number fighters which was 
15. S. Tahir-Kheli, Iran and Pakistan: Cooperative in 
an Area of Conflict, p. 484. 
16. Ibid., pp. 475-76. 
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used against India in the war of 1971. But dring the war 
Iran followed his past policy of nonmilitary involvement in 
support of Pakistan. Shah regarded the Simla settlement 
as a welcome step in creating peace and normalising the 
situation in a zone that was of a great significance to 
Iranian regional security and stability as well as 
promoting the regional cooperation. 
The most important and glaring example of Shah's 
regional cooperation is traced though his effort to offer 
economic ties to the countries of eastern zone. His first 
step was to supply oil at discount rate to the countries 
of eastern zone as well as a sizable capital aid and 
investment. A steady expansion in Iran's economic 
relationship with these three countries was experienced 
during 1960's but in a different manner, i.e. with 
Pakistan it took place largely within the framework of 
Regional Cooperation for Development while with Afghanistan 
and India it was arranged on a bilateral basis. During the 
period 1965-70 the volume of Iran's trade with Afghanistan 
was more or less equal while with India it was five times 
18 greater. Its economic relationship with India increased 
17. Times of India, Sept. 27, 1973. 
18. Tahir Kheli, 'Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an 
Area of Contlict', pp. 480-81. 
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significantly after this period with the establishment of a 
joint Indian-Iranian development of the Madras refinery in 
India. 
During the early years of 1970's economic 
relationship of Iran with these three eastern zone 
countries expanded significantly because of the sudden rise 
of Iran as a financial power. During the period 1974-75 
Shah's Cooperation is more evident with his high capital 
19 investment as an aid to these countries. On the whole 
Iranian commitment upto 1978 included actual or potential 
participation in a number of agricultural and industrial 
projects in Afghanistan provinces of Herat and Kandhar 
adjoining to the border of Iran and also in Hijigak iron 
ore mine north of Kabul. In Pakistan the aid was released 
for the development of petro-chemicals and shipbuilding 
while in India for a refinery at Madras, an iron ore mine 
at Kurdramukh and an irrigation canal to help grow more 
20 foodgrains in the Rajasthan desert. The Iranian aid was 
19. Tehran promised Afghanistan about 2000 million U.S. 
Dollar aid, to Pakistan he committed about 
647 million US Dollar and extended 133 
million US Dollar to India particularly for 
joint ventures (Jacqz, J.W., Iran: Past, 
Present and Future, p. 324). 
20. Keyhan International, Feb. 25, 1974, July 20, 1974. 
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used in Afghanistan in constructing the first Afghan 
railway joining the country with the Iranian railway in the 
west and the Pakistan railways in the east. It was assumed 
that after the completion of these railways in the year 
1983 as planned, Iran and its major ports on the Persian 
Gulf would be directly connected wih the land, not only 
21 
with Afghanistan but also Pakistan and India. 
Consequently, Iran was benefitted politically and 
economically. For the economic benefit Iran expanded its 
benefit by capturing the markets and resources (iron ore, 
agricultural products, technology and trained manpowr) of 
the eastern zone in general and India in particular. Iran 
was also benefitted by these countries as well as by the 
'riparian States' of the Indian ocean (Burma, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore as well as Australia) 
considering these countries as an outlet of these three 
eastern zone countries. Secondly, at political level the 
basic objective of this type of cooperation of Shah was to 
reduce Afghan and Indian dependence on Soviet aid and 
motivate these two countries to depend more on the western 
countries. On the other hand he also wanted to secure the 
approval of these three eastern states for his Persian Gulf 
21. Joseph, R., 'Afghanistan Plans Railway to Link it 
to world'.Canberra Times, Feb. 1, 1978. 
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policy and for his concern for the safety of the Indian 
ocean against the expected Soviet entrance. For the 
partial fulfilment of the Shah's objectives Prime Minister Bhutto 
and President Daoud visited Tehran separately in 1974 and 
1975 and endorsed the Shah's Gulf policy indirectly and 
favoured him in his view that the Persian Gulf and Indian 
ocean should be declared a 'nuclear-free peace zone'. A 
slight reluctance was noted by Mrs. Gandhi's during her 
visit in 1974 and avoided the approval on this matter 
except on the matter of a 'peace zone'. Mrs. Gandhi's 
reluctance was based on the facts of the growing fear of 
the Shah s military build-up and his aspirations toward the 
domination of the Indian ocean, on the one hand, and her 
country's friendship with the Soviet Union, on the other. 
Lastly, it was agreed -by both the sides that 'a construc-
tive relationship (India with Iran) based on political 
understanding and sound economic cooperation would make 
22 for real stability and lasting tranquility in our region. 
The Shah's policy of Regional Cooperation proposed 
the formation of a 'regional common market'. Firstly, he 
put forward this proposal for an Indian ocean economic 
union in the year 1974. It included not only the countries 
22. Keyhan International, April 21, 1974, May 1-6, 
T^74, April 29, 1975, May 2, 1975, Feb.4, 1978. 
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of Che eastern zone but also Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Singapore and Australia. But this idea was rejected at 
that time by India on the plea that such a proposal would 
be dominated by Australia. But Shah agreed not to include 
Australia in this proposal in the year 1978 and India also 
agreed with Iran on this issue. But Pakistan was not 
satisfied with this type of organisaion stating that 
setting up of the common market at this stage not serve 
the useful purpose. However, Shah was very keen in 
establishing such a scheme because of the dominant role of 
Iran in the Regional Cooperation for Development. In the 
year 1977 the Iran Foreign Minister declared after a 
meeting of Regional Cooperation for Development that Iran 
would welcome 'with open arms' to all the regional 
24 
countries to join Regional Cooperation for Development. 
(E) Regional Cooperation and Forces of Subversion : 
The Shah was largely against the forces of 
subversion, destruction and treason not only for Iran but 
also in the regional countries. He identified these 
forces and included all those who opposed his administra-
tion and his domestic and foreign policy objectives. The 
23. Ibid., October 5, 1974. 
24. Keyhan International , Feb. 4, 1978. 
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Shah identified these forces as 'Marxist, extremists or 
terrorist and any action activities against his regime. He 
declared that communism has no place for the activities of 
these forces in Iranian politics as well as it is his 
national duty to eliminate such forces not only in Iran but 
also in its region and also opposed at international level. 
But in order to safeguard his own interest through the 
means of regional cooperation Shah never wanted to become 
very hostile with the communist block countries. He said 
'the Russian government is one thing and the international 
communist party is another. That is why we have cordial 
25 
relations with the USSR, but fight communism at home'. 
These communist forces was considered by Shah as most 
dangerous at regional level such as Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Oman, the Marxist-Keninist government in the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Baluchistan. These forces 
were supported by the radical Arab nations of Iraq, Syria 
and Libya as well as the USSR and China, although the 
policy oi China changed dramatically after 1974 in favour 
of the Shah against Soviet influence in the region. The 
25. The Shah's interview with the Daily Telegraph. 
BBCSWB, Feb. 11, 1974. 
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USSR-backed Marxist-Leninist government in Ethiopia was 
more recently added to the list of the 'subversive 
forces'. With the help of the regional policies of 
regional cooperation Shah wanted to enforce his antlsub-
versive policy. The Shah's proposals for a 'regional 
common market' and 'collective security' aimed at also to 
intervene with the antisubversion policy. Consequently he 
build up Iranian Military to defend the regional 
cooperation and the status quo. He used to request the 
friendly countries to enforce his antisubversion policy 
except in few instances, i.e., Iranian support for Kurds 
against the Baghdad government and Iran's military take-
over of the Tumbs island in the Persian Gulf in the year 
1971. He replied to a question in the year 1971 that if 
one of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms were occupied by an 
extremist force, what Iran would do? Shah said "Its very 
difficult to envisage It,if we were not asked to Intervene 
by these countries themselves. It is evident that Shah is 
mentioning towards the regional security pact under the 
regional cooperation as a proper remedy for such type of 
regional problems. 
26. Smolansky, B.M. and Smolansky, D.M., Soviet and 
Chinese Influence in the Persian Gulf, 
pp. 131-53. 
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Till 1978 the Shah had managed the anti-subversion 
aspect of his regional policy and he was very watchful and 
cautious regarding regional reaction over any military 
actions. Even in the case of military takeover of the Tumb 
island the regional reaction was at the political level. 
While the conservative Arab States and Egypt expressed 
their guarded verbal disapproval of the Iranian action and 
the Soviet Union maintained silence. Iraq and Libya 
retaliated only by breaking of diplomatic relations with 
Iran. 
It is evident from the above analysis of the 
Shah's effort to strengthen the Regional cooperation with 
the Arab States that it was a most fruitful attempt of Iran 
in generating a cordial and amicable environment at 
regional , inter-regional and intra-regional level. No 
doubt his attempt to this direction is related to the 
development of the region, maintaining peace and largely in 
the benefit of his own country. His desire to have 
supremacy and upper hand in the region should not be 
considered as his selfish or narrow thinking but these 
achievements are consequently related with his concerted 
effort being financially a strong country in the region as 
well as his attitude towards the need of regional 
cooperation for the development in the whole region 
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Secondly, it is a well established fact that a large size 
country, especially the economic size, achieve more 
benefit as compared to the smaller countries under the 
issue of Regional cooperation. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
SHAH'S POLICIES: ITS IMPACTS AND REPERCUSSIONS 
IN THE GULF REGION 
(A) Economic and Military Objectives 
(based on increases in oil revenue) 
(B) Policies around Economic growth rather 
than Economic Development 
(C) Failure of Domestic and Regional Policies 
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CHAPTER - VI 
SHAH'S POLICIES - ITS IMPACTS AND REPERCUSSIONS 
IN THE GULF REGION 
It Is obvious from the above discussion that the 
Shah's policies in the Gulf region were concentrated 
around the Iranian economic and military strength 
emphasising that Iran should act as a powerful and 
influential country in the region. No doubt Iran achieved 
a capacity to strengthen its bargaining position in the 
conduct of its regional relations by increasing friendship 
in the region and always pursued the Gulf countries again-
st the increasing influence of the communist forces. 
But it was experienced that Shah's effort was not totally 
successful in achieving the support from the countries of 
its region and he failed to transform Iran into a self-
generating industrial and military power. Consequently 
these policies and objectives caused serious tensions 
within his own country as well in the Gulf region. It is 
also obvious that Shah was overambitious in their 
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objectives which were not planned properly and coordina-
tion was very poor as well as they were all mismanaged 
because of the lack of proper knowledge of the domestic 
political structure. 
(A) Economic and Military Objectives : 
During the period 1971-75 most of the Shah's 
policies based on economic and military objectives were 
implemented to a large extent. The implementation was 
possible because of the phenomenal increases in oil 
revenue. It was also calculated that such a hike in oil 
prices will continue atleast for one more decade and will 
continue to increase in future also which will help in the 
implementation of these basic objectives. He declared 
that these policies will bring a complete transformation 
in Iran and the country will attain a self-generating 
industrial and military power by the year 1985. He 
directed his policies towards extensive and rapid 
industrialization and militarization of Iran on the basis 
of his capabilities to invest intensively and application 
of improved and advanced technology in every sectors of 
economy. It was also obvious to Iranian planners that it 
is beyond the capacity of Iran to complete and fulfil 
these objectives proposed by Shah. But it was assumed 
that if the rise in oil income continues and foreign 
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exchange is made available through exports and Imports, 
the major limitations could be overcome to implement 
these objects. It was also realised by the planners that 
Iran has to continue to build its own self-generating 
capabilities. For this purpose Iran started a massive 
imports of highly advanced capital goods such as arms, 
technology, expertise, trained labour force in support of 
a rapid economic or industrial and military build-up. 
During that time, especially in the revised Fifth Develop-
ment Plan, the state machinery and administrative bodies 
started to improve the administrative efficiency, infra-
structural capacity and social services. 
(B) Policies Around Economic Growth Rather Than 
Economic Developient : 
Both the domestic and foreign private 
participation were encouraged in the expansion of 
capitalist-oriented economy of the country, particularly 
in the industrial sector and for more social equity under 
the Fifth Flan. But Shah's policy remained largely 
centralized and aimed largely at economic growth rather 
than economic development as it is evident from the Fifth 
Amin Saikal, The Rise and the Fall of the Shah, 
1980, Princeton University Press, p^ WJT 
171 
Plan that social services sector such as education 
remained on low priority. About 21 per cent of the total 
government allocation was given to social affairs' as 
against about 34 and 31.5 per cent for economic and 
defence affairs respectively. However, the Shah could 
not afford a more decentralized policy of economic 
development because of the nature of his ideology and 
rule. Therefore, he was limited to his socio-political 
reforms such as redistribution of wealth. Though a 
number of his advisors warned him that such reforms are 
basic to a successful and efficient implementation of his 
2 
economic, industrial and military plans. 
It was realised suddenly that it is beyond the 
capacity of Iran to fulfil the overall policies of Shah, 
i.e. accelerated economic, industrial and military 
build-up at the rate Shah envisaged. At the end of 1975, 
just after two years of high government expenditure, 
heavy importation of advanced industrial and military 
capital goods and increased foreign investment (by multi-
national corporations in capital intensive industries such 
as petrochemicals and rubber), the country was confronted 
with a serious scarcity of trained manpower and abundance 
2. Ibid., p. 183. 
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of technological, infrastructural and administrative 
bottlenecks as well as high inflation, a drop in 
agricultural output and socio-economic imbalances. Side 
by side a high level of corruption at government and non-
government levels increased in Iran with huge influx of 
money in the economy. A rural to urban migration also 
created a problem and changed the socio-economic struc-
ture of the country. The rural population started 
migrating to the cities, consequently the production from 
the rural areas decreased steadily in relation to its 
rising national consumption in general and quality 
consumption in the urban centres in particular. On one 
hand Iranian cities started facing the problem of 
congestion and acute social problems caused by unplanned 
urbanization and on the other side rural population 
started loosing its incentives to increase or even 
maintain production because of the urban attraction. 
Hence during the period of early 1970's Iran had become a 
net importer of livestock and agricultural goods despite 
the promise of land reform and effective incentives to 
encourage increased agricultural activities. During 1977 
Iran had to spend 10 per cent of its oil income on impor-
Graham, R., When the Dreaming Had to Stop. 
Australian Financial Review, March 5"j 19/6. 
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tation of food. Consequently Iran made an agreement 
with Brazil so that it could export oil for food. During the 
same period the nation could not redistribute its wealth 
equally both in rural and urban areas which resulted in 
the gap of the standard of living between these two socio 
economic strata of population. 
Another major failure of Shah's policy is noticed 
in the non-oil industrial sector of the economy because 
of the slow increase in the output, though Shah stressed 
the importance of non-oil industrial sector economy. It 
is also recorded that a massive investment was started 
both in public and private sectors but a declining trend 
was recorded in this sector of economy. The economic 
growth rate of the non-oil sector declined from 14.5 per 
cent in 1976-77 to 9.4 per cent in 1977-78.° In terms of 
export - import relations, non-oil exports fell from 22 
per cent of imports in 1959 to 5 per cent in 1975-76. 
In spite of the development of modern industries such as 
4. Economist, August 28, 1976, p. 43. 
5. Kayhan International, December 4, 1976. 
6. Joseph, R., Despite Oil Riches, Iran's Economy 
Faces a Slowdown, Canberra Times, Feb. 8, 
1978. 
7. Hallinday, F., The Major Obstacle on the Road to 
Democracy in Iran, Cambridge Times, July 30, 
vrrr.— 
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petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, electric 
appliances, automobiles and transport and metallurgical 
industries, the tradtional industries led by textiles, 
carpets and food packaging remained one of the major non-
oil exorts items and absorbed most of the country's labour 
force. It is because of the modern industries were 
relatively capital-intensive with multinational Corpo-
rations having major shares in them and the multi-
nationals were interested only in those sectors of 
production which were more beneficial to them. 
Regarding the Shah's efforts to build up Iran's 
military capability, it was also responsible for the slow 
progress and discouraging position of the nonoil sector. 
He justified his policy on two major grounds; 
(1) he argued the military build up, apart from safe-
guarding Iran's sovereignty, stability, security, 
oil wealth, and economic development, necessarily 
complemented the country's economic development in 
acquiring trained manpower, technology, know-how 
and basic infrastructure (post and storage 
facilities, roads rail networks etc.). 
(ii) he argued the high defence expenditure had not 
restrained Iran's economic development, simply 
because the civilian sector of the economy could 
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not absorb what was being spent on the defense 
build up. 
These, however, were the very grounds on which the 
defense exopenditures proved particularly costly to 
Iranian economic development. The Shah was attempting to 
create an extremely modern military establishment in a 
country lacking in the technical, educational and 
industrial and infrastructural base to provide the 
necessary trained personnel and management capabilities to 
operate such an establishment effectively. As a result, 
the military sector, instead of helping the economic 
sector, became locked in a serious competition with the 
latter to attract and trained the limited number of highly 
skilled people and to acquire access to the country's 
limited scientific and technological skills and infra-
structural facilities for itself. 
Among the major problems the rising inflation in 
Iran was noticed because of the high military expenditure, 
i.e. about 30 per cent in 1976-77. The military 
expenditure was funded at the cost of more rapid develop-
ment of the social sector which was more essential for the 
economic development of the country. During this period 
8. U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p. VIII. 
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a majority of the population was still illiterate and 
acute socio-economic inequalities particularly in rural 
areas were still major problems. This was attributed 
largely to the low government investment in education and 
the poor educational system. An official Iranian report 
stated in the year 1976 that in the last seven years, 
some 3.3 per cent of GNP and 6 per cent of the national 
budget have been devoted to education, while on an average 
the developed countries spent 7 per cent of GNP and 25 
per cent of their annual budgets on education. Thus, 
Iran, education could have enjoyed a higher priority 
because of the poor educational management which is 
lacking the desirable levels of technical, administrative 
and executive skills and its failure to create the right 
conditions for the development of other sectors of 
development. Therefore, education was considered as a 
major reasons for the lack of rapid improvement in Iran's 
trained manpower and socio-cultural conditions so 
necessary for the execution of the Shah's industrial and 
military programs. 
If it is regarded that the military sector was 
very successful in meeting its objectives but it was also 
very limited in considering the massive investments 
because till 1978 many of the Shah's defense programs was 
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under serious difficulties and problems. It was because 
of the lack of sufficient progress in the economic 
(industrial) and social sectors. It is evident from a 
U.S. Congressional Staff Report of July 1976 that in 
implementing the Shah's military programs, Iran lacked 
not only the necessary technical, educational and 
industrial base but also the needed experience in logistic 
and support operations and does not have the maintenance 
capabilities, the infrastructure and the construction 
capabilities to implement its new programs independent of 
outside support. Moreover, it was felt by most of the 
observers that Iran will not be able to absorb and 
operate within the next five to ten years a large 
proportion of the sophisticated military systems purchased 
from the U.S. unless increasing numbers of American 
personnel go to Iran in a support capacity. This support 
alone may not be sufficient to gaurantee success for the 
Iranian. program. All these factors are related to the 
serious doubts on the Shah's claim that, as a result of 
his massive military build-up, Iran had already achieved 
a military deterrent capability against what he perceived 
as direct and indirect threats from the Soviet Union and 
other radical forces of the region and that, conse-
quently, the country was marching firmly toward becoming a 
world military power by the second half of the 1980's. 
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It was observed by the year 1977 that the country 
was under the grip of numerous problems and largely the 
general economic and social situation was very critical, 
i.e., widespread inflation, increasing corruption at all 
levels (even some members of the royal family) and the top 
government officials and mounting social and economic 
inequalities that were widening the gap not only between 
country and city people but also between the privileged 
9 
and wealthy minority and the unprivileged poor majority. 
Although no reliable official information and statistics 
are available, by unofficial estimates a large elite of 
about 15 to 20 per cent of the population who benefited 
most from the oil wealth, the Shah's policies and their 
consequent opportunities, and who formed the upper social 
strata, led an amazingly lavish and extravagant Western 
life style. The remainder, who made up the lower social 
strata, lived largely in improvished conditions, envious 
of those with wealth, but struggling to improve their own 
social conditions and fulfil their rising expectations in 
whatever way possible. While the poor because restless 
with the lack of social opportunities and the growing 
9. Vakil, F., Iran's Basic Macro economic Problems, 
M.H., Income Distribution and its Major 
Determinants in Irari^  p.5. 
10. Saikal, A., The Rise and the Fall of the Shah, 
Princeton University Press, 1980, p.187. 
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shortages and high cost of their basic needs, including 
food and housing, a majority of the rich felt 
increasingly frustrated with the overcrowding and 
industrialization and congestion of the cities. This was 
in the face of an imminent slow-down in the general level 
of economic activity, and the fact that oil income was 
proving insufficient to finance the government's lavish 
spending, particularly as the Shah was not prepared to 
moderate his costly military program. The increasing 
unrest against the background of the people's growing 
expectations, caused the Shah not only to seek foreign 
loans but forced to change the cabinet. Shah was 
convinced that in the previous few years, Iran's high 
economic growth, which was directed by his own policies, 
12 had caused 'dislocations and backlash'. 
After realising the shortcomings of the existing 
administrative machineries. Shah replaced the prime 
minister by another minister in the year 1977. It was 
promised during the change of the minister that Inflation 
and corruption will be minimised and a necessary measure 
will be adopted to achieve more social equity and justice 
11. Canberra Times, January 17, 1977; Pace, E., Iran, 
Despite Her Oil Wealth, I.S. Borrowing on a 
Grand Scale, New York Times, Aug. 15, 1975. 
12. Kayhan International, January 21, 1978. 
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in order to bring more social and economic development in 
the interest of all Iranians, particularly the poor and 
unprivileged. He called on the Iranians to give up their 
'luxurious and idle living ' in order to save oil wealth 
13 for the sake of better future. Iranian government took 
a thorough review of Iran's Sixth Five-Year Development 
Plan for 1978-1983 which was considered a turning point 
in Iran's national development. During this time a high 
level Iranian planner revealed in 1976 that the Shah had 
been warned that unless the government succeeded in 
curing Iran's socio-economic ills under the Sixth Plan 
the country may face a very difficult situation. It was 
also realised that these social and economic problems can 
not be cured because of the Iran's chronically frail 
domestic political structure, i.e. to cope with the 
capitalist-oriented social and economic changes. But the 
Shah's policy later on failed to such an extent that even 
the economy of the country collapsed because export of oil 
became nill. The economic crisis in the country caused a 
large number of Iranians to leave the country and by the 
end of 1978 the demand for the removal of Shah started. 
13. The Australian, August, 27-28, 1977 
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(C) Failure of Domestic Policies and 
Regional Policies : 
The Shah's largely remained unsuccessful In his 
regional policies because of the failures of the domestic 
policies. A large number of factors are identified for 
such a situation, i.e., because of the traditional 
cultural, religious and political differences with the 
Gulf countries, but also the nature of his policies were 
not applicable in all the countries of the region. His 
rapid build-up of Iranian resource capabilities and his 
search for regional stability and support for Iran's 
position as a paramount regional power had caused several 
developments contrary to his objectives: 
(1) In this regard a large number of Gulf 
countries were not ready in criticizing the Shah's 
policies openly, they were very worried about his 
ambitious in the establishment of Iranian economic and 
military dominance in the region. Hence, most of the 
regional countries agreed to the Gulf policies of Shah and 
made use of his economic and military offers for their 
own country's development and security. But side by side 
the disagreed with the proposals and policies concerning 
the formation of a regional common market and Persian Gulf 
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collective security. As a result this was a serious blow 
for the Shah's objectives of establishing a regional 
structure in which Iran would hold the type of regional 
power he visualized. 
(2) The Shah's policies in the region aimed basically 
to strengthen Iran's relations with the conservative and 
moderate states of the region but some of the countries 
contradicted very actively against the objective of 
Iran's regional supremacy and hence they worked 
intensively to increase their own resources, particularly 
military capabilities in order to counter-balance the 
Iranian military buildup. First of all Saudi Arabia took 
the initiative to counter the situation. On the basis of 
Saudi Oil Wealth and consequent political leverage, the 
country's leadership had little difficulties in 
attracting Western support not only for building up its 
armed forces and equipping them with the most advanced 
nonnuclear weapons in the Western inventory. The other 
smaller but oil-rich Gulf states, led by Kuwait, followed 
the Iranian and Saudi examples and build-up their defence 
capabilities , this provided justification for such 
radical countries as Iraq and the Peoples Democratic 
14. The Saudi purchasing of sixty F.15 fighters, 
approved by the U.S. Congress in May 1978. 
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of Yemen to increase their defence expenditures in order 
to guard themselves against possible consequences of the 
Iranian military build-up. Consequently, the Shah's 
military policies played an important role in precipi-
tating an intensive local arms race in the Gulf region. 
As a result a competitive arms build up at the cost of 
socio-economic development and political reforms could 
easily lead to instability and insecurity as well as 
interference by outside powers, rather than to the 
reverse, which was what the Shah claimed to be pursuing. 
However, because of the fear of Iranian policies 
and the fear of possible Iranian regional hegemony were 
apparently a major criteria and considerations in the 
Saudi's continuous attempts during the year 1974, to 
influence OPEC politics against the interest of Iran. 
The Shah realized the need of more oil revenue in order 
to keep up the momentum of his ambitious economic and 
military programs and was therefore keenly interested to 
increase the oil price, which needed to be undertaken 
through OPEC. At that time Saudi Arabia was the most 
important and leading OPEC oil producer with the largest 
oil reserves did not like to increase the oil price and 
oil income, for its rate of earning was already more than 
sufficient to finance its extensive programs of national 
development and defense requirements. Saudi Arabia was 
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enjoying the advantageous position in OPEC, and sought to 
keep the primary source paramountcy (oil revenue) in 
check by striving either to freeze or keep as low as 
possible further oil price increases. During the period 
1975-76 Saudi Arabia resisted for not to increase the oil 
prices. At the OPEC Conference of 1976 when Iran took 
the lead for a crude price increase by 15 per cent, 
Saudi Arabia firmly opposed such an increase and 
bargained for either no increase or a very small one. 
Lastly, when Iran and most of the other OPEC members 
agreed on a 10 per cent rise from January 1, 1977, with a 
further 5 per cent at mid year, Saudi Arabia joined only 
by the latted Arab Emirates decided to permit only a 5 per 
cent increase in its crude price. The Saudi oil minister 
emphasised and declared that his country was planning to 
increase its output by nearly 20 per cent so that it 
could minimise the influence of the decision by other 
producers to charge higher prices for their oil. For a 
very small span of time, the Saudi Arabia decision 
resulted in the diversion of some of the Iranian 
customers to Saudi Arabia and a substantial drop in the 
country's oil exports. In order to compensate the drop 
and to save the collapsing Iranian economy from running 
short of funds, the Iranian cabinet agreed immediately to 
15. Camberre Times, January 15, 1977; The Australian, 
January 8, 1977. 
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raise about US Dollar 500 million in loans from American 
16 
and European banks. Consequently, it influenced the 
Shah's economic and military build-up as well as his 
regional behaviour in his search for regional supremacy. 
However, a clear cut rift between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
started and affected and proved to be a very damaging to 
the Shah's efforts and ambitious to achieve his national 
and regional objectives. 
The overambitious objectives of Shah and finan-
cial over-commitment to a number of regional countries 
was another weakness of his policy. It is obvious from 
the period 1974-76 that Iran's growing income from oil 
was the highest of any time and Shah was committed to 
release huge amount in foreign aid and investment to many 
states, particularly to the non-Gulf countries. But Iran 
could not fulfil the promise and consequently Iran lost 
faith with many of the countries as these countries could 
not continue their developmental plans. The declining 
and depressed domestic economy of the country was also 
responsible to extend the aid without a major cutback. 
However, it is evident from the above discussions 
that Shah's domestic and regional achievements appeared 
16. Canberra Times, January 17, 1977. 
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more impressive and ideal one but it could not be 
implemented because of the financial mismanagement and 
declining economy of the country. His policies are 
characterised as overambitious, mismanaged, badly 
coordinated and poor planned and beyond the capacity of 
the country. The military build-up at the domestic front 
took a great toll of economic and social policies which 
achieved little in terms of creating the desired self-
generating non-oil potential for Iran to be viable and 
effective regional and, consequently, world power in its 
own right. In this regard, Iran's gains from its military 
policies were responsible for creating the unrest and 
anxiety and provoked serious reactions, especially to 
Saudi Arabia and the Shah's regional cooperation was 
largely unproductive and uneconomic in term of his 
domestic and regional objective. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
SHAH'S CONCEPT OF REGIONAL POWER 
(DOMINANT GULF POWER) 
(A) Socio-economic programs and development In the 
Region and In Iran (Economic Power). 
(B) Military objectives and programs at national and 
Regional level. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
SHAH'S CONCEPT OF REGIONAL POWER 
(DOMINANT GULF POWER) 
Iran succeeded in emerging as the dominant 
'regional power' and 'regional supremacy' in the Gulf by 
the end of 1971 in spite of the fact that there were seven 
oil-producing Arab states in the same region characterised 
as economically well affluent to counter with Iran. Iran's 
policy in the seventies was the result of the logical 
continuity of its earlier policies. Components like the 
need to control the life-time of Iran to protect its oil 
wealth, to ensure the systematic continuity by opposing 
radicalism and insurgency in and around the Gulf, and to 
remain the dominant power in the region not only influenced 
her policy vis-a-vis the Gulf in the fifties and the 
sixties but also provided justifications and legitimacy 
for its policy in the seventies. It is evident that Iran's 
attempt for regional supremacy started firstly with the 
Strait of Hormuz (Oman) because of its high strategic 
location as if the Strait of Hormuz is closed the effect 
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of it on other Arab countries will be quite meaningful and 
useful to the state of Iran secondly, in the Arabian sea 
(South Asia and Bab-al-Mandeb region) and finally in the 
Indian ocean was, in essence, the logical result of her 
Gulf policy. 
Iran faced the threat from Arabism, radicalism, 
insurgency and the question of the security of the sea 
lanes as the justification for its policies. Similar type 
of problem, in seventies also, was raised by Iran with the 
same old arguments, i.e. the threat from Arabism, 
radicalism, insurgency and security of the sea-lanes. In 
addition, it also used the shifting international 
environment not only to justify its policy but also to seek 
international support for the same. 
During the period 1971-73 the Iranian regime 
propounded thesis of 'encirclement'. It was suggested and 
argued that Iran was being surrounded on all sides by a 
combination of interlocking forces which are hostile to 
Iran. The threat was projected from Afghanistan, 
Baluchistan, India, Dhofar, Iraq and above all from the 
USSR, that was present not only in the north but also in 
the Indian ocean. It was also argued that Iran was 
surrounded by hostile forces controlled by the USSR. The 
thesis gave Iran an excellent justification to follow an 
'aggressive' political and military policy in Oman, and a 
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tough policy vis-a-vis India and Iraq. It also justified 
Iran's arms acquisition policy as well as energy crisis. 
Experts of USA suddenly discovered that the USA would be 
more and more dependent on Gulf oil in the second half of 
the seventies and in the eighties. It was logically 
argued since the USA could not rely totally upon the Arab 
oil-producing states because of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and problem, Iran was the best bet to ensure a steady 
supply of oil to ward off the energy crisis. Hence, the 
so-called energy crisis enabled Iran to get the full 
backing of the U.S.A. Thus Iran and Israel emerged as the 
two reliable supporters of the USA in this region worthy of 
full political, economic and military support. 
During the period of October 1973 various types of 
political development started taking into account the use 
of oil as a political weapon by the Arabs, and also the 
price -hike of oil. The prevailing situation of October 
1973 strengthened Iran's position but also offered Iran 
sufficient petro-dollars to think in terms of developing a 
really independent foreign and military policy by using 
the huge petro-dollars as the new bargaining point. No 
doubt, Iran was benefitted from the October war for some-
time but the international environment, however, began to 
change after 1975 and Iran began to face difficulties. But 
the five year period, 1970-75 was the most important 
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period In Iran's foreign policy because it was during that 
period that it reached the peak of its political, economic 
and military ambitious which is being largely discussed in 
the following manner: 
(A) Socio Economic Prograums and Objectives 
(Economic Power) 
The perception of Iran as regional power is very 
complex in view of its need to maintain stability and 
security in a changing and insecure world. The Shah's 
concept of regional power is to transform the country into 
a strong, prosperous and stable monarchical state with the 
ability to fulfil two major functions : 
(1) to guard and influence its region (specially the 
Gulf region) according to its own political and 
economic interests, 
(2) and to regulate and conduct its relations parti-
cularly with its neighbours from a position of 
strength. 
The Shah considered that there must be a political, 
economic and social democracy in Iran with independent 
national foreign policy, with maximum regional security and 
stability. The Shah set the early 1980's as the probable 
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date for achieving this goal but after few years he set the 
probable date upto the end of the century. The emergence 
of Iran as a regional power had to be based mainly on his 
own firm national leadership on the basis of Iranian oil 
potentials, economic and military power. In order to 
fulfil these objectives he realised that the civilian 
sectors should be developed by providing the technology, 
know-how, expertise and economic infrastructure on the one 
hand, and the military sector in order to safeguard the 
oil potential which is the backbone of Iran's development 
against disorder, aggression and subversion, on the other. 
It is because of the weakness of Iran in these respects 
that during the early period of Shah's rule the country 
had a low regional standing and credltlbillty and was 
prove to regional pressures particularly from the radical 
Arabs forces. 
For several reasons the Shah realised that the 
Gulf region is very vital for Iran and also may be a 
source of trouble in coming future. The Persian Gulf 
waterway was considered as a strategic outlet to 
International water. It is through this waterways that 
over more than 90 per cent of Iranian oil is being 
transported and about 60 per cent of the country's non-
oil trade are handled. In spite of this a number of 
mineral resources are found in the Gulf water, therefore, 
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like other coastal countries, Iran is also very eager to 
have a reasonable share in the Gulf water. After this 
economic significance the strategic Importance of the 
Gulf is very important because of its central location 
in Asia, Africa and Europe for trade purposes and 
political interference. It is because of this the major 
powers use to interfere politically and economically in 
this region especially since World War II. The region 
was also under serious internal tensions and conflicts 
because of the outside interference and infiltration 
but in most cases because of the differences between the 
political units of the Gulf region. 
The differences, mainly political, is caused by 
the various groups, i.e.. The Persians and the Arabs. 
These two groups are distinct from one another on 
ethnic, cultural, historical and even religious bases as 
well as the territorial disputes and claims have been 
the major factor in separating them from each other. 
Some of the major sources of disputes, claims and 
counter claims are evident from the island of Bahrain and 
the strategically important Shatt-al-Arab waterways 
between Iran and Iraq. The dispute over Bahrain has 
constrained Iran's relations with most of the Arab 
World. Even the Gulf was named and being called as 
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'Arabian Gulf by the Arab Gulf states and 'Persian Gulf 
by the Iranians. Similarly, Iranian-Iraqi differences 
increased after 1968 when the pro-Moscow B'ath party 
rose to power. The Shah visualized this as a major 
change in the regional status quo, and as threatening to 
Iranian security and stability. As a result Iran 
supported financially and extended military support to 
Kurdish secessionist movement in Iraq and Iraq increased 
its support for the anti-Shah groups. This led to open 
conflict between the two sides and a full-scale Irani-
Iraqi war was avoided but relations between the two 
countries continued tense until the early part of the 
1970's. 
In order to achieve these regional (Gulf 
countries) objectives and sustain Iran's positions of 
leadership, the Shah resolved that Iran should achieve 
the necei^ sary power, i.e. military and economic power. 
As the ability and efficiency of a country to 
operate successfully in any region depends on the 
various types of resources such as political, social, 
human and economic as well as military potential. 
Knott, K., Military Power and Potential, 
Lexington Mass: Health, 1970 and Power and 
Wealth: The Political Economy of Inter 
national Powef^ London, Macmillan, 1973. 
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During the period early 1970's Shah's enormous petro-
dollar wealth was responsible for the emergence of Iran 
as a regional power as well as a great source of regional 
bargaining power and engaged Iran in intensive resources 
diplomacy in the region such as : 
(A) to tradeoff the Iranian oil and surplus petro-
dollars for the best and even for the scarce, 
capital goods, expertise, technology, skilled man 
power and arms. 
(B) to see Iranian products in suitable markets and 
on favourable terms 
(C) to give aid and invest in countries that were 
useful in helping him to promote his national and 
regional goals 
(D) whenever, necessary, to buy off relevant and 
influential individuals, companies, institutions, 
organisations and governments around the world. 
(E) and to promote his own leadership both at 
national and international levels. 
Therefore, in this regard, the Shah attempted and 
increased the Iranian economic and military potential 
and resolved that Iran must achieve a maximum degree of 
non-oil-based economic industrialization and military 
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sophisticated technolology within next two decades. The 
Fourth Economic Development Plan proved very effective 
till 1973 which stabilized the Iranian economy and 
developed a modern industrial infra-structure. Till 
1971 also Iran claimed as one of the highest rates of 
economic growth in the world and one of the highly 
industrialized state in comparison to other neighbouring 
countries of the Gulf. But the agricultural sector 
recorded a decline as against the target in the Fourth 
Development Plans. The production of foodstuffs, tobacco 
and cotton also declined and importation of these items 
started though the Iran was self-sufficient during this 
period. This was largely responsible because of the 
decline in agricultural labour force due to the higher 
remuneration in many other sectors of economy and rural 
to urban migration. As a result agricultural exports 
and imports registered a very disbalanced growth rates 
of 4.2 and 60.9 per cent respectively. It was because of 
the government policies and priority to industrial 
development over agriculture. 
However, the fall in the rate of growth in 
foreign trade was largely due to a slower growth in 
imports, because a number of projects requiring capital 
goods had already been completed. The emerging trend was 
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clearly in favour of Iran's growing trade with the 
regional countries. 
A considerable growth was recorded in social 
services sectors (education, health and welfare) but not 
as high as in other sectors of economy; it was because of 
the lower priority given to this sector. The government 
also claimed a great improvement in the field of health 
but only in the urban centres and central province. But 
because of the administrative incompetence and corrup-
tion some of the plans were not very successful as 
expected such as welfare measures. It is evident that 
Shah's economic policy aimed mainly at economic growth 
rather than economic development as in economic 
development it requires comprehensive political and 
social changes and equity in the distribution of national 
wealth, provide maximum public welfare and control the 
effects of inflationary tendencies, establish access to 
the latest scientific and technical achievements for the 
advancement of Iran's technological standard as rapidly 
as possible, as well as bringing about effective 
participation of research institutes and studies 
necessary industrial and agricultural growth. Moreover, 
the Shah stressed that the plan placed emphasis on 
"Cooperation with other countries" for investment and 
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activities, expansion of the economy on the basis of the 
mutual interests for reasons of both political and 
economic and the emphasis was not only to bring economic 
growth but economic development. 
At national level it was the intention of the 
'Plan' to diversify Iran's economic development and 
industrialization from their heavy dependence on the 
Iranian oil resources to becoming more self-dependent 
self-generating and independent of oil. For its 
successful implementation, Iran had neither the necessary 
capital goods nor the trained manpower, expertise, 
technological and scientific know-how and infra-
structural facilities. As a result, its implementation 
was foresees to require heavy importation. 
The basic objective of Shah's policy of starting 
this plan was to strengthen Iran's position as an 
economic power as well as a military power. The Shah 
believed that each one objectives is related to each 
other. He stated in view of the regional (Gulf) and 
international problems, the strengthening and 
consolidation of the country's defence power will enjoy 
special priority in the plan, so that it should act as 
the main factor in safeguarding the country's stability 
and independence, maintaining the precious fruits of 
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development (economic and social) and securing Iran, as 
before, as an area of peace and reliance in today's 
2 
turbulent world". 
MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS 
The military power of Iran and objectives to 
build the military power may be discussed in terms of 
internal and regional (Gulf States) purposes. Its 
functions, potential and military reputation can affect 
the national interests as well as the interests of 
regional countries. The military can fulfil a variety 
of significant inter-related functions both at national 
and regional level. It plays a central role in the 
shaping and conduct of national politics and provides 
effective power base and instrument of coercion and 
policy implementation as well as acting as a deterrent 
against external threats and infiltration. 
Therefore, the Shah was well convinced and 
determined to expand, reorganise and modernize the 
military as much as possible so that it could perform 
its functions more effectively and successfully. During 
1960's he transformed the armed forces into a well 
2. The Shah's speech, BBCSWB, August 13, 197A, 
ME/W788. 
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equipped modern army. Most of these arms have been 
supplied by the United States. Even though the Iranian 
army was not well equipped as compared to Soviet Russia 
or Iran and even Iraq was having more number of combat 
aircraft. However, the Iranian Army was an effective 
driving force behind the Shah's autocratic rule, on one 
hand, and his domestic policy of socio-economic reform, 
on the other; and It was strong enough to aid the Shah 
In promoting Iran as the most logical and capable 
successor to Britain In the Gulf. 
On the basis of existing capability of Army the 
Shah used his army In a number of Military actions such 
as : 
(a) Military aid to train Kurdish secessionists 
against Iraq particularly In the late 1960*s 
(b) Support for Pakistan during Indo-PaklstanlWar In 
1965, 
(c) Support for North Yemen and aid the Sana's 
government against the Peoples Democratic 
Republic of Yemen. 
(d) Military take-over of the strategic Islands of 
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs In 
the Persian Gulf. 
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The progress of Iran in the fields of economic 
growth, productivity, industrialization technological 
and scientific advancement as well as foreign trade and 
capital holdings abroad and political and administrative 
capabilities (efficiency) was very modest till 1972 but 
military progress was not well developed or affected by 
these development. After 1973, with the increase of GNP, 
the military capability and its efficiency increased and 
also US aid helped Iran in building the military. He 
developed the military capability and expertise after 
the oil achievements in the early 1970's. The develop-
ment of the economic-military potential in Iran was 
responsible to safeguard the domestic and regional 
capabilities and security. However, it is quite evident 
that with the expanding investment expenditures for 
economic development and heavy industrialization, the 
Shah embarked on a massive military build up which was 
rare in the history of less developed countries. 
During the year 1974 when Iranian oil income was 
the highest, the Shah immediately increased the defence 
budget by 27 per cent for the purposes to minimise the 
possible hostile operations mainly in the Gulf, however, 
3. Knott, K., Power and Wealth, The Political 
Economy of International Power, London, 
MacMillan, 1973. 
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this period is regarded as the turning point in the 
Shah's drive for military build up. In this year Shah 
declared that at present Iran has a certainmilitary 
potential ... to the extent that no one has managed to 
trifle with us in spite of a number of regional (Gulf) 
hostilities against Iran and within the next four five 
years Iran's armed forces will be such that no one had 
better entertain any evil thoughts about Iran 
Obviously, to have weapons and an army is not something 
which can be had free of charge, but thank God, today we 
can afford to purchase as many of the best weapons in 
the world as we can absorb, without any favour from 
anybody, for we pay cash. Of course, we are grateful 
that the producer provides us with the best weapons. 
However, the defense sector was given an equal 
status like economic sector in the final fifth Economic 
Development Plan and during the first four years of the 
Plan the defense sector consumed on an average of 27 to 
29 per cent of the government budget. In the year 1978 
4. Jacqz, Iran: Past, Present and Future, p. 98. 
Rustow and Mugno, OPEC: Success and Pros-
pects, p. 131. 
5. BBCSWB, August 3, 1974, ME/4668. 
6. Knott, K., Power and Wealth, The Political 
Economy of the International Power, London, 
Macmilian, ITTT. 
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Iran invested Che highest amount in military affairs and 
became the largest purchaser of the arms in the world, 
mostly after the year 1974 Iran entered in the 
International market to buy arms at a large scale. All 
means were adopted to keep secrecy in the arms purchase 
but according to the outside sources it is evident that 
Iran invested about 15 billion US Dollar between 
1973-77.'' In 1977 Iran was the world's largest 
purchaser of US arms which was about half of the total 
arms sale of the United States to the foreign 
countries. Both defensive and offensive and 
sophisticated weapons were procured by Iran for all the 
branches of army. a large number of arms were also 
purchased from Soviet Union in the year 1976. Most of 
the arms were not available to Iran till 1978 but it 
was expected to avoid them till mid 1980's. 
During the period of heavy arms purchases Shah 
was very eager to develop Iran's own arms industry but 
by the late 1970s the country was only able to produce 
pistols and machine guns, hence the government under-
7. U.S. Military Sales to Iran, pp. 16, 21, 27, 
SIPRI Yearbook, 1977. 
8. Strategic Survey, 1977, London, IISS, 1978, p.106 
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taken a number of programs to produce such small arms. 
After 1974 Iran was engaged in several agreements with 
the United States and Britain to assemble various types 
of armed helicopters. But the country's success in this 
field was limited like many other military and economic 
fields because of the lack of non-oil economic, 
industrial base, sufficient trained manpower and 
scientific technological know-how and infra-structural 
capacity. 
Because of the large military power after the 
efforts of the Shah, it was being regarded as the 
dominant military power in the Persian Gulf or the 
9 
country was being regarded as the regional super powr. 
In this regard military strength had become a major 
source behind Shah's aims both internally and in the 
Gulf region. The regional countries and the world as a 
whole was well aware of the military strength of Shah 
but only upto the level of to guard themselves against 
any regional countries of the Gulf. 
For peaceful purposes in the region, the Shah 
wanted to establish about 20 nuclear reactors with the 
help of United States, France and West Germany. Infact 
9. U.S. Arms Sales to Iran, p. VIII, 1977 
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the Shah wanted the Persian Gulf to be declared as "zone 
of peace". Hence the policy of Shah to build-up the 
military power either nuclear or non-nuclear was 
concentrated only for the following purposes : 
(I) to guard the Iranian economic development in the 
field of industrialization with the help of 
sophisticated technology and external influence 
should be minimised in the region. 
(II) to maintain the regional security against the 
forces of disruption and sabotage in the region 
(iii) to influence and possibly control developments 
and events in the politically Volatile areas of 
the Persian Gulf and Iran's eastern flank. 
(iv) and to enforce the traditional prestige of the 
Shah as the "King of the Kings" 
(v) and of Iran as a country that was once a mighty 
imperial power in its own right. 
10. Kayhan International, Shah's Interview, January 
TTl 1976; CFcember 18, 1976, March 26, 
1977; Amir Abbas Hoveida's Speech, Kayhan 
International, March 18, 1976. In 1972 
Shah declared that given the danger of 
smaller countries, if not the superpowers, 
...we have adopted what we call our 
independent foreign policy and first of all 
we are counting on ourselves and then on 
our friends and it is very good for us to 
have friends. We are searching in 
addition, to find good friends. 
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Thus by the end of 1971 the British were legally, 
and also in fact, out of the Gulf and Iran had emerged as 
the dominant Gulf power. It had attained its objectives 
in the Gulf. It publicly proclaimed its legitimate 
claims as the dominant Gulf power and it was declared 
that Iran was strong enough to deal with any trouble in 
the region. It was also justified that the Arabs should 
not worry about it by its arms acquisition policy. The 
stronger we are the better for the Arabs. 
11. Kayham International, 20 November, 1971. 
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CHAPraR - VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The present work entitled "Mohammad Reza Shah's 
Policy Towards the Gulf During the 1970*s" has attempted 
to analyse the Iran's policy towards the Gulf during the 
period 1970*s. The present work is divided into seven 
chapters with large number of important and relevant sub-
sections of each chapters. No doubt the present work 
embodies a very vast and complex field but some of the 
relevant and important aspects of the problem has been 
covered otherwise it would have been very difficult to 
synthesize and integrate all the aspects for a particular 
results. Most of the important and direct events have been 
taken into account which have a direct implications on this 
problem. 
It is evident from the present study which has 
largely discussed the problems of internal security, 
regional (Gulf) policies as well as external policies (with 
all the hostile countries surrounding the Iran) that it was 
the earnest desire of Shah to attain the dominant Gulf 
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power. Even his policies with USA and USSR was directly 
related with this desire, i,e., to achieve the supremacy in 
the Gulf region. It was also a noted fact that during the 
period 1970-75 which is characterised as the most important 
period for Iran to achieve the peak of its political, 
economic and military ambitions and among the various 
factors responsible oil economy is held responsible for the 
success of Iran in all these directions. 
The present work is divided into a number of chapters 
and sub-sections relevant to the main issue of the problem. 
A historical background of the Iranian policies towards 
the Gulf is discussed at length because it is not possible 
to understand the present without understanding the past. 
It is also evident from the analysis of fifties to 
seventies that the major thrust of the Shah policies 
towards the Gulf was to play a dominant role in the Gulf. 
In order to achieve this goal Shah's regime was very much 
successful in establishing the relationship with the 
hostile neighbouring countries, only to become stronger 
enough in international politics to have an indirect 
influence on the Gulf region. It is evident from the 
historical perspectives and analysis that the goal of 
Shah's policies was the same throughout but the approaches 
to improve the situation differ with the change of time 
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and change of the administrative system. For example 
changes in the power structure of various subsystems 
influence Iran's foreign policy. New power configurations 
in the Persian Gulf after 1968 and in South Asia 
particularly after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and the 
Soviet treaty with India; in Sino-Sovlet and Sino-Amerlcan 
relations, particularly after President Nixon's visit to 
China, and in the Middle East after the Arab-Israel war of 
1967 and particularly the war of 1973 - all exerted 
profound effects on Iran's foreign policy. Few factors 
influence the foreign policy of Iran more profoundly than 
the structure of power in the international system. 
Historically, the Anglo-Russian rivalry constituted the 
single most influential systemic factor in Iran's foreign 
policy. The Soviet-American cold war was the single most 
Important systemic influence in complicating the 
implimentation of Musaddiq's nationalization policy. The 
problems of political modernization Influence Iran's 
foreign policy. Every major foreign policy objective and 
decision of Iran has its domestic counterpart. Political 
stability is the most persistent problem of political 
modernization that interacts with foreign policy objectives 
and actions. 
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It is also evident that Iran's ability to cope more 
effectively with economic development exerted a profound 
influence on its foreign policy beginning in the 1960's. 
The regime's ability to penetrate Iranian society by means 
of both political suppression and economic reforms 
increased Iran's domestic capacity to the point that it 
influenced the rise of its international economic and 
military capabilities. Therefore, it is obvious that 
Iran's modern historical experience reveals that objectives 
of autonomy and authority overshadow other objectives. In 
spite of the spectacular achievements in economic develop-
ment, the problems of identity, legitimacy, distribution, 
participation and penetration complicate Iran's quest for 
optimal freedom of action in the international system and 
especially in the Gulf region. 
In this decade covered (1970's) by this study Iran 
pursued a number of strategy in achieving its foreign 
policy objectives - (1) supremacy in Gulf-power (or third 
power policy, which was continuing since many decades, 
(2) disbalanced equilibrium, (3) positive nationalism, 
(4) and independent national policy. No doubt it is true 
that the presence of great powers on Lranian territory 
placed serious limitations on Iran's freedom of action but 
it is also true that the foreign policy of no nation is 
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completely free from both internal and systemic restraints. 
But even in such a situation Iran managed to extract 
maximum assurances regarding its political independence and 
territorial integrity, as evidenced but its flat denial of 
Iran's prior agreement to an oil concession to the Soviet 
Union. However, Iran was successful and able to acquire 
American diplomatic, advisory, military and economic 
assistance at a time when it was possible that the United 
States might withdraw to its traditional isolationism, 
hence it is a clear indication of the success of its power 
supremacy in the Gulf region as well as with the countries 
hostile and surrounded from all sides such as India, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and USSR. 
In the history of Iran's foreign policy there was a 
widespread social rejection of the demand of USSR's oil 
demand and option for the nationalization of oil saying as 
exploration and exploitation of oil by "Iranian hands". 
Such a policy and principle is known as "negative equili-
brium" in the history of Iranian foreign policy. But such 
a policy of Musaddiq to implement the nationalization 
decision could not become successful because of the inter-
national and domestic conditions such as cold war with USA 
and USSR on the issue of the Middle East. 
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The 'positive nationalisation* strategy of Iran was 
no doubt very successful but it does not mean a blind 
hostility with the Soviet Union and uncritical friendship 
with the United States. For instance the policy of intimi-
dation and ingratiation of Soviet Union was responded by 
both ways from Iran. Similarly, Soviet diplomatic and 
propaganda attacks were resisted during the late fifties. 
But Iran also tried to respond positively Soviet overtures 
of peaceful co-existence from the very inception of the 
strategy of positive nationalism as it is evident from the 
unprecedented agreements with the Soviet Union regarding 
boundary disputes in the late fifties as well as joint 
utilization of boundary rivers and the friendly visit of 
the parliamentarians and Shah to the Soviet Union. 
Secondly, Iran's entry into negotiations with the Soviet 
Union for a Treaty of friendship and Non-aggression was not 
merely a pressure tactic to ensure a satisfactory defense 
agreement with the United States but also a test of Soviet 
gestures of peaceful co-existence and offers of economic 
cooperation. 
Lastly, the strategy of "independent national policy" 
adopted by Shah's regime in the early 1960's was not simply 
a pro-wes':ern posture. This strategy was adopted as a 
result of the combination of a variety of complex domestic 
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and international factors. The principal objectives of 
this strategy were : 
(1) to consolidate the regime's control over the polity 
and launch unprecedented measures of economic reforms 
(2) to explore the possibilities; cooperation with the 
Soviet Union, more independent policy towards the 
United States, more active policy in the Persian 
Gulf. 
The normalization of relations with the Soviet Union was 
primarily economic in character. Cooperation resulted in 
stabilization and expansion of trade relations with the 
Soviet Union. Cooperation with the Soviet Union 
encountered difficulties as it is evident from the trade 
deficit with the Soviet Union which was reduced after some-
time. But it remained to be seen whether the Soviet 
Commitment to "balanced trade" in the 1972 treaty would 
overcome this difficulty. During 1963-73 decade Iran 
continued to resist Soviet pressures. Secondly, the 
specification of conditions of peaceful co-existence with 
the Soviet Union announced during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war 
brought the Nixon Doctrine even closer to Iran's 
independent national strategy. The United States would 
oppose (1) Soviet predominance globally or regionally 
(2) Soviet exploitation or to weaken American alliances 
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(3) Soviet manipulation of relaxation of tensions as a 
'cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble 
spots. Intensification of Iran's alignment with the United 
States was further evidenced by not only the magnitude of 
its purchase of American Arms but also its ability to 
breach the traditional reluctance of the United States 
to provide Iran with sophisticated modern weapons. Iran's 
determination and ability to play the leading role in the 
Persian Gulf, an area of increasing economic and strategic 
significance to the United States and its allies, 
especially in light of the energy crisis, suited the Nixon 
Doctrine's reliance on local powers to protect their own 
as well as American interests without United States 
interference. 
The Iran's independent national strategy during the 
1963-73 decade was its new assertive position in the 
Persian Gulf and neighbouring areas of the Middle East and 
South Asia. By 1968 Iran's primary objectives in the 
Persian Gulf area had crystallized: (1) protection of the 
regime from internal subversive forces-by Arab hostile 
states or groupd or by Soviet proxy (2) preservation of 
free transit through the strait of Hormuz, The Gulf and 
the Shatt^ al-Arab (3) the protection of Iranian oil 
resources and facilities on shore and off against any 
deliberate or accidental disruptions. 
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After and even before the British withdrawal in 1971 
Iran launched towfold strategy (1) strengthening its 
military capability with the help of the United States and 
Britain (2) cultivating friends and allies, not only in 
the Gulf area, but also in the Middle East, South and South 
east Asia as well. Iran managed to cultivate in the Gulf 
area the friendship of all other Gulf states by economic, 
diplomatic and military means. Beyond the Gulf area it 
scrapped a decade enemity with Egypt, resumed diplomatic 
relations with Lebanon, settled historic dispute with 
Afghanistan over the Helmand River, committed its support 
to the integrity of Pakistan in the face of the Baluchi 
separatist movement, extended its security to the Gulf of 
Oman and the Indian ocean and developed economic and 
diplomatic ties with China. It was all to counterbalance 
to Indian and Soviet bids for influence in South Asia, the 
Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. 
The above discussed historical policies and 
objectives of Iran continued largely till late 1970's and 
these policies exerted great influence over the policies 
and programmes of Iran regarding the Gulf region during the 
period of 1970's. Throughout, most of Iran's modern 
history the person of the king has played the key role in 
the making of Iran's foreign policy especially during the 
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period 1970's. The Shah's personal control of Iran's 
foreign policy after the downfall of the Musaddlq 
government became supreme and unchallenged. In foreign 
policy even more than in domestic politics the Shah plays 
the central role. His all-pervasive personal role is 
evidenced in all major decisions, ranging from the oil 
agreement (1954) and his personal agreement with the oil 
companies in the year 1973. 
Iran's Gulf policy is separately discussed with some 
of the major countries of the region such as Iran's - Iraq 
and Iran's Saudi Arabia as these two countries are the 
major, though with different Ideological base, to counter 
with the policies emerging from the Iranian source. It is 
evident from the above discussion that Iraq always used to 
disagree with the Iranian move and propagating against the 
Interest of Iran keeping in view that Iran is a major 
threat in regional politics. A number of incidents have 
been cited in terms of cooperation, either political or 
economic, while Saudi Arabia use to remain as neutral not 
disagreeing directly with Iran but certainly on some of the 
major Issues use to keep side and favour the Iraqi stand. 
But Iran had finally Isolated Iraq in the neighbouring 
areas and even vis-a-vis the super-powers: 
217 
After a brief historical and country-wise analysis, 
the thesis is divided into a number of chapters discussing 
the key issues separately such as : 
(1) Shah's policies towards the internal security. 
(2) Shah's policies towards regional (Gulf) security 
(3) Shah's policies its impact and repercussions in the 
Gulf region 
(4) Failure of Domestic policies and regional policies 
(5) Shah's concept of regional cooperation 
(6) Iran-Arabs relationship and cooperation 
(7) Cooperation with surrounding hostile countries such 
as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India. 
(8) Shah's concept of regional cooperation and subversive 
forces. 
(9) Shah's concept of regional power (Gulf-supremacy and 
dominant Gulf power). 
(a) Socio-economic and development programs in the 
region. 
(b) Military objectives and programs at national 
and regional level. 
International Security and Gulf Policies : 
It is observed that the country's integrity and 
security was in danger during the period 1970's by several 
centrifugal forces operating in Iran because of the 
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prevailing political, economic and social systems. It is 
evident that religion posed a very significant threat to the 
Iranian political system because of its emotional, faith 
and socio-cultural base of the masses. It is also proved 
fact that Iranian religious leaders were very influential 
politically and they were also influential and being 
influenced by the outside forces also. The Ulema acted as 
the main opposition basically on two basic reasons, 
firstly, they opposed the modernization like land reforms 
and franchise to women, both were opposed on religious 
ground because of the violation of the individuality of the 
private property. The opposition of the Ulema took a 
turn of rioting and the market centres became the 
battlegrounds. But it is concluded that riots could not 
achieve a purposeful success because of the fact that 
there was not sufficient coordination between the Ulema 
and the secular nationalist forces in Iran. But the riot 
of 1978 was not purely a religious movement but a mass 
movement. Though the Iranian government was also worried 
and interested to find out the sources of the threat to 
its security from within the country and also from outside 
the country. Lastly, the situation became so worst that 
the government was running under martial law and guns and 
ultimately the guns fell silent and the Shah had to leave, 
probably never to return. The movement of Ulena was 
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supported by the nationalist radical forces, tribalism and 
minorities. The revolution against the regime spread 
throughout the country. Again this move started getting 
support from the external sources and ultimately the regime 
could not be saved. 
Shah Policies Towards the Gulf : 
It is a well established fact that Iran emerged as 
the dominant regional power in the Gulf during the period 
1971, succeeded in policies from all quarters except a few 
Arab radical states like Iraq. It is also evident that 
Iran's policy in the seventies was the result of the 
logical continuity of its earlier policies. 
During the 1975-76 the question of Gulf security was 
being widely discussed. Various ways and means were 
discussed to resolve conflicts in the region and to keep 
the foreign powers out of the Gulf and military 
cooperation among the Gulf states vTas the major issue of 
the discussion in 1975. Iran offered a plan in the year 
1976 for an unified army, navy and airforce under a joint 
command which would be responsible for the defence of the 
member states and the Gulf waters. But Saudi Arabia 
resented the Shah's ambitions in the Gulf and his 
proclamation as the sole protector of the Gulf. 
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It is obvious that Iraq, USSR and even USA were 
responsible for the failure of the Muscat conference which 
was a very serious set back for Iran. It is quite obvious 
that the United States is not especially keen on 
collective security in the Persian Gulf. The USA was also 
criticised for playing the divide and rule policy in the 
Gulf. Iran's attempt for a collective Gulf security pact 
have not succeeded because of the Arabs have a lingering 
distrust of Iran as well as Arabs also resented of the 
"Big Brother" attitude of the Shah or about the 
guardianship of the Gulf. But it is also a fact that 
between 1971-75 Iran managed to attain most of the 
objectives that it had planned much earlier for their own 
benefit. The Iran had managed and consolidated its 
position in the Gulf and successful to expand its 
influence on the Indian ocean littoral of the area, 
especially in Oman. It is also obvious that Shah very 
successfully utilized the international environment not 
only to strengthen its bonds with the pro-western elements 
but also to neutralize the potential threat from the USSR, 
China, India and radical Arabs. It is also a proved fact 
that Iran in the region in the year 1975 was developed as 
a major power in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean 
region. 
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The Iran Gulf policy can not be understood fully 
without analysing the British withdrawal and its repur-
cussions on Gulf politics. Iran never liked that any 
foreign power should enter the region and adopt the policy 
of the British. Because of this attitude Iran emerged as 
the regional dominant power, militarily, politically and 
even economically. Lastly, it is evident from the 
Military policy in the Gulf that its policy was probably 
designed to project an image of Iran as the dominant power 
in the Gulf and Shah said that we are the only country with 
economic and military sophistication necessary to offer 
the area protection. 
During the period 1971-75 most of the Shah's policies 
based on economic and military objectives were implemented 
to a large extent. These implementation was possible 
because of the phenomenal increases in oil revenue. It is 
also obvious from the above discussion that the Shah's 
policies in the Gulf region were concentrated around the 
Iranian economic and military strength emphasizing that 
Iran will act as a powerful and influential country in the 
region. No doubt Iran achieved the capacity to strengthen 
into bargaining power in its regional relations but in 
reality the Shah was not very much successful in a self-
generating industrial and military power. 
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Consequently, these policies and objectives caused 
serious tensions within his own country as well as in the 
Gulf region. It is also obvious that Shah was overambi-
tious in their objectives which were not planned and 
coordinated properly because of the lack of proper 
knowledge of the domestic political structure. In order to 
make his country stronger as compared to other Gulf-
countries he started massive imports of highly advanced 
capital goods such as arms, technology, expertise, trained 
labour force in support of a rapid economic and military 
build up. His policy was largely concentrated in economic 
growth rather than economic development. He was limited 
only to his socio-political reforms such as redistribution 
of wealth. At the end of 1975, just after two years of 
high government expenditure, heavy importation of advanced 
industrial and military capital goods and increased 
foreign investment, the country was confronted with a 
serious scarcity of trained manpower and abundance of 
technological, infra-structural and administrative 
bottlenecks as well as high inflation, a drop in 
agricultural output and socio-economic imbalances which 
changed the socio-economic structure of the country. 
During the same time the nation could not redistribute its 
wealth equally both in rural and urban areas which created 
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a big gap In the standard of living between these two 
socio-economic strata of population. 
The Shah was interested in an extremely modern 
military establishment in a country lacking in the 
technical, educational and industrial and infra-structural 
base to provide the necessary trained personnel and 
management capabilities to operate such an establishment 
ef fecttvx-ly. Ultimately defence expenditures proved 
particularly costly to Iranian economic development. Even 
the military sector was not very successful in considering 
the massive investments and till 1978 many of the Shah's 
defence programs was under serious problems and 
difficulties. As it is evident from the US Congressional 
Staff Report of July 1976 that in implementing the Shah's 
military programs Iran lacked not only the necessary 
technical, educational and industrial base but also the 
needed experience in logistic and support operations and 
does not have the maintenance capabilities, the infra-
structure and the construction capabilities to implement 
its new programs independent of outside support. 
Thus it is obvious that by the year 1977 the country 
was under the grip of numerous problems and largely the 
general economic and social situation was very critical. 
The mounting social and economic inequalities between the 
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rural and urban people but also between priviledged and 
wealthy minority and the unpriviledged poor majority 
created a situation of completely social and political 
unrest. No doubt, the Shah tried his best to improve the 
situation in the Sixth Five Year Development Plan 
(1978-83) which was considered a turning point in Iran's 
national development. During this time a high level 
Iranian planner revealed in 1976 that the Shah had warned 
that unless the government succeeded in curing Iran's 
socio-economic ills under the Sixth Plan the Country may 
face a very difficult situation. But the Shah's policy 
later on failed to such an extent that even the economy of 
the country collapsed because export of oil became nil. 
The economic crisis in the country caused a large number of 
Iranians to leave the country and by the end of 1978 the 
demand for the removal of the Shah started. 
The Shah remained unsuccessful in his regional 
policies because of the failures of the domestic policies. 
It is because of the nature of his policies were not 
applicable in all the Gulf countries as well as these 
countries were extremely worried about his ambitious in the 
establishment of Iranian economic and military dominance in 
the region. But the Gulf countries always disagreed with 
the proposals and policies concerning the formation of a 
common market and Persian Gulf collective security. As a 
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result this was a serious blow to the Shah's objectives of 
establishing a regional structure in which Iran would hold 
the type of regional power he visualized. 
However, it is obvious from the above discussion 
that the Shah's domestic and regional achievements 
appeared more impressive and ideal one but it could not 
be Implemented because of the financial mismanagement; 
policies are overambitious, badly coordinated and poorly 
planned and beyond the capacity of the country. Hence, 
the situation created the unrest and anxiety and provoked 
serious reactions, especially to Saudi Arabia and the 
Shah's regional cooperation was largely unproductive and 
uneconomic in terms of his domestic and regional 
objectives. 
The objective of regional and inter-regional 
cooperation discussed in chapter VI aims at analysing the 
Shah's attempt to attain the regional supremacy and to be 
recognised as an effective regional power but his regional 
policy behaviour in pursuing this goal was another 
coherent or inconsistent. 
It is evident from the analysis of corporation that 
the Shah's effort to strengthen the regional cooperation 
with the Arab states is a most fruitful attempt of Iran in 
generating a cordial relation at regional and inter 
regional level. No doubt his attempt is related to the 
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development of the Gulf region for maintaining peace and 
prosperity. But it largely in the interest of his own 
country as it is also obvious that generally the large size 
countries gain more benefit as compared to the small size 
countries if the cooperation is established between the 
small and large size countries, therefore, it is not true 
to say that the Shah started the move of cooperation for 
his own benefit. But it is obvious from the cooperation 
move with India, Pakistan and Afghanistan that Shah wanted 
a very high image at regional level by cooperating with the 
many surrounding countries as well as to minimise the 
impact of USSR in the region. 
As compared to other countries of the region Iran 
succeeded in emerging as the dominant regional power in the 
Gulf by the end of 1971 in spite of the fact that most of 
the Gulf countries are economically well affluent to 
counter with Iran. For this purpose Iran's policy is 
characterised as logical continuity of its earlier 
policies, i.e. control and protection over the oil-wealth, 
opposing the radicalism and insurgency in and around the 
Gulf and also provided justification and legitimacy for 
its policy in the seventies. It is evident that Iran's 
attempt for regional supremacy started firstly with the 
strait of Hormuz because of its high strategic location. 
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Iran faced the threat from Arabism, radicalism, Insurgency 
and the question of the security of the sea-lands as the 
justification for its policies for achieving the greater 
power and tried her best to seek the international support 
for the same. The USA suddenly discovered that it will be 
more and more dependent on Gulf oil in the second half of 
the seventies and in the eighties. It was logically argued 
that the USA could not rely totally upon the Arab oil-
producing states because of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
Iran will be the best bet to ensure a steady supply of 
oil toward off the energy crisis. Hence the so-called 
energy crisis enabled Iran to get the full backing of the 
USA. Thus Iran and Israel emerged as the two reliable 
supporters of the USA in this region worthy of full 
political, economic and military support. Secondly the 
five year period 1970-75 was the most important period in 
Iran's foreign policy because it was during this period 
that it reached the peak of its political, economic and 
military ambitious and all these helped Iran to achieve 
greater success in achieving the regional supremacy. Iran 
publicly proclaimed its legitimate claims as the dominant 
Gulf power and it was declared that Iran was strong enough 
to deal with any trouble in the region. It was also 
justified that the Arabs should not worry about it by its 
arms acquisition policy. The stronger we are the better 
for the Arabs. 
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